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Sergio Luis Ramirez Mendoza 
 
The crisis of civil-military relations in Mexico during the war 
against drugs: comparative reflections on accountability and 
legal reform in the modern democratic era 
 This research is focused on the current crisis that is taking place between 
Mexico’s civil society and the armed forces in the context of the “war against drugs”. 
In 2006 the federal government initiated a security strategy focused on the 
militarization of the enforcement against organised criminal groups that specialise in 
drug-trafficking. At the same time the number of civilian complaints for human rights 
abuses attributed to military personnel increased exponentially. Ten years later, the 
same policies are in force and the soldiers keep being accused of severe human 
rights violations. The aim of this project is to develop a theoretical framework that 
will provide the elements needed to reform the current Mexican legal frameworks 
and military institutions, in order to improve the relationship between the armed 
forces and civil society. To develop new theory, this research addresses the social 
background of the conflict and analyses contemporary concepts and frameworks 
that shape the topic of civil-military relations both at a domestic and international 
level. Subsequently, the cases of the German post-WWII military institutional 
reforms and the emergency legal regime in Northern Ireland during the 1960s and 
70s are studied and analysed. This provides the elements to do a legal comparison 
with the current Mexican legal codes and institutions. The result produces the theory 
needed to develop reforms that have the potential to shape a new civil-military 
relations paradigm in Mexico. 
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Introduction 
 
Setting the social context of this research 
 The armed forces are currently on the streets of Mexico performing security 
tasks against organised crime groups. Their duties consist in establishing 
checkpoints, chasing and confronting criminal groups that produce, transport and 
sell drugs both to the United States of America and Mexico’s own territory, and uses 
this country as a corridor for other Latin American States. Therefore, a central part 
of the global “war against drugs” security strategy1 is the physical confrontation with 
organised crime,2 which in Mexico adopts the modality of drug cartels. In order to 
confront this threat, ex-president Felipe Calderon took a unilateral decision and 
indefinitely deployed the armed forces inside the country during his administration 
(2006-2012), as the legislative and judicial powers (the other two powers of the 
Mexican State) were not consulted. The current Peña Nieto administration (2012-
2018) has not applied any changes on the security policies. At the same time that 
the army has been deployed on the streets, an alarming rise of complaints for 
human rights abuses has occurred. Violent crimes have escalated and neither the 
civilian security forces nor the armed forces have shown any efficient strategies for 
counter-attacking the powerful organised criminal groups. If the army’s presence 
can be expected to last several more years in Mexican territory, the most coherent 
decision would be to regulate its performance.  
 As the Federal Congress was not consulted to deploy the military on 
domestic territory, no set of public policies that would regulate the army’s actions 
was legislated, because the official announcement was only done through a press 
conference.3 The way in which events have developed clearly shows how the 
                                                          
1 Transform Drug Policy Foundation, “The War on Drugs: Undermining Human Rights” 
(Count the Costs: 50 Years of the War on Drugs 2011) 
<http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Human_rights_briefing.pdf> Accessed 26 
December 2016 
2 S Peltzman, G Fiorentini, The economics of organised crime (Cambridge University Press, 
New York 1995) 3 
3 Official Residence, “Announcement of the Michoacán Joint Operation” (Presidency of the 
Republic 11 December 2006) <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2006/12/anuncio-sobre-
la-operacion-conjunta-michoacan/> accessed 7 May 2016 (All translations on this research 
made by the author, except where stated). In this announcement, the Calderon 
administration uses the terms organised crime and drug cartels interchangeably, so this 
research uses both terms, which refer to the same groups. 
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absence of a legal and well defined framework has caused a broad conflict in the 
relationship between Mexican society and military personnel. Is seems that both the 
government and the National Defence Secretary (the official name of the military 
institution) are determined to carry on indefinitely with the same policy. 
 Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report that detailed the relationship 
between the army and Mexican citizens previously to the current security strategy, 
and included a section dedicated to analysing the situation in 2007 and 2008 after 
the military operatives against organised crime groups started.4 Access to details 
and information about human rights violations is very limited; Amnesty International 
(AI) has established the military’s reluctance to share information about the cases5 
in which military personnel was involved; the Defence Secretary never gave them 
any of the information requested.6 Between 2007 and 2008 HRW documented 
various cases of abuse which involved civilians who had no connections to any drug 
cartel; these cases involved more than 65 persons altogether. The acts committed 
against civilians include torture, rape, manslaughter, enforced disappearance, illegal 
detention, robberies, illegal break-ins in private spaces, threatening and sleep 
deprivation, among others. 
 Although The National Defence Secretary’s has issued a human rights 
framework for the military and aerial force, this policy has not had any impact on the 
number of human rights abuses. To put an example, HRW documented the 
testimony of an under-18 girl who was forced into a helicopter and consequently 
raped and threatened. She stated that a soldier told her “human rights don’t exist, 
we will throw you in the sea and you will be food for the sharks”.7 This illustrates the 
current culture prevailing within the soldiers, where basic human rights are not taken 
                                                          
4 “Uniform Impunity – Mexico’s Misuse of Military Justice to Prosecute Abuses in 
Counternarcotic and Public Security Operations” (Human Rights Watch 2009) 22-3 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico0409web_0.pdf> accessed 15 April 
2011 
5 Amnesty International, Mexico – New reports of human rights violations at the hands of the 
army (Editorial Amnistía Internacional, Madrid 2009) 18 
6 Human Rights Watch (n 4) 20 
7 ibid 39 
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into account, as this case is not an isolated event, but is part of a pattern8 which has 
been a constant on par with the indefinite deployment of the armed forces. 
The current problem found by HRW is the impunity that lies in military courts, 
as they concluded that the necessary standard of independence which is required to 
carry out a proper investigation does not exist when the military prosecute their 
personnel in military courts.9 Although this position changed recently, and now 
military personnel can be judged in civilian courts for cases of human rights abuse 
(this reform is analysed in this research), there is still no legal support that will 
regulate their actions in order to prevent these types of abuses. 
 Since the first months of the start of the current governmental, a series of 
events have taken the spotlight, attracting both the national and international public 
opinion; such incidents have also caught the Human rights defenders attention. 
Human rights organizations had problems to gather most of the information about 
abuse by the armed forces. For one part, the secrecy towards investigations about 
their personnel makes this task highly complicated. On the other hand, most of the 
victims are too intimidated to talk about it and most of them never make an official 
complaint. A civil organization located in the state of Nuevo Leon received 70 
complaints against the army that detailed torture and other issues but only 21 of 
them actually made an official complain.10 In fact, the Mexican government was 
reluctant to release information concerning drug-related violence, even the Trans-
Border Institute had to obtain a lot of data from Reforma newspaper, because there 
was a lack of general information from the official institutions11.The low number of 
official complaints can be understood when there is evidence of the authorities 
failing to conduct proper investigations of alleged killings, which include 
                                                          
8 “Mexico’s Disappeared: The enduring Cost of a Crisis Ignored” (Human Rights Watch 
2013) <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico0409web_0.pdf> accessed 5 
April 2016 
9 Human Rights Watch (n 4) 16-17 
10 Amnesty International, “New informs about human rights violations at the hand of the 
army”, (Amnesty International) 8-9 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library> accessed 8 
September 2011 
11 V. Ríos, D. Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2010”, (Justice in 
Mexico 2011) p. 4. <http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/2011-tbi-
drugviolence4.pdf> accessed 9 March 2011 
12 
 
manipulation of evidence, lack or forensic expertise and institutional 
independence.12 
To show the severity of the current security situation in Mexico, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein declared on the 7th October 
2015 the following, after his visit to Mexico: 
For a country that is not engaged in a conflict, the estimated figures are simply 
staggering: 151,233 people killed between December 2006 and August 2015, 
including thousands of transiting migrants. At least 26,000 people missing, 
many believed to be as a result of enforced disappearances, since 2007. 
Thousands of women and girls are sexually assaulted, or become victims of 
the crime of femicide. And hardly anyone is convicted for the above crimes. 
Part of the violence can be laid at the door of the country’s powerful and 
ruthless organized crime groups, which have been making life a misery for 
people living in several of Mexico’s 32 States. I condemn their actions 
unreservedly. But many enforced disappearances, acts of torture and extra-
judicial killings are alleged to have been carried out by federal, state and 
municipal authorities, including the police and some segments of the army, 
either acting in their own interests or in collusion with organized criminal 
groups.13 
 Commissioner Al Hussein does not justify what makes him establish that 
there is no armed conflict in Mexico, nor does he refer to any study or data at all. 
Chapter II analyses the current security conflict in Mexico with the requirements of 
International Humanitarian Law to establish if an internal armed conflict is taking 
place in Mexico. Regardless of the existence of such a conflict, it should be 
established that this thesis’ goal is to establish mechanisms that would improve 
civil-military relations in Mexico, as sectors of the armed forces, as the 
commissioner himself states, have been committing gross human rights violations. 
The army’s position on the accusations against them  
 The military commands have shown high concern about the absence of a 
legal framework that would regulate their actions. On September 15th of 2011, 
National Defence Secretary Guillermo Galvan Galvan expressed the armed forces’ 
point of view on the murder and assault of innocent citizens in the war against 
                                                          
12 United Nations General Assembly “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions in follow-up to his mission to Mexico” (6 May 2016) 32nd 
session (A/HRC/32/39/Add.2), paras 23-32 
13 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Statement of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, on his visit to Mexico, October 7th, 
2015” (United Nations Human Rights) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16578&LangID=
E> accessed 8 October 2015 
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organised crime, but he also spoke in behalf of the soldiers’ feelings. “We bemoan it 
with the same intensity that we grieve our fallen soldiers, their widows and their 
orphans. We are sensible to mourn as well as the everlasting bed of the crippled 
soldier.”14 Galvan Galvan addressed the urgency of creating a legal framework that 
regulates the armed forces partake in public security tasks and referred to the 
National Security Law which is being discussed in the Federal Congress at this 
moment  
If this extends (the absence of a regulation), confusion and uncertainty among 
commanders and troops and even between society can be generated……..the 
National Security Law will, without a doubt, help to maintain the armed forces 
high moral and solid body spirit.15  
  
The numbers from the Mexican Human Rights National 
Committee 
 These are the recommendations that the Human Rights National Committee 
in Mexico has issued to the National Defence Secretary and the Navy in the last ten 
years. It should be addressed that the governmental security strategy started in the 
last days of December of 2006, but the purpose of including data from 2002 
onwards is to show a correlation between the start of the military operatives and the 
raise in complaints against the armed forces (data taken from the Mexican Human 
Rights National Committee website16): 
2002 0 
2003 3 
2004 4 
2005 4 
2006 1 
2007 7 
2008 16 
                                                          
14 I. Alzaga, “Deaths of soldiers and civilians do hurt” (Milenio 2011) 
<http://www.milenio.com/cdb/doc/impreso/9026650> accessed 19 September 2011 
15 J. Aranda, C. Herrera, “It is urgent to clean up military duties in security tasks, says 
SEDENA” (La Jornada, 15 September 2011) 
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/09/15/politica/002n1pol> accessed 16 September 2011 
16 “Recommendations from 1990 to 2015” (Mexican Human Rights National Commission) 
<http://www.cndh.org.mx/node/32> accessed 8 May 2016 
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2009 31 
2010 28 
2011 29 
2012 21 
2013 9 
2014 1 
2015 1 
 
 It can be seen that he number of complaints for human rights abuses that 
involved members of the armed forces rose at the same time that these were 
deployed as part of Felipe Calderón’s security strategy. We can only imagine how 
many real cases of abuse have taken place, being that Mexican society does not 
have a denouncement culture (recent studies have shown that 67.3% of all offenses 
don’t get denounced17). While the latest reports about human rights abuses by the 
army have been putting them on the centre of controversy in the last years and 
reports about the increase in their brutality have been established,18 the National 
Defence Secretary website states that the number of complaints against the armed 
forces has significantly dropped from 1574 in 2011 to 570 in 2014.19 The secretary 
goes even further and establishes that the Human Rights National Commission has 
issued only four recommendations between 1 December 2012 to 14 May 2015, and 
states that such recommendations were issued for complaints that were started 
before 1 December 2012,20 the day before current president Enrique Peña Nieto 
took office.  
  
A better understanding between two separate visions  
                                                          
17 L. Vargas Casillas, S. García Ramírez, Legislative Proyects and Other Criminal Themes 
(Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas UNAM, Mexico City 2003) 178 
18 J.M. Vivanco, “Letter to Mexico’s Attorney General on Human Rights Crisis” (Human 
Rights Watch ,28 April 2015) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/28/letter-mexicos-
attorney-general-human-rights-crisis> accessed 7 August 2015 
19 “Complaints and Recommendations situation” (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional) 
<http://www.sedena.gob.mx/images/stories/D.H/2015/situacionquejasyrecomendaciones.pdf
> accessed 7 August 2015 
20 ibid 
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 It is essential to find mechanisms that can create a better coexistence 
between the armed forces and security. Mexico cannot wait for its political leaders 
to reform the security policy; violence is escalating and academics have even 
catalogued the army’s actions against civilians as “summary executions.”21 
 Taking the soldiers back to their headquarters seems almost impossible; the 
level of violence generated by organised crime groups and the corruption inside the 
civil security forces makes the return of the armed forces an unlikely decision. 
Therefore, finding answers that improve civil-military relations is fundamental; these 
should be based on concepts that will be able to conciliate both sides’ interests. 
These solutions should manage to create a democratic and respectful relationship 
between military personnel and civilians, as the ultimate goal should be generating 
a sense of union and cooperation towards the main goal which is restoring peace 
and wellness in Mexico’s streets. The following research attempts to lay the 
groundwork for new theoretical reforms that will provide the federal congress with 
the required knowledge to archive this. 
 
Research questions 
What kind of structures and mechanisms can be developed to solve the 
current crisis regarding civil-military relations in Mexico? 
In order to establish an appropriate approach to the problem, five legal and 
theoretical questions on the Mexican legal and institutional system are raised:  
1) Is the current military Mexican legislation on par with contemporary 
international human rights legal frameworks and international humanitarian 
law standards? During this research various legal gaps that exist inside the 
Mexican legislation have been found and their main flaws are described. 
Then the international frameworks on accountability, states of emergency 
and civil-military relations are analysed to understand the concepts that 
have shaped modern standards on these topics. 
2) Which are the current failures in the legal ground for the legitimacy of the 
Mexican army’s deployment? Research on the most emblematic human 
                                                          
21 A. Ahmed, “Mexican Military Runs Up Body Count in Drug War” (The New York Times, 
May 26 2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/world/americas/mexican-militarys-high-
kill-rate-raises-human-rights-fears.html?_r=0> accessed 16 June 2016 
16 
 
rights abuses cases is conducted, and the current legal frameworks that 
justified the army’s deployment are analysed according to contemporary 
international standards of emergency powers.  
3) Can Germany and Northern Ireland be the models for a comparative study 
with Mexico, in order to reform the military institutions and civil-military 
relations of this last one? Germany has been chosen as the first subject of 
comparison, in order to analyse the post-WWII institutional and legal reforms 
that had military accountability and human rights as the main points, in order 
to contrast them to the current military institutions and frameworks in 
Mexico. The Northern Irish emergency provisions are analysed and 
subsequently compared though legal methodology with the current Mexican 
frameworks, in order to identify legal and cultural similarities regarding the 
consequences that the provisions had on their respective populations.  
4) Which should be the main aspects at both legal and institutional levels that 
would allow a proper accountability system for commanders and soldiers in 
Mexico? The comparative study developed in this research attempts to 
provide the theory to suggest reforms and new structures for new 
accountability mechanisms and stronger civilian controls over the army. 
 
Chapter breakdown 
 Introduction: 
 Narrating the background of the conflict being analysed, and setting the 
questions which trigger this research and discussing the methodology to achieve it 
 In order to understand why new theoretical insights in Mexican civil-military 
relations need to be developed, the current security conflict must be explained to 
justify the need for this research. The questions that arise from this background are 
the foundations of this project. 
Chapter I:  
The background and concepts of Mexico’s anti-drug story, plus the 
relationship with the United States in the context of the war against drugs 
 Mexico’s relationship with drug-trafficking is long and complex. In this 
research the twentieth century and past anti-drug operations in which the armed 
17 
 
forces took part are discussed. The other main point is the Mexican-US 
governments’ relationship revolving the anti-drug war. Without understanding how 
both nations have developed joint security strategies, the current civil-military crisis 
cannot be understood. 
Chapter II: 
 International law and accountability for the Mexican civil-military current 
context 
 This chapter covers the topics related to the modern standards of 
international law for non-international conflicts, and its possible application for 
Mexico. The topics of State responsibility and individual accountability are also 
discussed in the light of the recent Mexican Military Justice Code. The relevance of 
addressing these topics relies on the current debates about accountability for 
human rights abuses at the hands of the soldiers. There are voices that have called 
for them to be liable for crimes against humanity; this issue is also analysed in the 
chapter. 
Chapter III: 
 Emergency powers, civil-military relations and the Mexican case 
 The general concepts of emergency powers, civil-military relations, as well 
as militarism and the relation between the commanders and the civil State through 
the twentieth century in Mexico are also discussed. The analysis of these concepts 
intends to set the legal and cultural context in Mexico, as the cultural elements must 
be addressed in order to make a in order to make a functional legal comparison. 
Chapter IV: 
The German post-WWII military institutional reforms: a lesson for the 
Mexican case? 
 The reforms that Germany carried after WWII in their military institutions are 
discussed in this chapter. Concepts such as the Innere Führung and figures like the 
Parliamentary Commissioner on the Armed Forces are also analysed. The current 
state of the Mexican military institutions is discussed, as this will set the standards in 
which the institutional comparison is carried in Chapter VI. 
Chapter V: 
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 An analysis on the state of emergency in Northern Ireland during the 1970s 
and beyond: civil-military relations in a domestic conflict 
 The next part of the legal comparison of this research is described and 
analysed here. The state of emergency measures, the military deployment that 
followed this, and the legal reforms carried in Northern Ireland are discussed in this 
chapter. Policies as internment, the Diplock courts and the infamous “shoot-to-kill” 
policy are analysed. The use of force and the human rights that were violated during 
the state of emergency are also addressed. This discussion is useful to choose the 
points that will be part of the legal comparison with Mexico. 
Chapter VI 
The German post-WII institutional reforms, the emergency powers declared 
in Northern Ireland, and their potential implementation in Mexico: a comparative 
study 
 The comparison between contemporary German and the Mexican military 
institutions is developed here. The emergency powers and all the reforms created 
by it in Northern Ireland are analysed along with the legal frameworks related to the 
security strategy in Mexico. The purpose of this chapter is to employ methods of 
comparative law in order to analyse and propose reforms for Mexico’s civil-military 
relations, based on the experiences of Germany and Northern Ireland. This chapter 
is the centre of the research, and the concepts and analysis set in previous chapters 
serve as the groundwork for these comparisons. 
 Conclusions 
  
Methodology 
In this research, a comparative study is made between Germany and Mexico 
analysing institutional reforms, and between Northern Ireland and Mexico regarding 
the state of emergency and the legal figures that came with it. The first point to set 
is the fact that this study will not compare entire legal systems, but specific 
institutions and legal frameworks, as a particular problem has been defined the 
main source of this research (the conflict between civilian society and the armed 
forces in Mexico, regarding human rights abuses in the context of the war against 
drugs). This type of comparison that focuses on a specific part of the legal and 
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institutional system is called a microcomparison; although, as Zweigert and Kötz 
have established, both micro and macro comparisons can be flexible and 
interchange at some points, because the essential rules of systems need to be 
analysed in order to understand how do legal solutions work in different regions, 
adopting them in the most natural way.22 In the case of the comparison between 
Germany and Mexico, the German Basic Law, which is the framework in which the 
German State and its fundamental rights are built upon, are analysed in their 
relevant points to see the goals behind the reforms that allowed the creation of 
democratic institutions and controls over their army. This will be contrasted with the 
constitutional framework regarding the armed forces in Mexico. Starting the analysis 
at a constitutional level and then moving to secondary frameworks and comparing 
selecting certain institutional models, allows understanding the social reality of the 
institutions in both countries and subsequently provide for better models to find what 
Zweigert and Kötz viewed as one of the main goals of comparative law, which is the 
resolution of social conflicts and the discovery of models that would provide such 
solutions.23 
In terms of the approach taken to perform the analysis, a comparison based 
on functionality (defined as the success in applying the systems being compared at 
the field level) is adequate, as this type of approach keeps its focus on concepts 
that have the same function.24 In order to establish the functionality of the 
institutions and legal concepts analysed, this study must take into account the 
cultural differences which might affect the functionality of the objects of comparison. 
The institutional reforms in Germany and the emergency provisions in Northern 
Ireland were selected for this study because they were developed as a response to 
specific conflicts that such societies had. Therefore, a comparison based entirely in 
plain positivism cannot be possible because, as Hofstede established; when we 
compare societies we are “studying culture”.25 An example of this last statement is 
the reference from specific cases of human rights abuses in Mexico which are 
described in this research, as Hofstede also states that “data collected from 
individuals within cultures” is an essential part of most studies comparing aspects of 
                                                          
22 Zweigert, Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, New 
York 1998) 5-6 
23 Ibid 15 
24 ibid 34 
25 G Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviours, Institutions, and 
Organisations Across Nations (Sege Publications, 3rd ed, London 2001) 15 
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different societies,26 hence the use of case studies as a part of the social context 
that gave birth to the civil-military relations conflict. Consequently, a modern 
approach to legal positivism called refined positivism is used, as it takes into 
consideration the social context and the meaning that the community which created 
the institutions and legal frameworks had in mind.27  This is interpreted as 
“identifying valid legal sources and determining the content of the rules they 
contain”,28 as Van Hoecke establishes.  
Refined positivism makes the comparison with Northern Ireland possible, as 
this country is ruled by a Common Law system, which is different from both 
Germany and Mexico which have a civil law system. The comparison study is 
focused on the functionality of the emergency provisions applied, which had aims 
that can be comparable with the aims that the Mexican State has in the current 
security strategy. This comparative study is not only focused on the technical details 
of the emergency provisions that were applied in Northern Ireland, but also on the 
aims that such provisions had and their effects at a field level. To put an example of 
refined positivism applied in this research, the concept of what is understood as 
“reasonable” suspicion when it came to State to arrest a citizen29 is analysed. With 
this approach it becomes easier to understand the meaning of the concepts which 
the State had in mind when legislating frameworks, as the social context which was 
the background for the “troubles” in Northern Ireland is also taken into account in 
order to understand the acts of will that constitute the law, as these are analysed 
with “a meaning created by a certain type of community”.30 This is also exemplified 
in the case of Germany, as their institutional reforms had the goal of breaking with 
the culture established by the Nazi regime and the damage that this experience had 
over the whole German society and their military institutions. 
The theories mentioned above work at a microcomparison level, because 
they can be used to identify specific problems within a part of a legal system. Van 
                                                          
26 Ibid 15 
27 M Zirk-Sadowski, “Legal Epistemology and Transformation of Legal Cultures” in M. Van 
Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Hart Publishing, USA 
2004) 25 
28 M Van Hoecke, “Deep Level Comparative Law” in M. Van Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and 
Methodology of Comparative Law (Hart Publishing, USA 2004) 166 
29 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v The United Kingdom 12244/86, 12245/86, (1990) 13 EHRR 
157, [1990] ECHR 18, 12383/86 [30], [31], [32] 
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Hoecke also refers to the cultural context when he states that even though research 
dealing with comparisons is focused on rules, these cannot be “isolated from their 
legal and non-legal context”, because the rules are developed with the knowledge 
acquired through “legal education, and their familiarity with the national, regional 
and local (non-legal) cultures, through their general education and their socialisation 
in the relevant communities”.31 
Since this comparative study is seeking to find theoretical solutions for the 
current conflict of Mexican civil-military relations, the comparison would also be 
considered de lege ferenda/de lege lata (which means comparing rules that are 
already in working order in a system, to seek for solutions to apply in another 
system). As Karhu establishes, this type of study is easier to perform on systems 
that share similarities, which can be historic for example, and undoubtedly the case 
of the current Mexican conflict draws parallels with both Northern Ireland during the 
deployment of the British armed forces, and Germany’s institutions before the end 
of World War II (although a comparison of pre-WWII institutions will not be made, as 
the aim is to apply the German reformist concepts into the Mexican system). The 
author explains that when these elements are reunited, there is “a constant 
possibility of exchanging legal ideas and plans for legal reforms”,32 which is the 
main goal of this comparative study. Karhu also states that this type of study would 
work in “dealing with something already in force in another legal system”.33  
The base in which this comparative study will work has already been 
analysed in previous chapters, as Zweigert and Kötz state that the first step for 
building a comparison is to complete reports of the different systems being 
analysed.34 In order to build an appropriate system for the comparison,35 general 
concepts such as accountability, human rights, and civil-military relations are used, 
because these concepts exist in all the systems being compared and the 
functionality of the topics being studied will be easier to identify. At the moment of 
the comparison an intermediate theory approach would be adequate to use, as both 
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the objective and subjective meanings of the institutions and the legal frameworks 
being studied are analysed. As Van Hoecke establishes, both the wording in the 
frameworks and the social context need to be taken into account,36 as even though 
we are comparing countries which are part of the western world, the differences in 
culture and development are large, and such elements cannot be overseen. In this 
case we would be establishing an intracultural study, as the societal types are 
similar, because, as it has been mentioned, they are Western countries regulated by 
non-religious legal systems and institutions, and their socioeconomic systems are 
liberal. Regarding the subjective elements, Da Cruz also establishes that a modern 
comparatist should also be “something of a polymath, highly learned in a variety of 
disciplines and extremely conversant with the socio-cultural backdrop to the subject 
matter of comparison”.37 Apart than those considerations other concrete rules do not 
apply, as da Cruz establishes that comparative law is “primarily a method of study 
rather than a legal body of rules”.38 Again, these theories have no major problem 
fitting into a microcomparison and at the same time allow understanding the 
functionality of its application in a better way, as cultural aspects are taken into 
consideration. 
Finally, the steps suggested by da Cruz39 for developing a comparative 
study are the most appropriate for this type of work. These steps consist in 1) 
identifying the problem and trying to clarify it as much as possible; 2) identifying the 
foreign jurisdictions and institutions and establishing the legal root to which they 
belong (in this concrete case there are no religious or mixed systems, which 
simplifies this task); 3) defining the primary source 4) gathering the relevant 
material; 5) organising the sources according to the legal bases of the system being 
researched; 6) developing hypothesis to the answers of the issue being analysed, 
taking into account legal and non-legal factors; 7) analysing the deep meaning of 
the principles; and 8) establishing the conclusions, including critical commentary 
that can relate it to the questions asked at the beginning of the present research. 
This research could have used other countries as the subjects for a legal 
comparison; the cases of Eastern European countries were also relevant, as they 
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experienced transitions from authoritarian regimes, to more or less liberal 
democracies, which included reforming their military culture and their constitutions. 
Cases of militarisation in South America during the 1970s were also attractive to 
compare, but Germany and Northern Ireland were selected as they were considered 
successful experiences which had elements that could be applied to the Mexican 
case in order to improve their civil-military relations. Germany has developed a 
highly democratic institutional culture, which includes a military that has kept a very 
stable and positive relation with civil society. Northern Ireland went through 
unsuccessful experiences dealing with the application of emergency measures, 
some of them which share close similarities with the current situation in Mexico. In 
this case, it is the human rights reviews and pronouncements from international and 
domestic courts which are relevant, as they established the flaws of the State 
concerning the protection of its citizens and the frameworks that were developed to 
confront non-State actors in a domestic conflict, and provided access to justice for 
the victims and their relatives in high-profile cases. 
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Chapter I 
1. Preliminary concepts, the historical background of anti-drug 
operations in Mexico and the geopolitical context with the 
United States of America 
 
1.1 Organised Crime 
The concept of “organised” crime is appropriate to analyse first, as the 
Mexican government is addressing this concept in a different way than the rest of 
the criminal concepts. Part of the State’s justification for the armed forces’ 
deployment is the fact that civilian security enforcement has not been successful at 
tackling this type of crime. The International and domestic legislations in Mexico 
have adapted certain frameworks in order to tackle and impose sanctions to 
organised crime. The need to create special codes displays the different 
conceptions that States have for such type of criminality. 
 The UNCTOC defines organised crime as “a structured group of three or 
more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of 
committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with 
this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit”.40 This modern concept takes in account the number of members needed in 
order to be considered a criminal organisation. It also mentions the obtaining of a 
benefit as the main objective of those involved in this activity (a circumstance 
established also by the Rational Choice drug policy). 
The UNCTOC also establishes that organised crime “(a) It is committed in 
more than one state; (b) It is committed in one state but a substantial part of its 
preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another state; (c) It is 
committed in one state but involves an organised criminal group that engages in 
criminal activities in more than one state; or (d) It is committed in one state but has 
substantial effects in another state”.41 The convention also establishes protocols for 
each participating state to implement at a domestic level, which includes 
criminalization for those who take participation in organised criminal groups, money 
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laundering and corruption. It should be noted that Mexico was one of the countries 
that signed the convention. 
Regarding Mexico’s domestic law, the Federal Law Against Organised 
Crime bases their description of organised crime on the definition contained in the 
above mentioned Convention, as the translation of the 2nd Article establishes the 
following: “When three or more persons, organise as a fact to perform, in a 
permanent or repeated way, conducts that by themselves or united with others, 
have as an end or objective committing one of some of the following misconducts, 
will be sanctioned by this fact, as members of organised crime…”42 
 Based on the different scopes that academics and experts on the topic have 
established, we can conclude that Organised Crime is a network-like enterprise 
which operates in the informal market with a continuous presence in time and 
whose main objective is to obtain an economic gain through the fabrication, sale, 
buying or realization of illicit goods and deeds. 
1.2 Drug Trafficking 
 Perhaps, the most important branch of organised crime, -not only in a 
domestic level in Mexico, but also in an international context- is drug trafficking. The 
complexity of the problem and the severe consequences in a social, economic and 
human rights context makes it an essential task for every State that considers itself 
to be on par with contemporary democratic standards or that is in the process of 
reaching such status. 
 It is important to include the definition that the US frameworks give to the act 
of trafficking drugs, because they have been the principal promoter of anti-narcotics 
strategies around the world; and, as it will be seen in this chapter, they were the 
security strategies which involved the use of the armed forces in Mexico were the 
product of Mexico-US joint strategies. The US Code 21, Chapter 24 defines Drug 
Trafficking as “any illicit activity to cultivate, produce, manufacture, distribute, sell, 
finance, or transport narcotic drugs, controlled substances, or listed chemicals, or 
otherwise endeavour or attempt to do so, or to assist, abet, conspire, or collude with 
others to do so.”43 The aforementioned code focuses on the product itself, as the 
drug policies have set a standard of the types of substances that are considered 
harmful. It also focuses on the desire to associate with other persons, which leads 
                                                          
42 Federal Law Against Organised Crime 2012 (MEX) art 2 
43 The US Code title 21 – Food and Drugs 2015 (US) ch 24 
26 
 
us to the modern definitions of organised crime that establish the need for a certain 
number or persons with the intention to engage in such activities.  
 In Europe, key actors have also legislated special frameworks focusing on 
drug trade enforcement. The Drug Trafficking Act of 1994 (UK) establishes as a 
misconduct the “retention or control by or on behalf of another person of the other 
person’s proceeds of drug trafficking is facilitated of the proceeds of drug trafficking 
by another person are used to secure that funds are placed at the other person’s 
disposal or are used for the other person’s benefit to acquire property by way of 
investment”.44  
 As the economy became globalised, the anti-drug concepts also adapted to 
the modern systems. Contemporary concepts focus not only on the product itself, 
but also the ways in which the criminal will carry on his operations. Money 
laundering is mentioned through the words “funds“, “property” and “investment”, as 
most criminal organisations rely on this type of activity. Modern criminal 
organisations –whether it is drug trade, human trafficking or terrorism-, have to rely 
in the structures imposed by free market in order to operate financially in the 
globalised modern economies. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime defines drug trafficking as a 
global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of 
substances which are subject to drug prohibition laws.45 This definition is practically 
identical to the one established by the US Code and focuses on the product, more 
than the features of the ones who operate it. By its part, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) defines organised crime as:  
“any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose 
primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups 
maintain their position through the use of actual or threatened violence, 
corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant 
impact on the people in their locales, region, or the country as a whole”.46 
 These definitions are useful to understand the way in which the Mexican 
organised crime operates inside and outside of their homeland. It is relevant in the 
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current context, as the different security policies built by the government have not 
been successful to track down the cartels’ financial funds, but instead have focused 
on physical confrontation with the criminal members. 
1.3 Characteristics of drug trafficking organisations 
In the last years, the security strategy in Mexico has been focusing in 
arresting and trailing kingpins, as the task of the armed forces moved from finding 
and eradicating crops, to clashing with organised crime groups and arresting their 
high-rank members. As the concept of drug trafficking itself, their organisations also 
have certain attributes that differentiate them from other criminal groups. 
Organisations that focus on the traffic of drugs tend to be classified in the 
same level as the terrorist organisms. To illustrate a similarity, both organisations 
view violence as one of the most effective ways of making political statements and 
positioning themselves in the eyes of the public. Regarding the conceptual 
differences, one of the key concepts that distinguishes drug trafficking bands from 
terrorist groups is that an organisation whose principal object of handling are illegal 
drugs must assure that their targets (customers) are alive and able to pay and 
consume their products. Nevertheless, there is a signiﬁcant distinction between the 
corporate culture of a smuggling organisation and that of a terrorist group.47 
 As most criminal organisations around the globe, Mexican Drug Trafficking 
Organisations have their own characteristics that set them apart from their counter 
peers in other places. The United Nations, through academics such as James 
Finckenauer and Joseph Fuentes, have established some important characteristics 
of the Mexican organisations: The first characteristic and the one that is defined by 
the geopolitical situation, is that most of the drugs being trafficked by Mexican 
groups have the U.S. as its principal destination. As a fact, approximately half of the 
cocaine in this country enters from the U.S. – Mexico border48. The structure of the 
Mexican organisations seems to be hierarchical, with well-known kingpins who 
appear as leaders. There seems to be cases of organisations that emerge out of 
older ones, with members of certain groups who leave them to engage with other 
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bands or even form their proper cartels (such is the case of the Zetas, which used to 
be ex-soldiers working for the Gulf cartel).49 
Another characteristic is that, being Mexico a country with a large territorial 
extension, drug cartels need to organise themselves not only in networks, but 
actually in territorial partnerships, which is called the Federation.50 This serves as a 
way to protect them and to improve the logistic of their operations. Corruption from 
the security and political institutions is another issue that is considered as a seminal 
characteristic of Mexican cartels. To point an example, in 2009 federal security tests 
were applied to Tijuana’s police and it was found that only 10% approved it.51 
 There seems to be a moral system in drug smuggling groups that judges the 
behaviour and actions committed by their members as the ground for being 
promoted in the structure of the organisation. While there are no written laws or 
codes (obviously due to their existence only in the informal market), concepts such 
as blood relations, closeness, trust and respect and experience define the place of 
each member inserted in this types of organisations. This may explain the heinous 
ways in which members of the Mexican cartels resolve conflicts between 
themselves. There is no professional relationship per se, so problems between the 
members tend to rely on subjective elements. 
The extreme level of violence generated by the cartels is becoming a 
common denominator between Mexican drug cartels. U.S. analysts have attributed 
murders of innocents, torture, beheadings and car bombs to these groups. Another 
fact established by security academics is that although the violence is concentrated 
on a small number or municipalities, it is spreading with speed across the whole 
country, especially in the northern states, which share the border with the U.S.52 
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1.4 What are the current policies against drug trade and what is the 
theoretical background behind them? 
 Recent studies have focused on the types of strategies that governments 
use to face drug issues: 
1) Demand reduction: demand for drugs is the centre of the phenomenon, 
so they focus on preventing individuals from consuming drugs to lower 
sales and consequently, achieving a reduction in all the drug issues.53 
Another theory establishes that the effects of drug enforcement will 
depend on the response of buyers and sellers.54 
 
2) Supply reduction: the strategy focuses on reducing the amount of 
availability to increase the prices and dissuade possible consumers.55 
There are theories that indicate that the former strategy tends to fail, 
because the seizing of drugs is not effective, narcotics can be replaced 
effortlessly, even more than the actual dealers, although these can be 
replaced in a short amount of time.56 Due to the need of the 
organisations for members who will keep supplying narcotics, the former 
proves that this strategy is strongly related to the one that focuses on 
demand reduction. Even in a market with organisations as large as the 
Mexican cartels, leaders of organisations, -also known as “kingpins”- 
can be replaced without disrupting the availability of illegal drugs.57 
Finally, it’s been established that enforcing restriction tends to increase 
drug prices, that less than its expected.58 
3) Crime reduction: focuses not on the selling or consumption of drugs, but 
on reducing the number of crimes committed by users to afford buying 
them and crimes committed as a consequence of drug addiction.59 
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4) Harm reduction: this strategy focuses on reducing negative 
consequences on individuals’ health.60 Recent theories establish that a 
harm reduction policy should focus on “…the reduction of drug related 
harm rather than drug use per se, where abstinence-oriented strategies 
are included, strategies are also included to reduce the harm for those 
who continue to use drugs; and, strategies are included to aim to 
demonstrate that, on the balance of probabilities, it is likely to result in a 
net reduction in drug-related harm”.61 
 
5) Civil rights: this theory states that individuals’ freedom is more important 
than any drug policy, consequently, the government does not create any 
type of policy against drugs and leaves it to each one’s responsibility.62 
After comparing the different strategies that contemporary states employ to 
tackle drug trade, it can be established that Mexico is currently following the Supply 
Reduction policy, without employing an integral plan that would also focus on the 
consumers and the reduction of harm, in order to decrease the demand, and not 
only focusing on the supply.  
1.5 The historical background of two nations that share the same security 
issue 
In order to understand the contemporary security strategy that the Mexican 
government is exercising against organised crime, it is appropriate to explain the 
importance of the United States in order to understand why Mexico has been 
completely dependent on the Americans’ own strategies. The geopolitical context of 
both nations has created one of the most complex bilateral affairs in security and 
political matters; one that has not been solved since the 1960s, when –in the 
context of the Cold War-, the US government decided to strengthen their 
enforcement against drug-trafficking. This chapter seeks to describe and explain the 
failure of all past security policies, as this will set a strong base to explain the 
possible outcomes of the current research. 
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 The importance of discussing the relationship between Mexico and the 
United States in this research is due to the fact that, as it will be described, the 
armed forces did take part on various anti-narcotic operations in the past, and even 
though their actions were not established with the required legal mechanisms, the 
various deployments were not permanent, and the government did not consider 
them as central to their security strategy. It is relevant for the contextual 
understanding of the subsequent chapters to describe the role that drug trafficking 
has taken in shaping the security strategies of both the US and the Mexican 
government, as well the reactions that the presence of the army caused among 
society. 
Since the creation of its modern post-revolutionary State, legality in Mexico 
has always been subordinated to different political and subjective interests. The 
construction of legal frameworks is a task that requires a broad effort in order to 
adapt it to societal current contexts. There is practically no information available 
about the legal support that past Mexican presidents have used in order to deploy 
the armed forces in public spaces to perform security tasks. The geopolitical factors 
that gave birth to the anti-drug operatives in the 60s and 70s in which the army was 
committed to perform certain tasks will be analysed. 
During the XX century, the armed forces were deployed more by request the 
United States than of the Mexican government. Part of what explains the former 
statement is that the American government sees Mexico as the principal source of 
drug supply to their territory, although both nations have combined efforts to 
eradicate this issue. With the rise of violence generated in Mexico due largely by the 
clashes between organised crime members, the drugs issue has become a matter 
of national security for the entire region. The Geography and Statistics National 
Institute (INEGI) reported that between 2007 and 2011, 95,632 homicides were 
documented.63  
It is important to analyse two events that are crucial in order to understand 
the current governmental strategy. The first event is the Operation Interception in 
1969, and the second one is the Operation Condor, being started in the mid-
seventies. Each operation had drug-trafficking as the centre of the strategy; 
although, as it will be seen in this chapter, the principal objective of the US 
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government with Operation Interception was to put pressure on its southern 
neighbour and make him feel politically forced to start a combined strategy against 
organised crime. 
1.5.1 Operation Interception 
The Nixon administration had noticed an important rise in the use of 
narcotics, coming from Mexico to the United States. The Mexican General Attorney, 
Julio Sánchez Vargas, admitted that this issue was affecting both nations and 
agreed to start the biggest antidrug campaign of the country’s history in which two 
thousand soldiers, ships and helicopters were involved.64 This would be the first 
time that the army was directly involved in an operation to tackle the trafficking of 
narcotics. Around this time the first disagreement between both governments took 
place. On the 28 of August of 1969, the North American Defence Department 
declared Tijuana a forbidden zone for all the military. The Mexicans reacted 
defensively,65 as this was considered an arrogant overreaction to a problem that 
was shared between both sides of the border. 
On the 21st of September of 1969, Operation Interception was launched; this 
operative included the intensified vigilance of land, sea and air of almost six 
thousand kilometres across the border with Mexico, such policy would be 
maintained for an “indefinite period”66 (little did both governments know at that time 
that it would only last for a couple of weeks). When the drivers, pedestrians and 
passengers of airlines would come close to the revision points of thirty-one 
entrances and twenty-seven aerial terminals, a pamphlet in English and Spanish 
that explained what would happened was given to them. Everyone, regardless of 
their position or nationality was scrupulously searched.67 All this caused serious 
issues in the border due to the inability of passengers to travel in a fluid manner, 
having to wait for 6 or 7 hours to cross from one side to the other. All this caused a 
considerable economic damage to both countries, the market and tourism dropped, 
causing a stir from the enterprise, which supported the seizure of drugs but 
condemned the strategy used for this. 
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The customs captured an average of 18.6 kilograms of marijuana per day 
across the border in 1968. During the twenty days that the Operation Interception 
lasted, 1,943 kilograms were captured, being this an average of 59 kilograms per 
day.68 Even though the number of drugs confiscated exceeded by much the 
previous operatives, it still did not made up for the enormous amount of money and 
personnel assigned to this task. Besides, the political conflict created between both 
nations was a collateral damage that the American State’s arrogant decision did not 
take in account before. If the operation was measured according to the number of 
drugs confiscated, it would not have been worth it. But the principal objectives were 
to impress the public with the “antidrug war” that the government carried out and to 
“make the Mexicans work, in order for them to really fight against the cropping and 
traffic of drugs”.69 Statements of this sort were expected, as the Nixon government 
was relying on a populist strategy that would give them strength upon their citizens. 
The stress and conflicts that this operative caused, forced the North 
American authorities to put an end to the Operation Interception on the 10th of 
October of 1969.70 Then-president Gustavo Diaz Ordaz formally complained about 
the general feeling of resentment caused by Operation Interception, and Nixon 
finally ended the strategy, probably more by the American businessmen pressure. 
As the 1960s evolved, a new generation of teenagers felt out of place of the 
bourgeois society that developed as a consequence of the industrial revolution. In 
their search for alternative lifestyles, the hippie movement developed and they 
started to experiment with drugs such as marijuana and LSD. As a result, drug 
addiction raised in the US in the second half of the decade. Also, another collateral 
consequence was the diplomatic conflict caused between the Mexican and North 
American States. The only positive outcome of the operation (at least, from the US 
point of view) was the commitment of Mexico to start developing anti-drugs 
strategies. 
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1.5.2 Operation Condor 
This antidrug campaign would include the use of defoliant chemicals. In the 
fall of 1976, Operation condor became the core of this program.71 Using hazardous 
chemicals represented a high risk for potential consumers, but in the eyes of the 
government this was considered the best way to eradicate cultures. The Mexican 
government decided to implement a permanent campaign, pouring $35 million into 
the effort.72 The importance of this operation was that for the first time the Mexican 
army would be used in a semi-permanent way, in coordination with the federal 
police and the Justice Department (PGR), for the purpose of developing a “war 
against drugs”. This operation was also jointly developed between the Us and the 
Mexican governments, as American intelligence agents also participated. 
In January 1977, Operation Condor was officially launched in the heart of 
Mexico’s opium zenith; Condor was named “war” by the general attorney Oscar 
Flores Sánchez.73 This was the first time that this term was used to describe a 
security strategy; it was also probably applied to justify the inclusion of the armed 
forces in the operation. The government strategy consisted in deploying 2,500 
soldiers, 250 federal police, unites of the Mexican air force and navy, state and local 
police, and an undisclosed number of DEA agents. Two primary tasks faced the 
civilian and military commanders of Condor I: eradication of the illegal crops and 
pacification of the countryside.74 The principal difference between Condor and the 
current strategy is that military personnel were not deployed in the urban landscape; 
their presence was limited to the cultures where the drugs were being raised. As it 
will be seen later in this chapter, this didn’t prevent the citizens from being abused, 
but the scale was much more shorter than the current figures show; another factor 
is that countryside citizens are considered the most deprived in the country, a 
situation which makes more difficult to expose their complains. 
The personnel involved in Condor did not have an easy task either; pilots 
often encountered heavy ground fire; some crashed while spraying; others were 
killed when their helicopter blades struck well-hidden cables strung from one hillside 
to another; It can be established that pacification of the countryside proved even 
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more difficult than eradication of opium and marijuana fields.75 A lot of the peasants 
got all their income from growing these drugs; as they would resist the military 
actions even by risking their own lives. Even in this period, army units that located a 
drug centre occasionally went beyond the call of duty; according to a well-placed 
American diplomat in Mexico City, houses were ransacked, men beaten, women 
violated, and belongings confiscated.76 As it can be seen, the same complains that 
are being made today by citizens, were a subject of discontent 35 years ago. This 
shows that, although the armed forces have been professionalized in the use of 
technology and security tactics, the coexistence with society is still a subject that still 
has not been engraved in their doctrine. 
Desperate peasants were flooding the cities, abandoning ejidos (communal 
plots) and private plots, streaming across the border as illegal immigrants, and 
becoming drug entrepreneurs; although, only one activity -involvement with 
narcotics-, caused deep official concern and determined action.77 Peasants did not 
have recourse other than engage in the drug culture, so, after Operation Condor, 
the number of immigrants raised considerably. Decades have passed, and the 
Mexican State has not been able to eradicate the drug-trafficking issue from its 
social roots. 
Operation Condor lost its impulse and effectiveness in the first years of the 
80s, and Mexico started to be, once again, an important marijuana and heroin 
supplier to the North American market, as well as a path for the cocaine that started 
to go from South America to the United States.78 The aftermath was the rise of 
immigration to the US and depravity in the countryside, plus, the organised crime 
groups that had settled in the Golden Triangle, simply moved to states such as 
Jalisco, Michoacán and Guerrero.  
1.5.3 The current security strategy 
On the 11th of December of 2006, just a few days after Felipe Calderon took 
office as President of Mexico, the presidential office announced a joint strategy 
called “Michoacán”, taking the name from the state where the new security strategy 
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began (Michoacán is also Calderón’s home state). The official announcement of the 
strategy was done not by Calderon, but by members of his cabinet, these being 
Maximilano Cortazar –Chief of Communications of the Presidency; Francisco 
Ramirez Acuña – Secretary of Government; Guillermo Galvan Galvan –Secretary or 
National Defence; Francisco Saynez Mendoza –Secretary of the Navy; and Genaro 
Garcia Luna –Secretary of Security. 
 Ramirez Acuña established that the aim of the security strategy was “…to 
recover the public spaces that organised crime has taken away…a policy that will 
finish with the impunity of the criminals that endanger the health of our children and 
the peacefulness of our communities”.79 Regarding the role of the armed forces, the 
same secretary established that the State would deploy “…more than five thousand 
elements (military) for this operation in which different activities such as eradication 
of illicit plantations, the establishment of control checkpoints to decrease drug traffic 
in highways and secondary roads, the implementation of search warrants and arrest 
orders, as well as location and dismantling of drug selling points will be made”.80 
 The strategy had initial success, as the number of murders in Michoacán 
decreased between 2007 and 2008.81 This encouraged the government to replicate 
the strategy in seven states (and subsequently in all the country), but the results 
were vastly different, as in 6 of the 7 states that were militarised the number of 
murders related to drug traffic increased 32% between 2007 and 2009.82 When the 
current Peña Nieto administration took office, most of the basic grounds of the 
strategy were left intact: the only institutional change was the creation of the 
Commission for Security and Integral Development in Michoacán, which carried on 
with the same military approach to the drug traffic issue. 
 The Mexican think tank Centre of Investigation for the Development (CIDAC) 
developed a study on the security strategy that Calderon implemented, and current 
president Peña Nieto has maintained basically without any substantial changes. 
One of the first observations made by the CIDAC is the degrading of the public 
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image that the armed forces have suffered as time passes by.83 The Calderon 
government tried to reform the civil police system by implementing a program called 
Accountable State Police, which among other things, would apply trust controls to 
police bodies. According to CIDAC, this strategy failed, as the perception of 
impunity increased from 40% to 41% in the states whose police bodies received the 
control tests. The study establishes that this was due to the fact that the strategy 
focused on the individuals and not on creating an accountability system that is 
independent from the government.84 The spread and increase of drug-traffic related 
violence is the most severe side effect of the security strategy. Human Rights Watch 
explains that such increase is the consequence of different criminal groups fighting 
between them and against the security forces for control of the drug trade and other 
activities like human trafficking.85 
 When Peña Nieto took office at the end of 2012, the number of murders 
related to drug traffic had passed the 60,000 mark.86 As it has been previously 
stated, the strategy did not have substantial changes, and the militarisation of the 
country is still on-going. The security forces’ reputation has entered a crisis in the 
last year, since 43 students disappeared, as recent investigations have put the 
official version in doubt (the government established that the students had been 
kidnapped by members of organised crime groups), and have linked police and 
military personnel to the victims.87 The Tlatlaya massacre, in which 22 persons were 
allegedly executed by soldiers,88 has created a lot of backlash against the armed 
forces, and the animosity between civil society and the army seems more 
aggravated than in Calderon’s administration. 
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 As the Peña Nieto administration follows its course, the allegations of 
abuses from the army have not stopped with the most well-known Ayotzinapa and 
Tlatlaya events (described in chapter VI of this research). The complaints of torture 
and physical and psychological assault keep on being documented.89 The 
government and the security institutions have not establish a date for sending the 
armed forces back to its headquarters, and give the primacy of security to the 
civilian bodies. 
1.6 Mexico’s relationship with the US government in the context of the 
security strategy against drug-trafficking 
 During the 1980s the security strategy of the United States changed their 
law enforcement approach on anti-drug security policies. The White House’s Office 
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), stated that one positive point that arose 
from the drugs war, was that the US and Mexico “went from a virtually non-existent 
military-to-military relationship to the formation of a bilateral military working 
group”.90 In 1986 President Reagan called for the militarisation of the drugs war in 
both Mexico and the US. Between 1981 and 1995, 1488 Mexicans went to US 
military academies with over 2000 Grupos Aeromóviles de Fuerzas Especiales (air-
mobile Special Forces- GAFE’s) doing the same in 1997-98. Eventually, some of 
their members joined the Zetas cartel. Another explanation given is that the security 
strategy has been used for repressing political and civilian opposition; GAFE 
members trained for counter-narcotics campaigns by the US military took part in 
some of the missions against the EZLN (the Zapatista Army of National Liberation is 
a guerrilla, which began armed actions in opposition to neoliberal reforms on the 1st 
of January of 1994, showing again the blurring of counter-narcotics and 
counterinsurgency operations and the US support in the background). 
 Various analysts state that the principal aim that has shaped the relationship 
between both countries is the prioritising of economic interests, more than 
establishing a true anti-drug bilateral plan. Mercille states that the US objectives in 
Latin America throughout the post-World War II have revolved around ensuring 
“Adequate production in Latin America of, and access by the United States to raw 
materials essential to US security”, which in Mexico’s case applies particularly to its 
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vast oil reserves. Another goal is the “standardization of Latin American military 
organisation, training, doctrine and equipment along US lines”, which has been 
accomplished through numerous training and security assistance programs with 
Mexico. Latin American countries should be encouraged “to base their economies 
on a system of private enterprise and, as essential thereto, to create a political and 
economic climate conductive to private investment, of both domestic and foreign 
capital…”91 
 The historical consequences of drug conflicts have had more to do with 
operative problems between the bureaucracies of both countries. Additionally, we 
can find that some of the conflicts are related with the deterioration of the bilateral 
relation for reasons not directly related to organised crime, such as post electoral 
conflicts, financial crises, mistakes on the Mexican exterior policies, and illegal 
migration to the US. The conflicts from the 80s -such as the Kiki Camarena murder-, 
can be seen as part of this context. Even at times when the relation was in fairly 
good terms, there were always problems concerning drug dealing, so this suggests 
that the conflicts that have generated with the drug dealing issue in the bilateral 
relation are more structural than conjectural.92 All the problems that have emerged 
between both countries in security issues conjure corruption and poverty. Beginning 
in 1982, the concern for drug enforcement led to a series of legal changes that 
opened a new chapter in US law, allowing the military to provide a vast array of 
support for civilian police. Much of this military support has focused on the US-
Mexico border region.93 
 Some of the most significant structural factors that have detonated the 
environment of violence in the northern border are drug trafficking, labour migration 
towards the United States, and since the 90s, trafficking of weapons and money 
laundering.94 Finally, US banks have increased their profits by laundering drug 
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money from Mexico and elsewhere;95 the failure to implement tighter regulations 
testifies to the power of the financial community in the US. The financial sector’s 
involvement in narcotics has never been rightly regulated because it provides 
significant liquidity to a powerful segment of US society.96 White-collar corruption 
has pressured both the American and Mexican congresses in order to freeze the 
legislation of political policies that would strengthen penalties against money 
laundering. US banks have laundered Mexican drug money in the past. In 2010 
Wachovia (now part of Wells Fargo) had to forfeit $110 million to US authorities for 
having allowed drug-related financial transactions of the same amount, in addition to 
$50 million for failure to monitor funds used to ship 22 tons of cocaine. The bank 
was sanctioned for not applying anti-money laundering procedures to the transfer of 
$378.4 billion into dollar accounts from Mexican currency exchange houses.97 
President Obama recently declared that his administration is “putting unprecedented 
pressure on cartels and their finances here in the United States”. It has been 
estimated that globally banks launder from $500 billion to $1 trillion every year from 
criminal activities, half of which goes through US banks. UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) Chief Antonio Maria Costa said that drugs money may have 
rescued some failing banks.98 The topic of money laundering is essential if the State 
wants to create a system that can effectively track and shut down the accounts from 
the cartels. 
 The US shares much responsibility for drug expansion thanks to its record of 
support for some of the main players in the drugs trade such as the Mexican 
government and military, and by implementing neoliberal reforms that have 
increased the size of the narcotics industry. The war on drugs has served as a 
pretext to intervene in Mexican affairs and to protect US hegemonic projects such 
as NAFTA, rather than as a genuine attack on drug problems. J. Mercille states that 
the drugs war has been used repeatedly to repress dissent and popular opposition 
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to neoliberal policies in Mexico.99 The fact that the US anti-drug security forces were 
not able to reduce drug trafficking into its territory in a significant amount is another 
factor. This is where American corruption can be seen in its most obvious ways, as 
there are currently hundreds of investigations into corruption among US border 
agents.100 
 There was a break point during the 80s which propelled the expansion and 
economic rise of Mexican drug cartels. South American cocaine had been smuggled 
into the US via the Caribbean and Florida, but interdiction efforts diverted the traffic 
through Mexico. The Colombian drug-traffickers cut a deal with the Mexican cartels 
to ensure that their drugs would reach the US through Mexico rather than through 
the Caribbean and Florida.101 This made Mexico the only path to North America and 
provided a gold mine for the kingpins. Mercille also states that the flow of narcotics 
was magnified by the neoliberal reforms that increased commerce across the US-
Mexico border. Cartels started putting shipments of heroin, crystal, cannabis and 
cocaine on the many trucks crossing the border. NAFTA (North America Free Trade 
Agreement) and neoliberal reforms have increased the size of the drugs industry by 
involving more Mexicans in it for a reason: lack of opportunities and employment in 
Mexico. NAFTA has also failed to generate job growth and increase wages; farmers 
were forced to abandon their land and migrate to the US or move to the cities in 
Mexico along the US border, where they became cheap labour for US 
manufacturing businesses. Non-taxed economy became 57 per cent of the 
workforce in 2004. Many had little choice other than participation in drug 
trafficking.102 In fact, migration rose more than ever after the NAFTA signing. 
 The US-Mexico military bilateral relationship has been preserved and 
upgraded, first through the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America 
(SPP), and then through the Mérida Initiative. Twenty-six armoured vehicles were 
delivered to Mexico, seven Bell helicopters valued at $88 million have been 
provided to the Mexican Army and three UH-60 helicopters valued at $76.5 million 
have been delivered to the Federal Police.103 
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 Another complementary fact that illustrates the American share of 
responsibility in the drug trade affair is the number of arms that enter the Mexico-US 
border through the American side. It has been estimated that 87 percent of firearms 
used by cartels originate in the US. A policy of “letting guns walk” has followed; it 
was approved by the Justice Department. This consists in not arresting drug cartel 
members in order to track the guns down to Mexico and try to learn more about their 
operations.104 The relative easiness in buying a fire arm in the border cities of Texas 
makes their smuggling into Mexico an authentic treat for the drug cartels. One of the 
dominant opinions in Mexico is that the problem is created from the inability of the 
United States to control its domestic demand for heroin, cocaine, and marihuana. 
The dominant US view has been that the Mexican government has failed to make 
effective efforts to control the supply of drugs.105 This is part of the structural conflict 
that permeates the relationship. It is more comfortable for both sides to blame the 
other, instead of reforming their institutions in order to end the existing asymmetry. 
While Mexican officials can be easily corrupted by money that comes from the drug 
bossiness, the source of the corruption is a sector of US society highly prone to 
drug consumption. The demand for drugs in the United States is the most serious 
national security problem for the Mexican government.  
 Del Villar has stated that one of the most important factors that comes a 
consequence of the drug-dealing presence in Mexico, is that the US narcotics 
market produces in corruption in Mexico’s public service. This is magnified precisely 
because of the massive involvement of the security and enforcement apparatus in 
eradication campaigns. The financial, security, and corruption costs of such an 
involvement have become unbearable.106 Toro indicated that one’s definition of 
drugs as a national security threat depended on the way one balanced the external 
and internal factors behind it. To the extent that it was cast in external terms, the 
risk came from both “the clandestine entry of drug traffickers entering from other 
countries (possibly in association with Mexican drug traffickers) and from a more 
active (and unauthorized) participation of DEA agents on Mexican territory”.107 
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1.7 Conclusion 
Organised crime in Mexico was tolerated for decades because corruption in 
this country cannot be considered an abstract issue: it is a form of social 
organisation. PRI relied on it for sustaining support from all the social layers during 
their 71-years uninterrupted presidential terms. Corruption was an “unofficial” part of 
the system which permeated every institution, not only at a governmental level, but 
also the private sector. 
The northern states were able to create a network of corruption, far away 
from the eyes of the central government due to the lack of communication 
infrastructure in the early XX century. Governors like Esteban Cantu resembled 
feudal kings,108 who established their own institutional system and were able to build 
an alliance with the drug dealers, due to their proximity to the US border. What they 
never expected was the economic and armed power rise of the cartels in such a 
small period of time. Nowadays, organised crime groups seem to have a much 
better organisation than the governmental security forces. Another key factor is the 
resemblance of organised crime to enterprises; it is important for the State to attack 
their economic sources and funding. Unfortunately, it is unlikely to see the current 
governments deploying such strategies, due to powerful interests, which may be 
close to high profile politicians. The lack of an integral strategy that focuses not only 
in the armed side of tackling organised crime, but also in the tracking and closure of 
their funding, is a main cause for the lack of success of the past and present 
security policies that the Mexican State has developed. 
Another situation that can be addressed is the lack of vision to implement 
prevention strategies that would focus both on the addicts and the suppliers. 
Enforcement strategies have been deployed for decades, and since operation 
Interception there has been direct involvement from the armed forces with drug 
combat. Thousands of millions of dollars have been spent, and yet the results are 
not only adverse, but appear to have counter effects, such as the rise in the levels 
of violence. The economic side effects of the war against drugs cannot be 
overlooked; since the Cold War ended radical neoliberal reforms have been 
introduced in Mexico due to the pressure of the Americans. Political repression and 
disappearances of social leaders opposed to these economic reforms, both in cities 
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and the countryside have been linked to the army and its operations in security 
tasks. 
Regarding the behaviour of the security bodies in all the main security 
strategies analysed, it is important to note the extremely negative side effects of the 
armed enforcement in Mexican territory. There are similarities that can be 
established: the decrease in tourism, the rise of immigration to the US, the 
complaints from the most deprived sectors of society of the soldiers assaulting and 
violating their basic rights, and the direct intervention of the American government n 
Mexico’s security policies. Whether it has been merely diplomatic, or with the supply 
of weapons and economic aid (the largest one being the Merida Initiative), both 
nations have had the need to work together in the development of the strategies. 
The results of their cooperation have always damaged Mexico’s society tissue more 
than the American, as most of the armed confrontation takes place in the Mexican 
side, even though the United States is the main consumer of the drugs being 
produced and distributed in Mexico. 
Analysing the nature of the war against drugs in the context of US-Mexico 
relations, would be a fascinating subject for a whole research, but this project is 
focused on creating a legal framework in order to increase protection to civilians, 
against human rights abuses. Based on the facts stated in this chapter, it can be 
established that the presence from the armed forces on public space, and their daily 
interaction with common citizens will be permanent. As it has been stated, contrary 
to popular belief, the army has been performing security tasks for the past 30 years, 
and even though the rate of abuses raised at an exponential level since ex-
president Calderón implemented the current strategy due to the permanent 
deployment of troops, it is important to understand that the army has been an 
integral part of the anti-drug strategies since the first one was conceived. 
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Chapter II 
2. International law and accountability for the Mexican civil-
military current context 
 
There are two main points to analyse in the current context of Mexico’s civil-
military relations. First, there is the lack of an international monitoring of the armed 
conflict, even though, as it is discussed in this topic, the security strategy of both the 
Calderon and the Peña Nieto administrations gathers certain elements that can be 
subjected to the legal scrutiny of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Regardless 
of this elements being present every day in the current strategy, there is not a 
proper system of international legal surveillance.  
 Second, the lack of accountability from the armed forces and the security 
civilian secretaries represents a failure in the democratic system that Mexico wants 
to achieve. The numerous complaints that involve the armed forces in the last 8 
years show that a deficit of legitimacy from the army currently exists. As it will be 
discussed later, the Military Justice Code reform is a step in the right direction, but it 
has noticeable flaws, and until this day, only a single military has been sentenced in 
civilian courts.  
Why should international institutions, such as IHL, Human Rights law, and 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) be considered as relevant to the war against 
drugs in Mexico? One of the main problems that comes when the armed forces are 
deployed without a set of reforms and regulations beforehand, is the absence of a 
correspondent legal body that will regulate this new context, either as a set of 
established emergency powers, constitutional regulations that would enable a State 
of emergency, or civilian figures with legal attributions to control the military. 
National law tends to establish balances and control interests which are confronted; 
the problem is that the armed forces are traditionally ruled by laws applied to 
international conflicts. These laws are one-dimensional and do not try to balance 
interests between parties, as their main interest is to limit as much as possible the 
possibility of a State force to cause unnecessary damage to the population of the 
zone where the armed conflict takes part. Therefore, the need for international 
frameworks that specialise in the regulation of armed conflicts and the protection of 
universal human rights are important to be addressed in this research. 
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 This chapter covers the academic discussion centred around the 
international legal frameworks that have focused on responsibility, international 
humanitarian law, accountability, human rights and the way in which the Mexican 
State is (or is not) complying with them. There are essential distinctions between 
IHL and Human Rights Law that are addressed and their sources are also different, 
especially when concerning its involvement in non-international armed conflicts. 
These distinctions involve factors like the type of conflict that is addressed, and the 
institutions in charge of investigating and prosecuting. The relevance of establishing 
the distinctions resides in the voices that have asked for the ICC to act in the current 
war against drugs in Mexico; the reports from human rights abuses by members of 
the armed forces has created the need to talk about possible international 
intervention. As it will be seen, the potential for IHL and the ICC to be applied in his 
conflict is complicated and unlikely at the present time, and this chapter seeks to 
explain the cause for this unlikeness for its application in the current context.  
 The current challenges for Mexico in matters of accountability and individual 
responsibility are also addressed in this chapter. Perhaps, the most important 
reform that theoretically reforms the mechanisms of accountability for armed 
personnel accused of human rights abuses is the Military Justice Code reform or 
article 57. The legal reforms and its application are also discussed here. Finally, 
transitional justice is addressed as a way of explaining how the Military Justice 
Code reform is part of Mexico’s democratic evolution in the face of its current 
domestic conflict. 
 The term “human rights” is not defined as a concept in the Mexican 
constitution, as the Mexican juridical system does not have a Human Rights Act or 
code, although the National Commission of Human Rights does define them as: 
 “The group of prerogatives sustained on human dignity, whose effective 
accomplishment results indispensable for the integral development of the 
person. This group of prerogatives is found established on the national 
juridical order, out Political Constitution, international treaties and laws.”109 
 The Mexican Political Constitution establishes in its first article that every 
person will enjoy of the rights that are both addressed in the Constitution and the 
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international treaties that Mexico has signed.110 Therefore, this thesis refers to 
human rights as the ones listed on international frameworks which Mexico is a party 
to, mainly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified on 23 
March 1981), the American Convention on Human Rights (ratified on 2 March 
1981), and the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States.  
2.1 Accountability 
A large sector of Mexican society has been pleading to prosecute not only 
the military personnel who have physically committed human rights violations, but 
also the commanders and political actors who have given the orders, and/or 
protected the abusers. When Felipe Calderón issued the Presidential Decree which 
gave a very questionable legitimacy to the deployment of the Armed Forces, he did 
not send a proposal to the Federal Congress, and the legislative did not work on 
any accountability reforms. Another issue resides in the lack of development in 
criminal responsibility as a theoretical concept in the Mexican criminal codes, both 
at a federal and at a state level; as a result, countless crimes -which go from verbal 
abuse to torture and homicide-, have been committed since the end of 2006. The 
responsibility of sanctioning such acts should not be exclusive to the domestic 
courts, but also involve the international law institutions, as the conflict meets the 
requirements for International Humanitarian Law to intervene. In this section, a brief 
recount of the development of international institutions is explained, along with the 
main concepts and institutions which are used to bring different State actors to 
justice. The former will give us an understanding of the needed reforms for the 
current human rights issue that Mexico is facing. It is appropriate to set a brief 
historical and theoretical background of the modern development of the concepts 
which encompass the subject of accountability. 
The foundations for the modern concepts of State accountability were 
established after World War I. In its aftermath, the Allies saw the need to create a 
commission that would revise and determine if war crimes had been committed; this 
commission was called the Preliminary Peace Conference. In this event, a majority 
of its members determined that there was responsibility from the Central Powers, 
which had proceeded “in violation of established laws and customs of war and the 
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elementary laws of humanity”.111 The Allies eventually included articles regarding 
the violation of customs of war and laws in the Treaty of Versailles.112 Although 
these first treaties were not very relevant at a field level (especially in light of the 
subsequent events of World War II), the theoretical foundations of such concepts 
were established for the first time. 
The Nuremberg trials established criminal responsibility for the new 
concepts of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against peace. The 
United Nations General Assembly adopted these principles in 1946, and the 
International Law Commissions adopted the same principles in 1950.113 After that, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN International Covenants, 
European Convention on Human Rights, American Convention on Human Rights, 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights among others, all adopted the 
concept of individual responsibility in war times.  
2.1.1 Accountability from the perspective of international law: a modern 
perspective 
For international law, the State used to be the most important of all subjects; 
(it should be addressed that Hans Kelsen created the first tie between International 
and Domestic Law –which was also called Municipal Law-114). Even today, the State 
is one of the key elements of International Law. Under it, the legal community has 
developed a mechanism that confers responsibility upon the States through treaties 
with other ones. Post WWII theoretical conceptions gave birth to the International 
Human Rights,115 and legal academics supported this creation; García Amador 
established that International Law did not only protect the rights of the State, but 
also the rights of non-State actors; therefore, such individuals should be fully 
incorporated under the protection of contemporary bodies.116 After the Nuremberg 
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Trials new theoretical issues were conceived as academics, lawyers, and judges 
started to cross-reference International Humanitarian Law, International Human 
Rights Law, and Criminal Law itself. Shorts and de Than point out the example of 
the Anto Furundzija case, who was tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and in his appeal both the Appeal Chamber and all 
sides kept referencing the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), particularly 
article 6 which states the right to a hair hearing.117 This proved how important were 
the Nuremberg Trials and its aftermath, for the development of contemporary 
legislations, but also for the incorporation of courts specialized in human rights in 
different regions of the world.  
The theoretical development explained above made a strong impact on all 
international bodies of law. The International Court Statute established in its article 
36 that lawyers who wished to apply for a judge position should be proficient in both 
criminal law and important “areas of international law and international humanitarian 
law and the law of human rights…”118 As it can be seen, human rights became an 
integral part of criminal law theory, as they have been built upon humanistic 
principles which (in most cases), do not enter in conflict with political affiliations, so 
most States have been able to establish them without falling into political turmoil. 
Academics state that in order to establish a new individual accountability 
culture, different bodies of law have been developed.119 Such bodies constitute the 
foundation for the purpose of bringing commanders and high rank State public 
servants to justice. The first one is International Human Rights Law, which the same 
authors explain as the body developed to dignify every human at a world-scale 
level, not only at a domestic level but also at an international field.120 The second 
body is represented by International Humanitarian Law, which will monitor and take 
actions regarding the behaviour shown in an armed conflict by the actors. Such 
actions include restrictions and protection to different persons taking part in it.121 
The third body is constituted by International Criminal Law, which Ratner 
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establishes, creates a theoretical conflict. The former reason resides in the fact that 
such legal bodies refer to the law which attach culpability –from a criminal 
perspective-, to actors who violate international law. The problem is to clarify how 
an international body can work to point out individual responsibility.122 (It should be 
clarified that Individual Responsibility is a term used exclusively by international 
legal bodies to point out the commission of human rights atrocities). Two main 
questions are set questions: 1) which is the easiest path that International Law has 
for assigning criminal responsibility in a direct way? 2) What are the limits for 
International Law to oblige the different States to impose sanctions?123 This is 
especially troubling for international legal bodies, such as the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, whose influence has been mild in the case of Mexico, establishing 
responsibilities within the State, but with no concrete actions taken inside the 
country.  
According to Abrams, Ratner and Bischoff the terms “individual 
responsibility” and “criminal responsibility” tend to be interchanged indiscriminately, 
when in fact both concepts are extremely related, but, describe different aspects of 
legal responsibility for violations in human rights. Individual responsibility refers to a 
subject of responsibility for criminal activity against human rights; such subjects 
would be individual, group and State responsibility.124 Criminal responsibility refers 
to the type of responsibility, which according to both international and domestic law, 
would be criminal and civil responsibility.125 In practice, the situation is less 
rewarding because most of the goals set in the international law scope are 
relegated to the States; this is why the concept of civil responsibility is used, which 
in fact would be State responsibility. Such responsibility operates when a 
determined State does not meet international or human rights expectations. 
International law has adopted responsibility for non-state groups as a whole126 and 
has accepted the penalization through civil liability by part of the State. 
Another basic point is to address the difference between international crime 
and crime under international law. The former is a figure used to award 
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responsibility to the State in an international legal context; the second concept 
refers to an individual, also in an international legal context. The International Law 
Commission states that the individual responsibility being attributed to an individual 
for an international crime does not necessarily attach responsibility to the State, but 
neither exhausts the responsibility that this one might have. The conclusion that 
Sunga established from the classification of the ILC is that the subject matter will 
determine the relation between the normativity of an international crime and its 
relation with the individual criminal responsibility.127 This is especially important 
when the investigations focus on determining and delimiting responsibilities, which 
might or might not be shared. During a trial it might be established that a State 
acted within the limits of international law, while some of its members might be 
found guilty at an individual level. These concepts date back to the Nuremberg 
Trials, where –as opposed to the theoretical standards of the time-, it was 
established that International Law could also act upon individuals, not only States. 
This also broke with the positivism of classic theories, which created a separation 
between International Law who only attributed the quality of subject to States, and 
National Law, in which such term only belonged to individuals.  It can be seen that 
the concept of the individual has come a long way after the Nuremberg Trials, but –
as opposed to the pre-WWII theoretical conceptions-, the subject of State 
responsibility did not develop in the same way in the second half of the XX century. 
As it has been mentioned before, the difficulty of prosecuting an abstract concept 
such as a “State” has been the most difficult to analyse. The result of debates within 
legal academy has been the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, later adopted by the ICC. 
2.1.2 The International Military Tribunal 
Fallowing the arrest of prominent Nazi commanders at the end of WWII, the 
International Military Tribunal in the city of Nuremberg was created especially for the 
prosecution of war crimes. The IMT Charter was the legal outcome of the newly-
established court; it is a decree that was issued on the 8th of August of 1945128, 
which contained all the procedures and legal body to carry on with the Nuremberg 
Trials. The governments that signed the agreement were the United States of 
America, the (provisional government) of France, United Kingdom and the ex-Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics.  
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The IMT Charter contains one of the basic principles of command 
responsibility in its Article 6, which states the types of crimes that will be subjected 
to individual responsibility. Crimes Against Humanity is the subject matter and it is 
defined as “namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; 
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”129 The Charter also 
made reforms which erased previous concepts such as command of law, act-of-
state immunity, and the defences of superior orders; the former concepts were 
established in the Control Council Law No. 10 (which prosecuted various Nazis 
before the IMT and then was picked by the United Nations General Assembly of 
1946), and the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal.130 
On the subject of individual responsibility, the Nuremberg trials were 
pioneers in prosecuting war criminals, but they were established as part of global 
legalism when the General Assembly reaffirmed the concepts used in Nuremberg 
and the International Law Commission and established them in 1950.131 After such 
principles were established, the concept of individual responsibility was adopted on 
most international and human rights law bodies (and, of course, the International 
Criminal Court Statute). According to Abrams, Ratner and Bischoff there is still an 
on-going debate about where can State responsibility end and when does individual 
responsibility start.132 Up until the last decades of the XIX century, the States had 
complete immunity, as it was considered undignified to them to be prosecuted or 
submitted to external legal decisions. Until then, only individuals were liable be 
punished for their acts. At the end of the XIX century, the need to develop new 
mechanisms to attach responsibility to this became a matter of urgency. Later, in 
the second half of the XX century, agreements like the European Convention on 
State Immunity (1972), took place. 
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2.1.3 International Humanitarian law and armed conflicts: is the 
application of IHL in Mexico’s non-international security problem 
possible? 
Mexico has signed the major international treaties and agreements 
regarding International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Law.133 The 
adaptation of international frameworks to its domestic codes has been subpar 
though, as they have not evolved or gone through any deep reforms in order to 
adapt the current military context (the Mexican Constitution and the Federal 
Criminal Code do not contemplate special provisions for a situation where the 
armed forces are permanently deployed). If Mexico does not show political will to 
reform its own legal bodies, then the International legal institutions must take the 
appropriate measures. Here is an explanation of how IHL and the organisms which 
apply it work. 
The concept of International Humanitarian Law can be described as: 
“International rules, established by treaties or custom, which are 
specifically intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from 
international or non-international armed conflicts and which, for humanitarian 
reasons, limit the right of Parties to a conflict to use the methods and means 
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of warfare of their choice or protect persons and property that are, or may be, 
affected by conflict”.134 
By its part, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) establishes 
that IHL:  
…a set of rules which seek for humanitarian reasons to limit the effects 
of armed conflict. IHL protects persons who are not or who are no longer 
participating in hostilities and it restricts means and methods of warfare. IHL is 
also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict...135  
Wolfrum and Fleck address that, one of the particularities of IHL is its lack of 
enforcement from a determinate institution or central body, as such enforcement 
comes rather by domestic law, and this is its main weakness.136 Another essential 
point is that a State can be liable to pay compensation to the affected parties if it 
violates the provisions of the Protocols, or if the armed forces commit illegal acts 
against citizens.137 The downside of these provisions is that “collateral damages” (a 
term used in the past by the Mexican military commanders, which means the 
casualties or destruction caused by the State security forces while a clash with 
organised crime takes place) are not regulated.138 
2.1.4 The types of conflicts covered by IHL 
Which are the main differences between international and non-international 
conflicts? For the purpose of analysing the possible application of IHL in Mexico, the 
frameworks dedicated to domestic conflicts are the centre of this topic, but it is 
appropriate to address the concept of its international conflicts first. Greenwood 
states that an armed conflict is considered international “if one state uses force of 
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arms against another state”.139 Article 2 paragraph 2 common to the Geneva 
Conventions 1949 refers to the fact that when a conflict between two states arise 
and the armed forces are involved, it will be considered an armed conflict even if 
one of the parties does not acknowledge the existence of a state of war. 
It should be addressed at this point that International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) has a different application than International Human Rights Law (IHRL),140 as 
the first one applies only in armed conflicts, while IHRL is applicable at all times. 
IHRL are rules that every person is entitled to, whereas the provisions contained in 
IHL depend on very specific circumstances. Both bodies of rules are applicable in 
armed conflicts, but IHRL’s scope of application is much broader and covers 
situations outside the confinement of armed conflicts. 
By its part, the legal distinction between international and non-international 
conflicts has been intricate and difficult to legislate. One of the essential pillars for 
the regulation of domestic armed conflicts is article 13 of the Additional Protocol II of 
the Geneva Conventions, which establishes the rules for the protection of victims of 
non-international conflicts. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
has commented that the sentence’s “general protection against the dangers arising 
from military operations” refers to “movements of attack or defence by the armed 
forces in action”.141 Additionally, the ICRC states the prohibition of attacks against 
the civilians “remains valid, even if the adversary has committed breaches”.142 As 
Fleck states, there are four principles applicable to all military operations, regardless 
of the international or domestic context: the distinction between civilian objects and 
military objectives, and civilians and fighters; the prohibition of unnecessary 
suffering or superfluous injury, and; the treatment of very person in a humane way 
without any type of discrimination.143 
The principles mentioned above could cause confusion in the case of non-
international conflicts, where the State security forces are in direct clash with non-
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State actors, like the Mexican case. The civilian nature of those participating directly 
in the confrontations has been limited to preserve the logic of the jus in bello 
provisions. As the ICRC has established, “those who belong to armed forces or 
armed groups may be attacked at any time. If a civilian participates directly in 
hostilities, it is clear that he will not enjoy any protection against attacks for as long 
as his participation lasts”.144 The commentary also includes an essential phrase, 
which is relevant on the light of accusations of extrajudicial executions by members 
of the armed forces in Mexico, as the Committee establishes that, after the 
participation of the civilian in the hostilities, “as he no longer presents any danger for 
the adversary, he may not be attacked; moreover, in case of doubt regarding the 
status of an individual, he is presumed to be a civilian. Anyone suspected of having 
taken part in hostilities and deprived of his liberty for this reason will have the benefit 
of the provisions laid down in Articles 4, 5 and 6”145 (of the Additional Protocol II), 
which refer to the fundamental guarantees, the persons whose liberty has been 
restricted, and the penal prosecutions. The comment from the ICRC enforces the 
Mexican armed forces to avoid using any kind of inhumane treatment to individuals 
that are already out of combat. Events such as the Tlatlaya massacre would 
indicate that the security forces have been violating the jus in bello principles of 
Additional Protocol II. 
2.1.5 Non-International conflicts 
The legal foundations for non-international issues are common article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions (GC), Additional Protocol II, and customary international 
law. The Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 
1977 was an amendment made in order to address domestic armed conflicts. This 
protocol consists of 28 articles which set the concepts of non-international armed 
conflicts and the rules that apply to the parties involved. Article 1 paragraph 1 
recommends its application in conflicts:  
…which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its 
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups 
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its 
                                                          
144 International Committee of the Red Cross [ 4789] 
145 ibid 
57 
 
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol.146 
 With the former definition it can be established that the security strategy 
issue in Mexico -the numerous reports of civilians murdered and injured-, contains 
elements that make the application of the legal frameworks of IHL possible, as the 
organised crime groups have been seizing territories in order to control the 
distribution and production of drugs. As the government has responded with the use 
of the army, the armed conflict involves a direct confrontation between State forces 
and non-State actors. 
 According to Greenwood, a non-international conflict can be established as:  
…a confrontation between the existing governmental authority and groups of 
persons subordinated to this authority or between different groups none of 
which acts on behalf of the government, which is carried out by force of arms 
within national territory and reaches the magnitude of an armed confrontation 
of civil war147 
 This definition also finds similarities with the development of the armed 
conflict in Mexico, as the drug cartels are in direct confrontation with the official 
security forces. As an example of the clarity of the conflict, it should be mentioned 
that the members of organised crime have even left written messages in the crime 
scenes directed not only at the federal government, but also at local levels.148 
Unfortunately, Mexico is not a party to Additional Protocol II (only to Protocol I), so 
this means that the provisions of this protocol cannot be directly applied in this 
conflict. The purpose is to compare the Mexican security context with the elements 
of what Additional Protocol II establishes for a conflict to be classified as a non-
international armed conflict. This recognition can be useful in order to establish the 
potential commission of war crimes by members of the armed forces, hence, the 
importance of addressing the existence of the Protocol. 
2.1.6 Application of IHL in domestic armed conflicts 
As it has been established, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is 
the most relevant provision to apply in a non-international armed conflict. According 
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to the ICRC, this covers “armed conflicts in which one or more non-governmental 
armed groups are involved”.149 There is a threshold in the level of confrontation that 
a situation requires for to be classified as a non-international armed conflict., and 
Additional Protocol II establishes in its Article 1(2) that no application will be done 
“to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed 
conflicts.”150 
The Tadic case was essential in order to develop concepts that would 
differentiate armed conflicts from riots and disturbances (1) the intensity of the 
conflict and (2) the organisation of the parts in conflict. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia established that “armed conflict exists whenever 
there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such 
groups within a State”.151 Academics stress that other relevant factors include: the 
seriousness of attacks, their geographic spread and temporal persistence, the 
mobilization of government forces, the distribution of weapons and whether the 
situation has attracted the attention of the UN Security Council.152 Lawland points 
almost identical requirements as he establishes that the violence must reach a 
certain level of intensity and the opposing armed groups must show a minimum 
degree of organisational level. Such variables must be analysed in their individual 
context; the intensity of the conflict is measured by the severity and duration of the 
armed confrontations, the number of State agents involved and the consequences 
and casualties of the clashes. By its part, the organisation of the opposite criminal 
groups is measured by their network, their resources and ability to operate. No 
specific motives of an armed group are needed as a requirement.153  
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It should be pointed that the Geneva Convention does not include the term 
“civil war” in Article 3; the word to describe such concept is “armed conflict not of an 
international character”154. This term might have been introduced as a way of 
broadening the possibilities of international humanitarian law to operate, as the first 
phrase would considerably limit the capabilities of IHL application. 
For the second factor (the organisation of the parts in conflict), the ICTY 
Chamber mentioned in the Haradinaj case the existence of a command structure, 
disciplinary mechanisms, headquarters, control of territory, access to weapons, 
military style training, ability to plan and carry out military operations, and ability to 
speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as ceasefire or 
peace accords as elements that encompass the concept of organisation.155 In the 
Lubanga case, factors such as intimal hierarchy, commando structure, equipment 
and weapons, ability to plan and carry out military operations, and extent of military 
involvement were established as elements of organisation.156 
For his part, Jean Pictet established general considerations that distinguish 
non-international armed conflicts from internal disturbances and tensions157: 1) The 
Party in confrontation with the government has military force, responsible authorities 
for their acts, acting in a determinate territory, and being able to respect and ensure 
respect for the Geneva Convention; 2) That the government is forced to use their 
armed forces against insurgents which have taken control of parts of the territory 
and are organised in a military style; 3) that the government recognises the 
opponents as belligerents, that these ones consider themselves as belligerent, and 
that the Security Council or UN General Assembly recognises the opponents as 
threats to international peace, or as committing acts of aggression; 4) Pictet also 
establishes certain conditions for the insurgents.  
It should be addressed that Pictet explained that the insurgent civil authority 
should agree with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, which would be a 
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problem to apply in Mexico, as obviously the drug cartels are not willing to guide 
their actions by any legal bodies. Nevertheless, the author also establishes that the 
scope of application of this article should be as wide as possible,158 and for this 
reason, not all the conditions mentioned above should necessarily be met. The rules 
applied to the actors in a non-international conflict can be said to have human 
protection as their priority, being that the main goal is to guarantee that every 
person involved in either an active or a passive way gets an adequate, humane and 
dignified treatment.159 Lawland states that even enemies that have been wounded in 
the conflict must be attended in the same way as the other actors.160  
Rowe states that in non-international conflicts the armed forces are fighting 
against civilians; it is unlikely for these armed groups to have military training, so 
international humanitarian law would be a topic unknown to them.161 The Mexican 
drug cartel called Los Zetas, however, contradicts Rowe’s theory, as the majority of 
their members consist of ex-members of special troops forces162, a condition that 
makes them one of the deadliest and most successful criminal groups in existence 
(their leader –Miguel Angel Treviño Morales, known as the “Z-40”-, was captured by 
the marines on the 16th of July of 2013163, but at the time of writing, it is still 
unknown if this will have an effect on the cartel’s structure and operation). This is 
one of the main concerns about the high number or soldiers deserting every year, it 
has been easy for cartels to recruit them with a promise of better wages and more 
powerful positions.  
The States have a major responsibility to conduct investigations and control 
the military’s actions in the case of a non-international conflict. The Additional 
Protocol I of the GC establishes in its article 87 the duty of military commanders to 
                                                          
158 Ibid 36 
159 Additional Protocol II, art 4(2)(a) 
160 1949 Geneva Convention, arts 12-13[2] 
161 P. Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2006) 168 
162 K. Stastna, “The cartels behind Mexico’s drug war” (CBC News August 28 2011) 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/08/28/f-mexico-drug-cartels.html, accessed 10 
April 2013 
163 AP, “Mexico captures Zetas leader Miguel Angel Treviño Morales, known as Z-40” (The 
Guardian 16 July 2013) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/16/mexico-drugs-trade, 
accessed 18 July 2013 
61 
 
prevent, supress and report any breaches of the Conventions.164 Rowe states that 
such a role will belong to the domestic legal bodies, including military law. The same 
author states that the rank of a military might be a key factor for limiting the 
investigation of expanding into other actors, using the concepts for command 
responsibility.165 The Mexican case is more extreme, as it shows a complete 
absence of a professional criminal code for the armed forces in times of non-
international conflict. 
To reinforce the former statement, Rowe enlists a number of factors that 
present obstacles for domestic law to serve as the immediate medium of 
prosecution.166 Among various points, the right of a State to reform or amend the 
law is perfectly accepted regardless of the stage of the conflict (international 
humanitarian law cannot go through any amends during the course of such conflict). 
Depending on the situations that are presented during the course or the armed 
issue, the State forces might be willing to engage in conducts that would have been 
considered inappropriate at another stage of the conflict. Desperation from the State 
in order to end the conflict with a favourable note can cause the forces to relegate 
the respect to human rights to a second place. This is consistent with Calderón’s 
rhetoric when he stated that the fatalities of innocent civilians were “collateral 
damages”.167 Another factor that Rowe establishes is the domestic codification, 
which may contain provisions which give impunity to the military for all its actions, or 
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it might cause a conflict between domestic and international legislation; it will all 
depend on the extensive powers given at a national level. The final point made by 
the author is the difficulty for victims and witnesses to recognize their offenders due 
to them being camouflaged in uniforms.168 This last factor might be debatable, as 
part of the investigation should focus on getting access to all information relating to 
work shifts, names and positions of every military personnel involved in a certain 
space and time, but there’s no denying that most witnesses tend to be very 
intimidated when they have to face military personnel. This issue is another 
obligation for the Mexican State to apply reforms that will give all witnesses a 
minimum of security.  
Rowe establishes that States whose military authorities have the monopoly 
when investigating their own personnel, tend to have more problems for prosecution 
and access to victims’ justice. He quotes that Inter-American Commission by 
establishing that most suspects of sexual abuse or other violations are rarely 
convicted.169 It seems that military impunity due to the complete military legal control 
in Latin America is a common theme. This is a point worth taking into account when 
reforming domestic codes; it is necessary to establish mechanisms for the victims to 
access international humanitarian law in a safer and easier way. In the couple of 
cases of military personnel being tried that were analysed for the first chapter, all of 
them were still being “investigated”. This makes it virtually impossible for the victim 
to access international justice because the domestic paths have still not been 
exhausted as the trial has not started even years after the official investigation 
started. There is no way for the ICRC to monitor the procedure in any way, because 
the file is kept in military desks as classified information (even though civilian 
criminal trials are public, except for kidnapping and sexual assault, the military has 
not agreed to make public any information, to the extent that not even the victims 
have access to any information). 
At a domestic level in Mexico, the Military Justice Code (MJC) has explicitly 
stated in its article 78 that the Military Public Ministry (the institution in charge of 
investigations), will collect all the needed data to certify the existence of a crime and 
the possible responsibility of the suspects. The problem with the MJC is that the 
crimes contemplated in it do no cover human rights violations, which was what 
triggered the recent reform of article 57. 
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2.1.7 How has Mexico complied with IHL? 
 In 2009, Felipe Calderon issued a presidential decree created the 
Interministerial Committee on International Humanitarian Law (CIDIH).170 Its 
principal mission is to ““disseminate and promote respect for international 
humanitarian law rules, principles and institutions and further the national 
implementation of Mexico’s commitments in this respect under the international 
treaties to which it is a party”.171 Regardless of the creation of this institution, the 
abuse of human rights by members of the armed forces has not seen a change in 
policies, and very few information can be found on the activities of the CIDIH.  
In order to address non-international armed conflicts according to the 1977 
Additional Protocols, the CIDIH has established as one of its main objectives “to 
review the definition of offences contained in the Federal Criminal Code, in light of 
the [1998] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocol I [of 1977], with a view to bringing 
them into line with international standards.”172 
On the subject of the use of force by Mexican law enforcement officials, the 
president of the ICRC, Mr Peter Maurer, established that the protection of persons 
and the rule of law needs to be essential when the military forces take part in 
security tasks, and concluded stating that the ICRC has been cooperating with the 
Mexican armed forces and security bodies in order to adapt legal standards of 
human rights to the procedures, doctrines and training of the security institutions.173 
2.1.8 The concept of war crimes: is it possible to apply in the Mexican 
security conflict? 
Sanctions are applied to serious violations of international humanitarian law; 
such offenses are called war crimes. The actors who break the law shall be 
penalized by the domestic law, but in certain cases criminals will also be prosecuted 
by the International Criminal Court. At a domestic level in Mexico, there has always 
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been a strong reluctance of political actors and military commanders of subjecting 
their personnel to international scrutiny (as evidenced in the last chapter of this 
research) Finally, in order to determine the classification of a conflict, the ICRC will 
engage in a dialogue with those under the threat of the conflict; subsequently, they 
will perform an analysis with the points mentioned previously (the requirements for a 
situation to qualify for a non-international armed conflict), and finally make the 
classification through a public statement. 174 Article 5 of the Rome Statute states 
that the ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals under the conditions defined 
under articles 121 and 123.175 It should be noted that the investigation for war 
crimes will belong to the State, being that international humanitarian law will only 
work monitoring the conflict. Regarding the concept of war crimes, the permanent 
representative of Mexico established in a UN Security Council on the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict the following: 
We should bear in mind that violations of the norms and basic 
principles of international humanitarian law constitute war crimes, and that it is 
the Member States who bear the primary responsibility to investigate and 
prosecute those allegedly responsible for them. … Should States lack the 
capacity or willingness to prosecute alleged perpetrators, the International 
Criminal Court has jurisdiction to take up such crimes, as set forth in the 
Rome Statute [1998 ICC Statute].176 
 The most precise list of war crimes in domestic conflicts is –according to 
Ratner, Abrams and Bischoff-, the Rome Statute of the ICC, which is still shorter 
that its inter-state counterpart.177 Its article 8 is the one which refers to war crimes, 
and the relevant part of the provision for the Mexican conflict is its subparts c, d, e 
and f, which refer to the violations of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
and other violations for the situations of non-international conflict. It should be noted 
that article 8 establishes that such provisions will not be applied in situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions. 
 Are there any general principles in order to regulate the conduct of the State 
security forces in domestic conflicts? In the Prosecutor v Tadic jurisdiction decision, 
the Appeals Chamber referred to the German Military Manual of 1992, which 
establishes that: “Members of the German army, like their Allies, shall comply with 
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the rules of international humanitarian law in the conduct of military operations in all 
armed conflicts, whatever the nature of such conflicts.”178 The purpose of the 
Chamber with this reference was to establish general principles to regulate 
hostilities in non-international conflicts are also carried in military domestic 
manuals.179 The Appeals Chamber also established that it is the right of the parties 
in conflict to limit the scope of the right “to adopt means of injuring the enemy”.180 
There is also the need to set a logical standard of what is acceptable at a domestic 
level, regardless of the internal regulations at the time of a domestic conflict, as the 
Chamber also stated that “what is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in 
international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife”.181 This 
rationale implies that states need to regulate their standards of confronting internal 
enemies in harmony with the international standards. 
 In the Tadic case, the defence agreed that the provisions entailed on 
international conflicts do not “entail individual criminal responsibility when breaches 
are committed in internal armed conflicts”.182 The Chamber established that, 
although common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did not make a direct 
reference to criminal liability when the provisions are violated, the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg established that “a finding of individual criminal 
responsibility is not barred by the absence of treaty provisions on punishment of 
breaches”.183 What does the concept of individual criminal responsibility in respect 
to war crimes mean? Chuter establishes that the “individual” can be either a military 
commander or a civilian.184 The way of proving such responsibility is highly 
complicated, as the same author addresses, in the case of war crimes, the range 
and the depth of the factual material which the prosecutor neds to prove are much 
greater than in domestic trials.185 Since the Rome Statute was concluded, the UN 
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Security Council has provided with more material on individual accountability in 
domestic conflicts, as on the situation on Sierra Leone (SC res 1315), they 
established that “persons who commit or authorize serious violations of international 
humanitarian law are individually responsible and accountable for those violations 
and that the international community will exert every effort to bring those 
responsible to justice”.186  
The principle of complementarity is another issue that limits international 
prosecutors, as the International Criminal Court (ICC), must first analyse and decide 
if the domestic prosecutors and courts are conducting an investigation and posterior 
prosecution in a proper way.187 This principle intends to give the ICC the quality of a 
“last resort” court, which will supplement, but not supress domestic jurisdiction,188 as 
the Rome Statute establishes the responsibility of States to exercise their own 
jurisdiction over international crimes.189 The rationale is that domestic courts have 
better access to the evidence and keep control of the procedures in direct way. The 
Appeals Chamber in the Prosecutor v German Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 
case established that the principle of complementarity would operate in a State that 
has been proven to be unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute.190 This 
means that as long as the domestic jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting the 
case, unless the conditions mentioned previously appear.191 
2.1.9 Customary International Law 
The importance of this area of law in this research relies in the fact that IHL, 
and various other legal sources -such as the Convention against Torture- are 
sources of customary law. Its use goes back centuries ago, as philosophy and 
religion shaped the practices of international law, and customary laws made for 
warfare have been part of the grounds for modern international legal frameworks.192  
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Customary law is shaped by customs and practices, and as Judge Read 
established on the Fisheries case, it can be considered as “the generalization of the 
practice of States”,193 or as the International Court of Justice established in the 
Libya v Malta case, customary international law is found “primarily in the actual 
practice and opinion juris of States”.194 Postema establishes the values that are 
used to understand the concept of “custom”, these being: behaviour or usage (usus) 
plus belief or conviction of necessity (opinion juris sive necessitates).195 As 
Steinhardt addresses, both common law and civil systems incorporate customary 
international law as domestic law (here lays the importance of the Mexican legal 
system to comply with the current international standards on the use of force, and 
the prevention of practices like torture by their officers).196  
There is an essential role that customary law plays in modern legal systems; 
Perreau-Saussine and Murphy state that the growth and application of customary 
law in cases where the legislators have left a gap to fill needs to be developed as 
well as new frameworks.197 They also establish that the written law is unable to give 
“exhaustive directions on its own interpretation, (so) customary rules and practice 
inevitable guide judicial interpretation”.198 
2.1.10 Human rights law applied in non-international armed conflicts 
The rights covered in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
are considered to be part of customary law by an increasing number of academics 
in recent times.199 The principle of sovereignty of a state which is found in article 
2(7) of the UN Charter establishes that no State can intrude in other State’s 
domestic affairs, but in the subject of human rights, reinterpretation has been 
                                                          
193 Fisheries case, ICJ December 18th I95I (ICJ Reports 1951) 79 
194 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) Judgment (ICJ Reports 1985) 27 
195 A. Perreau-Saussine and J.B. Murphy (eds), The Nature of Customary Law: Legal, 
Historical and Philosophical Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, UK 2007) citing 
Postmena, 279 
196 R Steinhardt, “The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights 
Law” in H. Hannum (ed) , Guide to International Human Rights Practice (4th edn, 
Transnational Publishers Lc, NY 2004) 272 
197 A. Perreau-Saussine and J. B. Murphy (n 195) 1 
198 ibid 10 
199 See N.S. Rodley, “Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: the Case Law of the 
World Court” (1989) 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 321, 333; L. Henkin, 
The Age of Rights (New York: Columbia University, 1990) 19 
68 
 
carried on, in order to have international surveillance on domestic human rights 
issues.200 
How does a State comply with the customary application of human rights 
law? The Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
establishes that adhering to the UN Charter and accepting that UDHR ways of 
accepting such rules; other ways of complying with it are participating in the debates 
that include the condemnation of States that violate law.201De Schutter states that 
the ICJ has encouraged the recognition of the UDHR as a source of legal 
obligations, as this framework has been implemented at various degrees by many 
legal bills all over the world.202 Steinhardt establishes that in most legal systems 
(Mexico is an example), the judicial system is forced to incorporate or interpret their 
domestic frameworks in accordance to international law, both in conventional or 
customary forms. This author also establishes that the interpretative power of the 
judges also plays an essential role for a State to comply with international law, as 
they can fill the gaps and ambiguity of international human rights provisions.203 
Malcolm and Evans also establish that the UDRH was conceived as “a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”, instead of being a 
set of legal obligations.204 Despite this classification, the International Court of 
Justice set a strong precedent with the Barcelona Traction case, as it was 
established that the set or rules and principles on human rights, should be 
“obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole”.205 
The purpose of potentially applying human rights law in the Mexican security 
conflict would be due to the numerous complaints about human rights abuses by 
members of the security forces, in particular the military. Is there a way to make a 
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State liable for the violations of their officers? In the Sarma v Sri Lanka case, the 
Human Rights Committee established that the violations of soldiers or other officers, 
who make use of their position or authority to execute an unlawful act even when 
the subject is acting beyond his authority, will be attributed to the State.206 The 
problem with making the Mexican State liable for the violation of international law, is 
that, as section 702 of the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States establish, this violation must be part of a State policy,207 which is in 
congruence with the definition of Crimes against Humanity. 
2.1.11 The Convention against Torture and its application in the Mexican 
context 
The military in Mexico has been accused of practices that involve torture;208 
the Special Rapporteur –Juan E. Mendez- on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment made his last visit to Mexico on April-May of 
2014. In his report he concluded that there was evidence of the involvement of both 
military and civilian forces in acts of torture and ill-treatment in the stage of arrest 
and detention before the suspects were brought before a judge.209 Mendez also 
established legislative recommendations, which included the reforming of the 
Military Justice Code (which the Mexican State complied on 2015), the derogation of 
“arraigo” (the 40-day period of detention for suspects of organised crime, which is 
still legal in the Mexican Constitution until the moment of this writing), and invited 
Mexico to reform the use of force in accordance to international principles.210 
Torture is considered one of the most serious breaches of law in 
contemporary frameworks, both traditional and customary. First, the most widely 
accepted concept of torture should be established; the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’s article 1(1)211 
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was referred by the ICTY as the one that contained both the definitions established 
in the Declaration on Torture, and the Inter-American Convention, and represented 
customary international law.212 To understand the importance of this crime in 
modern legal culture, the judgement of the ICTY in the Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija 
case needs to be referred. The Court established that the States have the obligation 
to eradicate any practices of torture, and these attempts to legislate such crime 
have caused both treaties and customary rules on torture to have a highly important 
status in the international frameworks, being as relevant as crimes like genocide or 
slavery.213 In this judgement the Filartiga v Pena-Irala case was also referenced, as 
the USA Court stated that “the torturer has become, like the pirate and the slave 
trader before him, hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind”.214 The ICTY 
continued stating in the Furundzija case that the practice of torture has gained the 
status of jus cogens (compelling law).215 As Klein addresses, jus cogens “embraces 
customary laws considered binding on all nations…and is derived from values taken 
to be fundamental by the international community rather than from the fortuitous or 
self-interested choices of nations”.216  
The Furundzija case also established notions about the effects of torture as 
a peremptory norm both at inter-State and individual levels. In the first case “it 
serves to internationally de-legitimise any legislative, administrative or judicial act 
authorising torture”,217 and at an individual level (criminal liability), “it would seem 
that one of the consequences of the jus cogens character bestowed by the 
international community upon the prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled 
to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture, who 
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are present in a territory under its jurisdiction”.218 The USA Court of Appeals also 
established the importance of torture as a jus cogens law in the Siederman Blake v 
Argentina case, as it concluded that “the right to be free from official torture is 
fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest status under 
international law, a norm of ius cogens”.219 
The international legal scope on this crime has developed important 
frameworks, which as a consequence has influenced the modern Mexican 
legislation. The most important international legal body dedicated to this topic is the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT); this convention was created by the United 
Nations Committee in order to expand the principles contained in article 5 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDRH) and article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which establish that “no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”. Article 1 of the CAT defines the concept,220 and article 4 establishes 
the obligation of the States to regulate the penalties for torture in their domestic 
frameworks. The convention is the base for the standards that every State Party 
should adopt and observe regarding torture issues. It should also be pointed out 
that the CAT is considered part of the customary international law.  
Mexico signed this convention on the 3rd of January of 1986, and it started 
to be applied on the 26th of June of 1987.  In 1991, the federal congress developed 
the Federal Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Torture (FAPPT), which 
defined the concept and established the penalties for who commits this crime. In 
2012, the UN Committee against Torture developed a report on their concluding 
observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports on Mexico; in this it 
was established among other considerations that the reports of torture had 
increased alarmingly since the start of the joint security operation between the 
civilian security bodies and the armed forces. On the concept mentioned above, the 
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committee recommended that all members of security forces should be identified; 
that the persons held in official custody are clearly registered and monitored; and 
that legal assistance is given to them in order to challenge the detention.  It should 
be noted that although the UN Committee established that the Mexican State should 
reform article 3 of the FAPPT, in order to add the elements contained in article 1 of 
the CAT, these elements were already contained in article 5.221 
 Mexico has issued periodic reports to the Committee against Torture, which 
include the amendments to the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure222 and the 
Federal Act to Prevent and Punish Torture of 1991.223  Even though the Committee 
published their conclusions in 2012, the Mexican State has not shown signs of 
developing strong mechanisms of accountability for the officials that commit or order 
acts of torture. Amnesty International (AI) documented in 2015 the conclusions of a 
campaign started in 2014, and in which Mexico has one of the countries in which 
they focused. The results showed that the country continued to suffer from an 
endemic spread of torture by the security forces; and even though AI established 
that the legislative power was developing a draft for a new framework (General Law 
on Torture), they stated that most important thing that the State has to work on, are 
the sources of impunity and the strengthening of monitoring mechanisms in order to 
implement the frameworks.  
Finally, how is the nature of torture as a crime liable to individual 
application? Ratner, Abrams and Bischoff have stated that, due to the jus cogens 
nature of this crime, the adherence of the majority of States to the CAT, and the 
non-derogability of the prohibition of torture, customary international law gives 
torture the nature of a freestanding international crime.224 
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2.1.12 Can the International Criminal Court (ICC) intervene in Mexico for 
the possible commission of Crimes against Humanity? 
The ICC works as a complement to the domestic criminal court systems; its 
function consists in prosecuting crimes that States by themselves don’t want to 
prosecute or are not able to do it. For this reason, States need to make sure that all 
obstacles for the ICC to intervene in a conflict are removed from domestic legal 
bodies. 
The concept of crimes against humanity constitutes an essential addition to 
this chapter, as the current situation between the Mexican armed forces and civil 
society has reached a point of emergency since the Human Rights National and 
States Commissions started to receive dozens of complains from abuses by the 
armed forces every year (official reports of the Human Rights National Committee in 
Mexico establish that 143 complaints against the armed forces have been lodged 
from 2007-2015225). This concept embraces the protection of civilians as its main 
focus, and another essential point is the possibility of submitting members of the 
State to prosecution for the commission of this crime.  
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes the 
concept of Crimes against Humanity (CaH) in its article 7 as any of the “acts 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack”.226 This definition is important to refer in 
the Mexican armed conflict, as the crimes documented where the military are 
suspected be involved are the following: murder, torture, torture, rape, enforced 
disappearance of persons, and other inhumane acts causing suffering or serious 
bodily or mental injury. In theory, these conducts do fall into the category of CaH, 
according to article 7(1), (a)(b)(f)(g)(i) of the Rome Statute. 
The current governmental security strategy started in December of 2006, so 
in a hypothetical prosecution the defendants would not have the possibility of 
invoking the non-applicability of these Statutes because of the previously mentioned 
dates of adherence and ratification (Mexico signed the Convention on the non-
applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity in the 
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2nd of July of 1969, ratifying it on the 15th of March of 2002227). The former 
explanation is relevant because the Mexican State has attempted to refer the 
principle of non-retroactivity of treaties (basing their argument on Article 28 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties)228, in order to contest an international 
court before, concretely on the Radilla-Pacheco v Mexico case, in which the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights replied and established that the subject matter in 
which the accusation was based on (forced disappearance of persons), had a 
continuous or permanent nature, therefore it persisted after the date of Mexico’s 
adhesion to the American Convention. Due to the former, such crime “may generate 
international obligations for the State Party, without this implying a violation to the 
principle of non-retroactivity of treaties”.229  
To continue with the contemporary international legal foundations, it is also 
important to state that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
establishes in its article 5 the need for human rights abuses to be committed in the 
context of an armed conflict to be categorized as Crimes Against Humanity230, but it 
should be pointed that under customary international law this element is not 
required. For the purpose of establishing the possibility of creating a nexus between 
the human rights abuses which are attributed to military personnel in Mexico and 
the concept of crimes against humanity, the main points composing such concept 
must be analysed. Ratner analyses Article 7 by establishing the existence of two 
basic elements in the articles description, these ones being “humanity” and “against 
a….population”.231 We must clarify the current theoretical conclusions and also 
current jurisprudence in order to approach the concept to the Mexican context. 
During the intervention of the International Criminal Court in the Republic of 
Kenya, two important considerations were established:  the Court stated that an 
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attack is not limited to the ones of a military nature232, but to any type of attack to a 
civilian population, which should be distinguished by various factors such as 
ethnicity, nationality and other features, although the article cannot be referred when 
random citizens are the victims. The Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC stated that 
civilian population must be the primary object of target,233 which opens one channel 
for the application of such articles to the Mexican situation, as drug cartel members 
are the official target of the State, and the Human Rights Commission has gathered 
various evidence of attacks directed against citizens whose connection with 
organised crime has not been proved.  
In the judgement of the Prosecutor vs. Jean-Paul Akayesu case, the 
Chamber I established that “Members of the civilian population are people who are 
not taking any active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed  forces 
who laid down their arms and those persons placed hors de combat by sickness,  
wounds, detention or any other cause”.234 Another point to take into consideration is 
that the footnote 6 from the article 7(2) (a) of the Rome Statute establishes that this 
attack towards the civilian population must be part of a State active policy235, which 
in principle would fit properly with the Mexican government issue of the current 
security strategy, a policy which was actively started by the Felipe Calderón 
administration and is actively continued by the Enrique Peña Nieto administration. It 
is important to notice that the human rights abuses in Mexico have been committed 
while the soldiers are performing security duties as part of the government strategy.  
The former statement was supported by the former Defence Secretary, 
Guillermo Galván Galván, when he stated the following “Despite the deaths of 
civilians –children, young students and adults-, in the confrontations between the 
armed forces and organised crime, the strategy will be maintained, (as) they are 
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lamentable collateral damage”.236 It is important to note that this was not said during 
an informal meeting or an interview, but in the Chamber of Senators, in an official 
appearance before the senators of all political parties as part of the National 
Security Cabinet hearings. Galván seems to have justified the murders of civilians 
by inferring that the State’s main objective is to confront members of organised 
crime, but it is important to notice that recent judgements have clearly stated that 
this is not an excuse for the commission of human rights abuses. The former point 
is established by the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in The 
Prosecutor vs. Fofana and Dondewa case; the Appeals Chamber established that 
international humanitarian law must apply to every part involved in an armed 
conflict, regardless of who the “aggressor” is. Therefore, the attacks against a 
civilian population can be characterised as crimes against humanity even if the 
“ultimate objective of the fighting force was legitimate and/or aimed at responding to 
aggressors”.237 This last argument would make Galván’s argument unjustifiable at 
the eyes of an international criminal court, as the human rights abuses in Mexico 
have not been part of the structure of the governmental security strategy, but they 
have been committed by the military personnel while performing security tasks that 
the State policy orders. 
Must the attack on the civilian population be clearly stated in the State’s 
policy? The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 made some clear definitions in the judgement 
against Tihomir Blaskic, stating that the attacks might be a consequence of the 
events, among them: “the general historical circumstances and the overall political 
background against which the criminal acts are set”; “the establishment and 
implementation of autonomous military structures”; “the mobilisation of armed 
forces”; “temporally and geographically repeated and co-ordinated military 
offensives”; and “the scale of the acts of violence perpetrated –in particular, murders 
and other physical acts of violence, rape, arbitrary imprisonment, deportations and 
expulsions or the destruction of non-military property, in particular, sacral sites”.238 
The former stream of events have been proven to form part of the security strategy 
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in Mexico, which has deployed the army for an unknown time through a presidential 
decree which created a special enforcement body to help civilian security forces. 
Another highly important point would be the term “widespread attack”. What 
is the definition of the Pre-Trial Chamber II about such concept? It has been 
established by academics that an attack can be considered as widespread when it 
encompasses "the large scale nature of the attack, which should be massive, 
frequent, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against 
a multiplicity of victims"239 Can the human rights abuses in Mexico be considered a 
widespread attack? In November of 2011, just a year before ex-president Felipe 
Calderón’s presidential term finished, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report 
named “Neither Rights Nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in 
Mexico’s War on Drugs”. Such report established that Mexican military personnel 
have been responsible for human rights violations, which included 39 
disappearances, 24 extrajudicial killings (it is important to point out that death 
penalty is forbidden in Mexico, so the term “extrajudicial” is irrelevant from a 
domestic perspective, but not to international law), and more than 170 cases of 
torture since the year 2006 (in a HRW article that incidentally, uses the term 
“widespread” in its title).240 The same report states that almost no case has been 
properly investigated; the former statement was concluded after HRW carried a 
deep research in five of the most affected states in Mexico, where the military had 
been deployed with the intention of counterattacking the drug cartels. The officials 
from the Human Rights Commissions stated that there was a clear contrast 
between the evidence they had gathered and the number of cases being 
investigated by the official prosecutors (Guerrero is an extreme example, were 
between 2007 and 2010 there was not a single investigation carried on, even 
though the local Human Rights Commission had received 52 complaints241).  
Such report also states that both military and civilian prosecutors have 
downgraded some of the crimes being denounced, such as the case of torture., as it 
was stated that most of the criminal files on the official website of the National 
Defence Secretary listed the crime being investigated as an “abuse of authority”, 
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which in the Mexican Code of Military Justice is conceived as committed by “the 
military that treats an inferior in way that is contradictory with the legal prescriptions” 
(Article 293)242. According to the military frameworks, such misconduct only applies 
between military personnel; nothing is established in the case of abusing a civilian. 
As there is no domestic mechanism left due to the inactivity of local prosecutors, 
there is enough evidence to suggest the intervention of International Criminal Law in 
the Mexican scene. The last important element to establish is the nexus between 
the attack and the crimes. In the Mexican case, documents show that military 
personnel have committed human rights abuses while performing security tasks, 
uniformed and in official vehicles. This would suggest that, even if the victims were 
not the ultimate target, they were around the core of the attack. 
In spite of the continuous murders of innocent civilians, we can conclude 
there are not enough elements in order to suggest that the Mexican State has been 
targeting them as part of their strategy. It can be stated that the policy has been 
inadequate and has failed to prevent the unwanted side-effects, but it cannot be 
established that civilians are actively targeted by the armed forces. 
2.1.13 Enforced disappearance 
 One of the most delicate accusations against the security forces in Mexico is 
their alleged implication in enforced disappearances. Human Rights Watch issued a 
report on this topic in 2013, in which they documented more than 140 events in 
which the State forces participated or were the sole responsible of the 
disappearance of civilians.243 The report establishes that the authorities do not 
investigate in time the complaints and reports of the witnesses and relatives. Plus, 
they state that the investigators and prosecutors take an unprofessional attitude and 
imply that the victims were probably related in some way with illicit activities.244 The 
severity of this crime from an international legal perspective, relies in the fact that, 
as HRW points out, “enforced disappearances constitute violations of the right to 
life, freedom from torture, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention”.245 Such 
is the severity of this concept, that the UN General Assembly saw the need to 
create an international treaty (the International Convention for the Protection of All 
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Persons from Enforced Disappearance), and a special protocol focused on this 
crime (The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance). Article 1(2) of the convention establishes that a state of war or any 
other public emergency is not a justification for allowing enforced disappearance. 
 HRW made an incisive point on the current Mexican legislation, as they 
stated that the Criminal Federal Code only included public servants as the subjects 
liable for the commission of Enforced Disappearance, but they did not include any 
other person who might be operating under the orders, commission or knowledge of 
a public servant.246 As of 2016, the Federal Code has not been reformed to include 
the recommendation done. In the military legal frameworks, HRW also established 
that the Mexican Military Justice Code does not include Enforced Disappearance as 
penalised conduct.247 At the moment of this writing, the Mexican legislators are 
elaborating a project for a framework with enforced disappearance as its main 
focus, but it is currently stagnant in the federal congress. The proposal has four 
basic points: the establishment of new forms of coordination and jurisdiction in order 
to prevent and sanction enforced disappearance; establishing new criminal 
definitions on the subject; creating a national system of data in order to find missing 
persons; and to guarantee the protection of rights and establishing measures of 
attention, aid and State reparation to the victims.248 It is uncertain at the moment 
when the final version will be approved. 
 As it has been addressed, the Military Justice Code was reformed in 2014, in 
order to prosecute all the military personnel who are involved in the human rights 
abuses of a civilian, in the civil courts. This was one of the main observations that 
HRW had made in the same report,249 as they established all the enforced 
disappearances in which the military were involved, were left in a state of impunity 
because the soldiers were being investigated under the Military Justice Code.  
On August 18 2015, a civilian federal judge sentenced a soldier to 31 years in 
prison for enforced disappearance. The sentenced military personnel (it should be 
noted that his name is kept confidential), had been proven responsible for the 
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disappearance of a civilian the 20th of May of 2012.The judge also sentenced the 
soldier to be separated from his position in the army, and restricted him from 
working in public service for 15 years and three months.250 The sentence 
established that the rights and juridical goods that were violated were the psychical 
integrity, personal freedom and life of the victim, as well as the protection of his 
family, and their right to know the truth.251 The judge also established that the armed 
forces’ reputation was also damaged; and he pointed that even though the military’s 
actions were opposed to the spirit of the army, this case was an isolated 
behaviour,252 a statement that implies that the authorities have not considered this 
crime as part of a policy or pattern. On the other hand, this sentence has set a 
precedent that will undoubtedly constitute a turning point regarding the limits of the 
armed forces’ liability upon the civilian courts, based on the last reform to article 57 
of the Military Justice Code. 
2.2 Military Justice Code reform: ensuring effectiveness? 
 On the 24th of April of 2014, the United Commissions of Justice, National 
Defence, first and second Legislative Studies that comment on the Navy and on 
Military Justice Subject (these are groups of Mexican senators that gathered to 
debate the reform), issued the document the contains the new legal reforms for the 
Military Justice Code. The reforms contained in article 57 are of essential 
importance to this research, as the monopoly that military courts had –even when 
civilians were the passive subjects of a crime-, has been reformed. It is important to 
make an analysis of the legal foundations for such changes, and interpret the 
transition articles which might create a whole for impunity of past and future human 
rights violations. 
One of the main goals that this reform had –certainly the one that is relevant 
to the subject of accountability-, was to narrow military immunity, establishing that 
crimes against military discipline which are committed by their personnel, and in 
which civilians were involved, would be under the jurisdiction of civilian 
                                                          
250 “Informative note” (Judicial Power of the Federation) 
<http://www.cjf.gob.mx/documentos/notasInformativas/docsNotasInformativas/2015/notaInfo
rmativa88.pdf> accessed 1 January 2016 
251 ibid 
252 ibid 
81 
 
authorities.253 This reform started to be developed in 2009, by members of the 
Democratic Revolution Party (PRD). 
The senators were influenced primarily by the judgement that the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in the Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico case 
(Judgement of November 23, 2009). The Court established that the Mexican State 
was responsible for violation of the rights to humane treatment, juridical personality, 
personal liberty, and life; all covered by the American Convention of Human Rights 
(articles 5(1), 3, 7(1), and 4(1)), plus articles I and XI of the Inter-American 
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, in detriment of Rosendo Radilla-
Pacheco. In its Operative Paragraph no. 10, the Court established that Mexico 
should adopt appropriate reforms to article 57 of the Code of Military Justice, in 
order to be compatible with the American Convention on Human Rights, and other 
international standards on the subject. Plus, recommending the State to implement 
courses that focus on the analysis that the IACHR did on the case, in order to 
establish the limits of military criminal jurisdiction.254 At a domestic level, the 
senators established that there was a direct conflict between the limits of the Military 
Justice Code and article 13 of the Mexican Constitution.255 Strangely enough, the 
first one was issued in 1933, while the Constitution was established in 1917, but the 
Military Code, being a secondary law, took a character or legal preponderance in 
the subject of immunity.256 The next criteria that the legislators took as a foundation 
for the reform was a domestic set of criteria that the Supreme Court of Justice had 
stated concerning the situation of military jurisdiction.257 The referred set contains 
six separate criteria -which are called “isolated thesis” in the Mexican legal system-, 
and in which the ministers of the Supreme Court state that military jurisdiction 
should not monopolize the judicial situation of a crime in which a civilian is involved, 
as the file should be investigated and tried in civilian courts. The isolated thesis also 
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stated that the military immunity established in the military justice code contradicted 
the American Convention on Human Rights, which as it has been previously stated, 
was the sentence on the Rosendo Radilla Case. The ministers also stated the legal 
right that the family of a civilian victim to present an “amparo” (injunction) against 
the decision of a military judge to take jurisdiction over such cases. We can 
establish the vast amount of pressure that was put on the legislators in order to 
establish limits and organise a well-defined jurisdiction between the military and 
civilian courts. 
The need to establish liability for military personnel under civilian jurisdiction 
was not exclusive to the IACHR and the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice, as one 
of the first recommendations that the Mexican State received in an international 
context, and which influenced the senators to start debating the reform258, was a 
report made by the Committee against Torture (CAT/C/75). This report was issued 
on 2003, before the current security strategy started, but when the army was 
already conducting certain operations related with anti-narcotics policies. On its 
paragraph 220(g), the committee established to restrict the application of military 
law to misconducts strictly related to military issues, and continued establishing that 
legal reforms needed to be made in order to give competence to civilian courts to 
conduct trials against human rights violations committed by military personnel.259  
This committee continued to monitor the security strategy in Mexico, and 
subsequently issued a Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under 
article 19 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT/C/MEX/CO/4), which states the need to establish 
the crime of torture in military codes. They recommended the Mexican State to 
ensure that military personnel who violated human rights of civilians are tried in civil 
courts “even when the violations are service-related”.260 This last statement was not 
considered appropriate for the Mexican legislators, as crimes and misconducts that 
are of a strictly military nature will continue to be investigated and prosecuted by 
military courts. As the conflict in Mexico continued, more innocents became victims 
of abuse, including underage citizens; in regards to this issue, the Committee on the 
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Rights on the Child also made investigations on such abuses and issued an official 
report regarding the situation of children in armed conflicts in 2011 
(CRC/C/OPAC/MEX/1).261 It should be noted that the same committee had issued 
statements about the need for the civilian justice to have jurisdiction over military 
personnel since 1994, when it presented a report on Mexico regarding article 44 of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.262 International recommendations that 
asked for civilian liability on military personnel continued with the concluding 
observations of the Human Rights Committee issued by the Centre for Civil and 
Political Rights (report CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5); this time, the issues which as 
addressed to the Mexican State had the goal of ensuring an effective remedy for the 
victims, as they thought that the violations got lost in the military jurisdiction.263  
The Human Rights Council issued two reports which also added more 
pressure against military monopoly on their own personnel; these documents 
consisted in a Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and 
lawyers (A/HRC/17/30/Add.3); they focused on several issues which also tended to 
point out the need to guarantee access to justice from the victims’ perspective.264 
The second document was a Report on the Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances (A/HRC/19/58/Add.2); on such report (para 98), the 
working group expressed their concerns about the enforced disappearances and 
other human rights violations and –again-, pressured the State to reform the 
aspects of military justice that granted immunity from civilian law.265 It can be seen 
that the international pressure was essential for the Peña Nieto administration in 
order to gain some degree of international legitimacy, after the troubled elections 
(something that his predecessor, Felipe Calderón, never did, despite suffering from 
a similar lack of legitimacy in the eyes on an important sector of Mexican society). 
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The amount of international and domestic focus on the lack of equality upon 
the law between civil society and the military, leads to the conclusion that since the 
security strategy focused on deploying the armed forces for specific operations on 
civilian spaces, its personnel were not trained in dealing with civilians in their 
confrontations with organised crime. To be more precise, the situation magnified 
itself after ex-president Felipe Calderón permanently deployed the army on 
December of 2006. This security strategy, as it has been stated previously on this 
research, has been continued by current president Enrique Peña Nieto.  
The senators then proceeded to develop a legal analysis and juridical 
valuations of the initiatives made by both the federal government, and the personal 
initiatives sent by a couple of legislators. The first point which was analysed were 
the limits of military immunity: at a domestic level, article 57 fraction II of the Military 
Justice Code was incompatible with article 13 of the Mexican Constitution (which 
states that the military cannot extend its jurisdiction when civilians are involved), and 
in an international level the legislators concluded that the military code contradicts 
articles 2nd and 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and also article 
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.266 The Mexican 
legislators should have taken into account article 8 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in order to state legal priority between legal frameworks, but that is a 
matter of pure subjectivity. 
The legislators then continued to develop their criteria: one of the main 
points established in the charter is the fact that when military tribunals exercised 
jurisdiction on their own personnel –on cases where a civilian is involved-, the 
courts are also taking power over the juridical situation of the last one (the victim). 
This created a conflict when the victim wants access not only to the compensation 
for the damage suffered, but also an effective access to the truth and justice (this 
criteria seems to be taken literally from the isolated thesis that the Supreme Court 
issued), which contradicted article 13th of the constitution. The criteria established 
that if juridical matters that do not correspond to the military sphere are violated, the 
jurisdiction of military courts is not enough. The legislators once again referred to 
the statements made by the Supreme Court, which established that military courts 
would be competent only when crimes of a strictly military nature are committed and 
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no civilians are involved in it.267 Based on the previous considerations, the 
legislators centred the reform of article 57 in the following way: 
Local or federal crimes committed by militaries will also be considered crimes 
against military discipline, as long as the passive subject who is being affected 
by the criminal behaviour does not have the status of civilian or holder of the 
juridical good, which is put in danger by the action or omission provided in the 
legal framework as a crime, in the circumstances stated in points a) to e) of 
fraction II of the mentioned article.268 
There is another subject which is relevant that could be interpreted in a 
critical way; there is an addition in the same article which tries to homogenize the 
13th article of the Constitution (which states that civilians cannot be judged in special 
courts), with the Military Justice Code. The main goal is to establish that when 
militaries and civilians act as active subjects, only the first ones will be judged by 
military justice.269 This research has found no previous cases of civilians having 
being judged by military courts, precisely because when they have been arrested, 
they have either been set free, or disappeared. 
According to the charter developed by the senators, the reform has 
established that the limits of military immunity had been drawn in a clear way under 
two fundamental guidelines: they have given a much more restrictive and 
exceptional character to military criminal jurisdiction; and the victim has been given 
the right to participate in the criminal process, not only for matters of compensation, 
but also exercising their rights to justice and truth.270 At this point, another 
contradiction is found with another point that was approved as part of the reform: 
the senators approved, based in previous criteria from the Supreme Court which 
established that, regardless of the jurisdiction that knows of the facts in a crime, a 
military does not lose this quality. The commissions that reformed article 57 
pronounced in favour of giving the military personnel that has been sentenced, or 
are in the stage of preventive prison, the option to spend their sentence in a military 
prison, according to the commission. The main argument behind this, is “the safety 
of the sentenced military”, which established that the sentenced personnel should 
be the one that make these requests to the judge who was in charge of the 
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process.271 This creates suspicion, as one of the main problems of the current 
military prison system is its secrecy, which keeps most of its information away from 
the public, as even in cases in which the victims from human rights abuses have 
requested information about their case, the military prosecutors have denied it. How 
is it possible to guarantee true access to justice to a civilian victim if a military gets 
the option to spend his prison term in the secrecy of the military facilities? 
Judges of sentence implementations and ministerial military investigators 
The second main point which the new reform brings is the creation of judges 
which will be in charge of the surveillance of the implementation of sentences. The 
main goal in this part of the reform is to have a system of vigilance to make sure 
that the military penitentiary system is organised over a base of work, training, 
solving health issues, education, military training, and sports as ways to make sure 
the that the sentenced personnel will be capable of reincorporating to its military 
activities, and to society as a whole. Once the prisoner has been sentenced, he will 
follow the law and be able to meet up the standards required.272 This is basically a 
point in the reform used to meet the standards of the Criminal Code reforms of 
2008, which established the figure of Judges of Sentence Implementations in order 
to improve the conditions of reinsertion to society from ex-convicts. Another relevant 
point is that once an investigating commission establishes the existence of a civilian 
involved in a military crime, they have the obligation to submit the file to their civilian 
colleagues in order to have them taking the first steps in such investigation.273 This 
point can be considered as one of the most positive in the whole reform, as civilian 
investigators have shown to be (at least to a larger degree), more open to share 
information in a public and transparent way than their military counterparts. 
There is a basic point which is necessary to address here: in the transitory 
articles of the charter that the Senators Chamber developed, it is stated in its third 
point that the investigations and criminal trials that have been initiated before the 
reform -and where the crime committed violates military discipline-, will be 
processed and concluded according to the legal dispositions applicable at the 
moment of the commission suspected crime. Besides, the implementation of the 
sentence will also be according to the legal dispositions available before the reform. 
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On the fourth transitory article, the senators established that the investigations and 
criminal trials that were initiated before the reform, and in which the crimes 
committed do not violate military discipline, will be forwarded to the according 
civilian authority in a term of 30 days after the reform starts its effect.274 While this 
would be totally coherent with the standards that current international human rights 
frameworks contemplate, it is important to remember that there are at least seven 
cases in the public file of the National Defence Secretary website that involve 
enforced disappearance, torture, and physical assault in which civilians and military 
personnel are involved, in which the crime being investigated or tried is “abuse of 
authority”, which is a classified as a strictly military discipline misconduct. 
2.3 The use of firearms by the military 
 There is an important aspect of the current security strategy in Mexico, 
which has not been properly addressed, not even after the Military Justice Code 
reform. This is the use of fire arms by the security forces, and the military in 
particular. The UN developed a series of guidelines (The Basic Principles on the 
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials), in order to regulate the 
use and behaviour of firearms by governments and law enforcement agencies. 
 These principles base their criteria on the protection of life, liberty and 
security located in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials. At a domestic level, the Mexican State issued the Basic Principles for the 
Use of Force and Firearms by Servants in Charge of Law Enforcement 1990. 
The Mexican code builds their principal guidelines on the assumption that 
officials will only use firearms when it is inevitable (principle 5), and that its use will 
be proportionate to the nature of the crime and the “legitimate goal that is 
pretended”.275 It also establishes that the officials will notify the relatives and close 
friends of the affected persons.276 This is clearly detached from the reality, as the 
relatives of various suspects have stated that the authorities not only have failed to 
notify them of their whereabouts, but have actually used methods of intimidation in 
order to discourage them from enquiring. An additional point of importance for this 
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discussion is principle 8, which establishes that “no exceptional circumstances such 
as internal political instability or any other public emergency situation, in order to 
justify the breaching of this basic principles”.277 Under this principle, it could be 
established that the current security conflict would not justify the abuse of civilian’s 
rights, and much less extreme measures, like the permanent armed deployment at 
checkpoints and general patrolling. 
2.4 Transitional justice in transitional democracies 
Most of the former communist states have been reforming their civil-military 
relations in order to prevent their armed forces forming a Pretorian state. Leigh 
provides a deep insight on some of the main reforms that mark a transition in civilian 
control from communism to western democracy. Article 92 of the Slovenian 
constitution establishes that “A state of emergency shall be declared whenever a 
great and general danger threatens the existence of the State. The declaration of 
war or state of emergency, urgent measures and their repeal shall be decided upon 
by the National Assembly on the proposal of the Government. The National 
Assembly decides on the use of the defence forces. In the event that the National 
Assembly is unable to convene, the President of the Republic shall decide on 
matters from the first and second paragraphs of this article. Such decisions must be 
submitted for confirmation to the National Assembly immediately upon the next 
convening.”278 This is an example of a qualitative reform in which the Slovenian 
State achieved a truly democratic balance between the legislative and executive 
powers. It also forces both branches of the State to justify the reason for 
establishing such powers upon society, as not every threat would be considered 
dangerous enough to establish a State of emergency. 
The Estonian legislation has established in its Article 65 a Commander in 
Chief of the Defence Forces; this commander will be appointed by the Parliament. 
By its part, the Romanian Constitution concedes power to the Parliament to monitor 
all security and defence matters. Its Article 62 mentions that the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies will meet and establish the proceedings with the majority of 
the voting. The situations which will be subjected to this parliamentarian procedure 
are: declaration of state of war; suspension or ceasing of an armed conflict; the 
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examining of Supreme Council of National Defence reports and of the Court of 
Audit; the appointment on proposal of the Romanian president, the Romanian 
Information Service director, and to perform control over the Service’s activity. 
Article 117 of this constitution considers the military organisation and structure as an 
“organic” matter, so all its legislation must be approved with the voting of a special 
majority; article 85 of the Bulgarian constitution establishes that political or military 
treaties must be approved by its Parliament. 
Apart from those very concrete moments in which the State gives special 
power to its soldiers, most modern democracies tend to contemplate the everyday 
military as a citizen, the only difference is that military personnel have very defined 
rights and obligations provided by their legal frameworks. Legal officers in 1911 
stated that a “soldier differs from the ordinary citizen in being armed and subject to 
discipline but his rights and duties in dealing with crime are precisely the same as 
those of the ordinary citizen”.279 It is precisely because of this modern 
conceptualization of the soldier that western democracies proceeded to reform their 
armed institutions, in order to create a well-established link between the citizens and 
military personnel. In contradiction to such concepts, undeveloped democracies, 
such as that which exists in Mexico, have isolated the soldier not only from a 
physical and social perspective, but also from a legal one, due to the establishment 
of military courts which had a complete monopoly (until recent times), of carrying out 
the investigation, course of the trial, penalization and social rehabilitation, apart from 
having their self-made legal codes. If the Mexican State wants the common citizen 
to view the soldier as another citizen, it must be subjected to the same obligations 
and process of accountability. 
One of the main differences between a soldier who operates under normal 
warfare statutes and one that operates under emergency bodies is the kind of 
obligations that he as a public servant has in the light of ordinary crime. A soldier 
operating under normal status has the duty to take “reasonable measures”, which 
can stretch as far as necessary, as long as he doesn’t compromise his life or 
personal integrity, nor does he have the obligation to chase the criminals or 
suspects.280 The presidential decree created by Calderón which gave life to the 
Federal Support Force Body clearly establishes emergency tasks for the military 
personnel, as it states that its main goal is to “have properly trained body which will 
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be ascribed to the armed forces so that, in exceptional cases in which such forces 
will be required to support civilian authorities in public security duties, public order 
restoration, and even confronting organised crime, these will count with the needed 
training to attend different situation from those strictly belonging to warfare”.281 It is 
necessary to mention the institutional fragility of the Mexican context: the first group 
of soldiers which was deployed to do civilian tasks started their operations on 
December of 2006, and it was not until 10 months later that the official decree which 
would give legality to the army’s operations was issued, along with Calderón’s 
declarations which stated that Mexico was in an emergency, but did not officially 
issued a state of emergency. 
2.5  Conclusion 
 From the analysis made in this chapter, it can be addressed that 
international institutions have been determinant in the reforms being done to the 
Mexican military legal system. The political pressure applied by institutions like the 
Committee against Torture, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child was 
successful and forced the legislators to apply new mechanisms to the old Military 
Justice Code structure. The effects of the new legislation in terms of the victims’ 
access to justice is still very limited at the moment, as there is only one soldier 
sentenced for human rights abuses up until the moment of this writing, even though 
there have been more reports of military personnel involved in human rights abuses. 
It is clear that new structures that regulate civil-military relations are needed, but 
there is also an imperative duty of the military justice system to send the files of 
personnel being investigated for human rights abuses to the appropriate courts, 
these being the civilian jurisdiction, according to the reform of article 57 of the 
Military Justice Code. 
There is a resort to armed force by the Mexican government against 
organised armed groups within the State; a characteristic that is essential to define 
if a non-international armed conflict is taking place.282 The presidential decree283 
issued by ex-president Felipe Calderon constitutes an official act of indefinitely 
deploying the armed forces in order to attack organised crime inside Mexico. The 
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current conflict in Mexico has reached most of its territory, as the drug cartels are 
spread through all states of the republic, and they use high-power arms to retaliate 
attacks from both the armed forces and federal and local police bodies. Extreme 
violence is not only used for self-defence against the State forces, but also to 
execute enemies. For this reason, it has been established that the raise of violence 
in Mexico is associated with the cartels.284 The indefinite deployment of the army 
shows that the violence caused by organised crime is not sporadic, but systematic 
and permanent, as armed aggression is essential for the cartel’s survival. 
The drug cartels, as non-State actors, have also shown a well-defined level 
of organisation, as cartels are complex structures made or different cells and 
criminal networks. They produce, distribute and sell their product in the same way 
as an enterprise.285 This is also consistent with contemporary requirements to 
identify domestic armed conflicts.286 It can be stated that the characteristics of a 
non-international armed conflict are be applicable to the current security context in 
Mexico.  
 Because of the high level of organisation and aggression that the organised 
crime groups pose to the government, the State has tacitly recognised a situation of 
belligerence, which the ICRC establishes, “can be deduced from government 
measures or attitudes towards an internal situation of conflict”.287 These measures 
are obviously the permanent deployment of the armed forces, started by a 
presidential decree, and continued as one of the main points of the security strategy 
in both ex-president Calderon’s administration and the current Peña Nieto 
government. Independently of the fact that Mexico is not a party to Additional 
Protocol II, there is no doubt that various facts that are characteristics of a non-
international armed conflict are currently taking place inside the country. 
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The Mexican State has complied with the requirements of IHL by creating 
the Interministerial Committee on International Humanitarian Law, and is currently 
elaborating the law on enforced disappearance. While the rhetoric of the authorities 
seems to be congruent with the recommendations of institutions like the Committee 
against Torture, the reality of civil-military relations in Mexico is still very far from 
truly engaging in the standards that a democratic society should have. 
There are important points to make regarding the accusations and the 
petitions for IHL and the ICC to intervene in the Mexican conflict. First, the 
probability of any military commanders being prosecuted for crimes against 
humanity is very low, due to the fact that the official strategy does not contain any 
type of group as a specific target. While there is evidence that suggests that 
unlawful orders have been given, such orders have not been part of an official 
modus operandi of the National Defence Secretary. This is an essential requirement 
for the liability of crimes against humanity. 
 The possibility of members of the armed forces to be prosecuted under War 
Crimes will depend on the will to act on the principle of complementarity of the ICC, 
as until this moment the Mexican judicial system has had complete control over the 
investigations of the members of the armed forces which have been accused of 
human rights abuses. In the latest report of military personnel who is being 
subjected to an investigation/prosecution,288 case AP/PGR/BC/ENS/962/12/I has 
“illegal search warrant, illegal arrest and torture”. The Human Rights National 
Commission issued a recommendation establishing that an investigation done by 
the adequate authorities should be done, but up until the 24 of February (the day of 
the last update), the case file only mentioned that “the recommendation had been 
successfully fulfilled”,289 although the file states that no military personnel has been 
prosecuted or even investigated for it.  
This example shows the lack of will of the military authorities to either 
investigate or to submit the file to the civilian authorities for crimes which constitute 
severe violations of human rights (in this case it would be Torture). As it can be 
seen from the most recent file, the secretary states to have complied with the 
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recommendation, but no one was convicted or even investigated for it. Are these 
precedents for the ICC to intervene? It is clear that the number of sentences (one 
until today) is completely disproportionate to the number of complaints and case 
files currently open. If the victims to not have real access to justice, then the Military 
Justice Code or any subsequent legal reforms will not have the desired effects. If 
the government has presented the abuse of human rights as “collateral damage”, 
but as it has been seen in this chapter, certain crimes like torture have the quality of 
being jus cogens, so they would not be able to be derogated or tolerated under any 
circumstance, even in states of emergency. To worsen the situation, the Mexican 
government has never acknowledged the existence of a state of emergency, and 
this adds a lack of legitimacy in the security structure, as the militarization of the 
country has been done amid a climate of “democratic normality”. 
 Just as the structures of accountability and prosecution in Mexico continue 
to show legal holes and a lack of commitment from the authorities in charge of their 
application, the civil-military structures and the frameworks which would regulate the 
permanent deployment of the army continue to lack the necessary adaptations to 
the current security strategy. In the next chapters the concepts of states of 
emergency and the modern structures of civil-military relations will be analysed. 
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Chapter III 
3. Emergency Powers, Civil-Military relations and the Mexican 
case 
 
 On March 29 2016, the Federal Congress approved one of the most 
important constitutional reforms in recent times: the creation of a mechanism to 
decree a state of emergency. Until this point, the government had taken 
extraordinary measures, like the indefinite deployment of the armed forces to fight 
internal organised crime, to confront the extreme security issues that Mexico had 
been facing in terms of drug trafficking and other clandestine activities. One of the 
critiques to the governmental strategy was the absence of an adequate legal 
framework that would enable the State to activate extraordinary measures, when 
they considered having a situation that justified them. In the first half of this chapter, 
the legal reform will be analysed, and its main points and mechanisms of 
employment will be contrasted with the international standards on states of 
emergency. In order to address this reform, a brief explanation of the concept of 
emergency powers and the current international institutions which have established 
legal provisions to set its standards are discussed. 
 The current state of civil-military relations in Mexico and its development 
from the creation of the modern Mexican State until the present, and the main faults 
that have identified in the army are also established. Finally, two cases of human 
rights abuses committed by members of the military are presented, as they 
exemplify the severe lack of a well-established mechanism of protection for society. 
These cases will allow the reader to see the similarities between the abuses 
committed in Northern Ireland during the most conflictive years of the “troubles” 
(which are the focus of a chapter in this thesis) and the current security issues in 
Mexico. The lack of accountability and professional institutions that the Mexican 
cases exemplify is also relevant for the later comparison with Germany, as their 
post-WWII institutional reforms provide a point of comparison between the two 
countries. 
3.1 Emergency powers 
It is appropriate to quote Abraham Lincoln to start this section, as he was 
one of the first statesmen that gave the subject of states of emergency a political 
view: 
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Every man thinks he has a right to live and every government thinks it has a 
right to live. Every man when riven to the wall by a murderous assailant will override 
all laws to protect himself, and this is called the great right of self-defence. So every 
government when driven to the wall by a rebellion will trample down a constitution 
before it will allow itself to be destroyed. This may not be constitutional law but it is a 
fact.290 
Carl Schmitt’s theory is essential to understanding emergency powers theory 
in the 20th century. He stated that there was a total contradiction between exception 
and liberalism; emergencies are out of reach of any institutional system, therefore, a 
total control of power would be needed in case of them happening.291 It should be 
addressed that Schmitt’s theories have been associated with Nazism, and therefore, 
has been called “the Crown Jurist of the Third Reich” in some academic circles.292 
One of Schmitt’s main points is that he does not conceptualise the state of 
exception within the juridical order, but placed outside of it, even though, the 
referred State still has an order.293 This constitutes a contradiction in itself, as he is 
putting juridical attributes to a situation that he also places outside of the juridical 
order. This critique is also Shared by Giorgio Agamben, who establishes that 
Schmitt’s theoretical attempt to “inscribe the state of exception indirectly within a 
juridical context” is fallacious.294 
Agamben establishes that the concept of state in Emergency is “the 
dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics”.295 He also states that 
the state of exception founds itself in the concept of “necessity”, which is not a legal 
source, but it is the concept that will define the application of the exception.296 
Agamben did not see the state of exception as a “legalised” dictatorship, but as the 
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absence of law, a legal gap.297 The problem with this, in the eyes of this author, is 
that, since the state of exception is not located within the juridical sphere, it is highly 
difficult to judge the acts committed under this state. Therefore there is still a lot of 
theory to be developed regarding the exception.298  
Even though Agamben defines the exception as the absence of law, the 
existence of emergency frameworks would contradict his statements. Precisely, the 
existence of international organisms, like the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights, that will monitor state of emergencies, constitutes proof that there is some 
degree of legal regulation and following to the emergency provisions established by 
a government. The most important thing is not to violate the democratic order, and 
issuing emergency measures without creating a legal framework for them. 
The Calderon administration did not establish an emergency state, but 
justified the presidential decree which deployed the armed forces without consulting 
the legislative and judicial powers (which are the other two pillars of the Mexican 
State) by establishing that the security of the nation required what can be viewed as 
an authoritarian decision. 
In theory, emergency powers should only be applied when there is a 
situation that requires it as a last measure and only for a certain period of time, until 
the event or threat is neutralized at least enough for the State to control it through its 
normal institutional measures. Khakee tells us that applying emergency powers at a 
field level is a much more complicated task due to two main factors: trying to keep 
enough balance between powers and giving protection to human rights while 
keeping a State of Law.299 Which types of events can be considered emergencies? 
O’Boyle classifies emergencies in six categories: war, economic recession, natural 
disasters, secessions, insurrection, and subversion.300 These categories are 
accurate but very general because, as we saw in the last chapter, contemporary 
emergency frameworks do not consider every threat as severe enough for 
deploying a state of emergency. 
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It has been difficult to discuss emergency powers without finding 
encountered postures. Apart from the theories of Schmitt and Agamben, Mégret 
states that most of the human rights are unlimited; this means that no emergency or 
goal justifies its limitation (for example, the right to be free from torture).301 There are 
other rights or guarantees302 which may be limited or derogated by a State in an 
emergency state.303 The concern for how limited the promulgation of emergency 
powers must be is explained by O’Boyle, as he establishes that when they are 
applied successfully, their administrations might use them in future situations with 
more ease, as they might resort to them before using other methods.304 Another 
downside of activating emergency powers, as Lord Jellicoe established, is the fact 
that the measures taken might alienate society or parts of it, as in his Review of the 
Operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976, he 
established that one of the most important things in the strategy to 305implement 
these powers is to prevent the unnecessarily alienation of society. 
3.1.1 What can be understood as a “public emergency”?  
In General Comment 29 (3) on Article 4 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Human Rights Committee (HRC) defined this 
concept by establishing that:  
Not every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies as a public emergency 
which threatens the life of the nation, as required by article 4, paragraph 1…. 
The Covenant requires that even during an armed conflict measures 
derogating from the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that the 
situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation.306 
The European Court of Human Rights has conceptualised a situation of 
emergency as: 
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…an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole 
population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of 
which the State is composed.307  
Roy Chowdhury follows the definition of the ECtHR, just adding that an 
emergency situation should affect “the whole population of the area to which the 
declaration applies”.308 Even though one can establish that the area in which the 
state of emergency is applied is the most affected directly, emergency provisions 
tend to have political, social and economic consequences on other areas in which 
the provisions are not being applied. On the other hand, Bonner establishes that 
emergency powers have three main characteristics, which he elaborates from the 
international frameworks and different constitutional research: a) they have an 
extraordinary scope, b) they provide discretional powers and authority on the 
government, c) they have a temporary nature, and they will only be renewed if the 
emergency keeps on existing,309 The “temporariness” of a state of emergency is 
essential for this concept to be justified, as this provisions are to be understood as a 
solution to the problem that caused the emergency, and whose solution would imply 
that the emergency is no longer needed.310 
Tushnet states that emergency powers have an “extra-constitutional” 
nature, but in his theory democratic institutions should not control them; the 
control to review these powers should be given to “mobilised citizens”.311 These 
ideas have a much more progressive background, but a very strong pressure 
would have to be applied from society because there is still a lack of political will 
from global southern States. Tushnet’s theories can be considered as the most 
appropriate way of giving civil society a real control over the military, as the 
political class is structured in a bureaucratic system that makes their relationship 
with society less direct than building bridges of communication with civilian 
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organisations. The temporary nature addressed by Bonner is also fundamental 
for the survival of the democratic order and the state of law. Therefore, Tushnet’s 
and Bonner’s definitions of the concept of emergency powers seem to be the 
most appropriate for the development of contemporary mechanisms. A 
combination of these authors’ theories seems appropriate when comparing 
emergency legislations. 
Contemporary legislation in Germany states that parliaments need to be part 
of the decision that will impose an emergency rule; this action would be a response 
to an official statement or proposal from the executive power.312 A parliamentary 
decision of such importance requires more conditions that the everyday legislative 
acts though; most parliaments ask for a larger majority of MPs to be present and 
vote in favour, in order to establish emergency powers. We can see a direct contrast 
with the Mexican case, in which neither the parliaments nor the judicial authorities 
were consulted before issuing the presidential decree which deployed military 
personnel.  
European States, such as the case of the United Kingdom and specifically 
the region of Northern Ireland –which will be analysed in depth in this research-, 
have developed emergency frameworks where the decision to issue and cease 
emergency powers belongs to the parliament.313 Here Westminster’s government 
lost exclusive control, and the reason behind this measure is to restrict such an 
important decision to a single power. As Gross and Ní Aoláin state, in modern 
constitutions the authority to declare states of emergencies resides in the legislative 
power, although in some cases, the executive is invested of more powers, the 
decision cannot be unilateral (without the approval of the legislative).314 
 There is a dichotomy in the application of emergency powers, as Bonner has 
addressed; on one hand, the promulgation of a state of emergency will always carry 
inherent dangers, but at the same time, it is the duty of the government to protect its 
citizens and the whole State from any threat, like terrorism.315 This should not mean 
that any kind of terrorism would have the magnitude to justify a state of emergency, 
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but it is an example of a crime would be severe enough to affect the democratic 
order of a State. 
 Is there any consensus on which factors should be analysed in order to 
classify a state of emergency? The Council of Europe have established that the 
following questions should be asked:316 
1) Is the state of emergency justified? 
2) Is the resulting response necessary and proportional to the threat? 
3) Do the actions taken conflict with any of the State’s other international 
obligations? 
These questions help setting the scope of the emergency, and therefore, 
establishing its severity and the limits on the measures taken. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights established on the “Honduras: Human Rights and 
the Coup d’ État” report that: “Even in a legitimate state of emergency, each 
measure taken must be reasonable; in other words, it must be strictly appropriate to 
the cause and to the scope of the state of emergency.”317 
3.1.2 The modern concept of states of emergency in the Latin American 
context 
The Organization of American States 
Alongside the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Organization of 
American States (OAS) is the main mechanism of diplomacy and conflict solving 
that the American countries have to face international and domestic challenges. 
This figure includes a chapter dedicated to collective security, which is a 
consequence of the Rio Treaty celebrated in 1947.318 The States have specific 
obligations between them that are established by Article 1 of the Additional Protocol 
in Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), establishing 
the need for cooperation  depending on the available resources of each one.319 The 
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organism has also worked on issuing political statements about current issues in 
Latin America; this is understandable, as the continent has split in very different 
ideological positions, making cooperation between countries –and especially 
between hemispheres-, a complicated matter. The OAS has been trying to fulfil the 
role that an “American Union” (thinking in the European Union model) would have 
done. 
The OAS is organised as most State assemblies, with the General Assembly 
on top, seconded by the Councils; The Inter-American Juridical Committee; the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; the General Secretary; the 
Specialized Conferences; and the Specialized Organs.320 In the subject of 
international law, the Charter establishes that the Inter-American Judicial Committee 
will work as an advisor in legal matters, developing international law frameworks, 
and attempting uniformity in the legislation of the OAS members.321 
 One of the essential autonomous organs of the OAS is the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). Its main functions are the observance and 
the defence of human rights, and their work as an advisor of the OAS.322 The 
Commission presents an annual report to the General Assembly of the OAS,323 
which, among other contents, includes special reports on the situation of human 
rights in member States that are subjected to different criteria. Among them, the 
report will include any situation in which the exercise of rights has been unlawfully 
suspended by promulgation of exceptional measures, like a state of emergency.324 
This phrasing implies that any state of emergency would be unlawful by nature, but 
the rest of the Rules of Procedure does not address the validity of such measure 
again. A rephrasing would be beneficial as the current provision is vague.  
The American Convention on Human Rights 
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Article 27 
This article is essential for the domestic development of emergency powers 
in Latin American countries. The first paragraph of such article states that: 
 In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the 
independence or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating 
from its obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the 
period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law and do not involve discrimination on the ground of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin.325  
In order to perform a correct interpretation of article 27 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the concept of “suspension of guarantees” will be 
explained. The Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers also 
points out that the term “suspension” is also mentioned in article 27(2) and (3), at 
the same time that the phrase “measures derogating from” is expressed in article 
27(1). The Inter-American Court has explained the former concepts stating that 
certain rights are inherent to men and cannot be suspended, and that only certain 
limitations can be applied to them.326  
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The foundation for the faculty of States to derogate from their obligations in 
situations which can be justified is article 4. This article (among secondary sources 
such as paragraph 21 of the Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and 
Lawyers) establishes on its paragraph 2 that some rights may never be 
suspended,327 and the Court has established that the States will do their best effort 
to guarantee as many as possible. Here the Court expresses that unless there is a 
situation so severe that truly requires the restrictions of certain rights, these shall 
always be at the forefront of any social context. The ideology when applying 
emergency powers must not seek to undermine human rights, but to preserve them 
unless there is absolutely no other choice. The Court continues to establish the 
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importance that the State shall not break this principle, which is the foundation of 
every democratic State.328 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) also establishes the 
duty of the State to provide security.329  However, the Court establishes that: 
“regardless of the seriousness of certain actions and the culpability of the 
perpetrators of certain crimes, the power of the State is not unlimited nor may the 
State resort to any means to attain its ends. The State is subjected to law and 
morality, so disrespect for human dignity cannot be part of any State action.”330 
Related to the limits on the suspension of rights that States have to meet a certain 
goal, the IACHR has established concrete jurisprudence regarding emergency 
powers before. In1987, the IACHR issued an advisory opinion on the habeas corpus 
(the legality of a person’s detention by the State forces) in emergency situations, 
where they established that even in severe situations of emergency, some rights, 
like the essential judicial guarantees, cannot be suspended (expressly the ones 
established in article 27(2)).331 These judicial guarantees will be analysed in scope 
of each individual context, depending on the rights that are in danger, but to 
measure which ones will be considered essential, the analysis must be towards 
which rights would deny or restrict the full enjoyment of the referred judicial 
guarantees, if they were suspended.332 The Court concluded that “the suspension of 
the legal remedies of habeas corpus or of amparo (injunction) in emergency 
situations cannot be deemed to be compatible with the international obligations 
imposed on these States by the Convention.”333 
In 1987 the government of Uruguay had an advisory opinion from the Inter-
American Court on the matters of suspension of the judicial guarantees in states of 
emergency, asking exactly which guarantees are “essential” (as established in art. 
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27(1)), and the relation between article 27(2),334 concerning such essentialness, 
with articles 25335 and 8336 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court 
referred again to the Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations Advisory Opinion, in 
order to define the guarantees, and to point out the recourse of the injunction. In this 
advisory opinion, the Court established that “…the absence of an effective remedy 
to violations of the rights recognized by the Convention is itself a violation of the 
Convention by the State Party in which the remedy is lacking.”337 The Court 
empathised the rationale of effectiveness, as they established that the mere 
existence of a right in the law is not enough to guarantee its application, without 
being effective in practice because of different circumstances, like the lack of 
independence from the judicial authorities.338 This is how the Court ties the essential 
guarantees with the right to judicial protection and a fair trial, which must prevail 
even in states of emergency. The Court infers that the overall status of an 
emergency means that the certain rights (life, humane treatment, freedom from 
slavery, freedom of conscience, rights of the family, right to a name, political 
association, nationality, rights of the child) must never be suspended. In case they 
were unlawfully supressed, the right to judicial protection and fair trial must be 
completely available in order to restore the other rights lost. 
3.1.3 The Rosendo Radilla case 
One of the most important crimes that have been attributed to the Mexican 
armed forces in recent years is enforced disappearance. For this reason it is 
important to refer the Rosendo Radilla case, for which the Inter-American court has 
published its judgment. In order to see how what is the Court’s understanding of 
human rights abuses committed by the armed forces in Mexico about enforced 
disappearance, it is relevant to point out some of the facts.  
                                                          
334 “The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following articles: 
Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane 
Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), 
Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 18 
(Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of the Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and 
Article 23 (Right to Participate in Government), or of the judicial guarantees essential for the 
protection of such rights.” 
335 Right to Judicial Protection 
336 Right to a Fair Trial 
337 Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR ) October 6, 1987 [24] 
338 ibid [24] 
105 
 
Rosendo Radilla Pacheco was a political and social activist in the very poor 
region of Atoyac de Álvarez, in the state of Guerrero, Mexico. He was arrested for 
composing corridos (a style of folk music with lyrics based on stories about drug-
smuggling), even though this was not considered a crime, at the time of his 
arrest;339 his family never saw him again. After decades of justice obstruction and 
delays, Rosendo’s family submitted a complaint to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights.  
 The Court decided that the Mexican State was responsible for the violation 
of personal liberty, human treatment, juridical personality, and life as established in 
the American Convention on Human Rights.340 Even though the disappearance of 
Radilla was not done in a context of a declared state of emergency, the Court 
referenced article 1a of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of 
Persons,341 in order to establish the responsibility of the Mexican State upon this 
treaty, as the accused had established that “military jurisdiction is competent to hear 
a case of forced disappearance if a member of the armed forces commits the crime 
while on duty”.342 The Court ‘s reasoning did also establish that Radilla’s 
disappearance had not been an isolated event, but had been taken part in a context 
of “…massive arrests and forced disappearances, which leads to the conclusion 
that it put him in a grave situation of risk of suffering irreparable damages to his 
personal integrity and his life.” 343 The Court also established that the military had 
been in charge of his safety from the moment of his detention, and his 
disappearance also constituted cruel and in humane treatment because it was 
established that he had been isolated in solitary confinement.344 
Radilla’s case was also essential in the future shaping of the 2014 Military 
Justice Code reform, as the Court concluded that the State violated the right for a 
competent tribunal, as the military courts were not competent to resolve a case of 
forced disappearance.345 This rationale influenced the competence of civilian courts 
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for military who were being accused of violating the human rights of a citizen. This 
also influenced the subsequent reform of constitutional article 29, which established 
the attribution of the State to issue emergency provisions, as the document of the 
legislative organs states that forced disappearance will not allowed or tolerated 
during the restriction or suspension of certain rights.346 
3.1.4 Mexico’s reform of Constitutional article 29: the creation of a state of 
emergency 
 The constitutional reform addressed at the beginning of this chapter is 
essential, as it is probably the most important legal reform in emergency powers 
carried on since the so-called war against drugs became the centre of the 
governmental strategy. 
As the official Bill from the Federal Congress states, the reform regulates the 
process of restriction or suspension of rights and guarantees that constitutional 
article establishes, as well as stating that such measures will only procced in cases 
of “invasion, severe perturbation of public peace or other that puts society in severe 
danger or conflict.”347 The goal of this reform is re-establishing normality and 
guaranteeing the “enjoyment of human rights”.348 This entails the concept of 
exceptional threat that General Comment 29 explains, as even during an armed 
conflict, the promulgation of a state of emergency cannot be justified if the life of a 
nation is not endangered.349 The phrase “or other that puts society in severe danger 
or conflict” has been criticised by the National Association of Democratic Lawyers 
(ANAD), as they have stated that such sentence is not defined in the international 
standards of emergency powers, and as such, it could be interpreted for personal or 
political interests.350  
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Regarding the use of the sentence “other that puts society in severe danger 
or conflict”, it should be pointed that article 15 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which uses the phrase “in time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation”.351 In this case though, the use of the “public 
emergency” concept would limit the scope of state of emergency’s application, 
whereas in the Mexican legislation, it is left widely open. In Lawless v Ireland, the 
ECHR established that article 15 of the Convention was “sufficiently clear; whereas 
they refer to an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole 
population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which 
the State is composed”.352 The phrase used in the Mexican Constitutional article 29 
is more ambiguous, and as the ANAD has pointed out, it leaves a gap for vast 
interpretations. 
 Among the essential parts of the reform, are the statements that such 
restriction or suspension can only be decreed when the suspended rights were “an 
obstacle to facing the exceptional situation, always taking the minimum possible 
time”;353 the Bill also states that certain rights cannot be suspended in a state of 
emergency.354 The rights listed are a direct adaptation of the rights mentioned in 
article 4 paragraphs 2 of the ICCPR; they are also harmonised with the Paris 
Minimum Standards (section C). In terms of the procedure to activate these 
measures, the Bill states that the executive must request it to the legislators, who 
will discuss it in the next 24 hours and decide in the next 48. After the approval, the 
state of emergency will be published domestically and internationally, and the 
Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation will issue a statement concerning the legality 
of the decree issued by the executive.355 Another fundamental point about the Bill is 
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the emphasis made on the principle of proportionality that should be observed on 
the authorities’ behaviour, and the legislative power has the possibility of modifying 
or finishing with the emergency at any point, whereas the Supreme Court is in 
charge of monitoring the legality of the adopted measures.356 This is congruent with 
the principle established on the Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms 
in a State of Emergency, which address that “every extension of the period of 
emergency shall be subject to the prior approval of the legislature.”357 
 The term “obstacle” has also been challenged by the ANAD, as they have 
stated that such word implies that the referred human rights would be an obstacle to 
face the emergency, not the situation in itself.358 It is an ambiguous term, and it is 
not found neither on the ICCPR, The Paris Minimum Standards, or the American 
Convention on Human Rights. The importance of defining each term as 
meticulously as possible is essential in a reform of such importance. 
 The bill mentions the concepts of non-derogable rights at various points in its 
content. International law is referred as the source of such rights and in concrete, 
the American Convention on Human Rights (article 27), and the ICCPR (article 4) 
are mentioned as primary sources.359 Regarding the requirements in order to 
suspend certain rights, the bill mentions as minimum standards the proportionality, 
temporality, territorial reach, and the “subjection of the taken measures to the 
principles of legality, publicity, proclamation and non-discrimination, among 
others”.360 These are the definitions which are given in the bill to these principles: 
a) Legality: “…pre-existence of norms that regulate the state of exception, 
established in the constitution and ordinary legislation, as well as the 
existence of mechanisms of control”361 
b) Proclamation: “refers to the State’s obligation to warn the population 
about the state of emergency before any measures are taken”.362 This is 
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congruent with the criteria mentioned in General Comment 29, as the 
Human Rights Committee has established that before a State invokes 
article 4 of the ICCPR, a state of emergency must have been official 
proclaimed, as this is essential for congruence with the principles of 
legality and rule of law.363 
c) Publicity: “the obligation of the State to immediately inform the General 
Secretaries of the international organisations about the cases that 
generated the restriction or suspension of rights and guarantees, as well 
as the rights which will be subjected to this emergency regime, the time 
that the emergency will be applied and the legal provisions that will be 
suspended”.364 This principle also harmonises with what the HRC has 
established in General Comment 29, as this document states that the 
States members of the Covenant must submit reports under article 40, 
where information about the law and practice regarding emergency 
powers.365 
d) Non-discrimination: “obliges the State not to engage in discriminatory 
practices”366 This principle harmonises with article 4 paragraph 1 of the 
ICCPR, as it establishes that the measures should not be taken solely on 
the ground of colour, sex, race, religion, social origin or language. 
e) Proportionality: “implies that the measures applied in states of 
emergency should be adopted in proportion with the needs of the 
situation”.367 This principle harmonises with the statements of the HRC, 
where they establish that even in both non-armed and armed conflicts 
should the State justify the measures taken and make sure these are 
legitimate and necessary for the circumstances presented.368 
Proportionality, as the Mexican legislators have addressed, is related to 
the duration, geographical scope and material reach of the state of 
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exception.369 This also replicates the arguments established in General 
Comment 29, as the HRC stated that the fact that article 1 paragraph 1 
establish that these measures “are limited to the extent strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation”, relates to the “duration, geographical 
coverage and material scope of the state of emergency and any 
measures of derogation resorted to because of the emergency”.370 As 
the HRC states, the extent of when can certain rights be derogated is 
established on the sentence that states: “to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation”.371 
f) Rationality: “implies that every measure is subjected to a previous control 
of rationality, this means that the decision being taken should be properly 
justified in objective elements of appreciation, founded in the rational 
nature of human beings”372 
 There are also two distinctions which the legislative has established between 
the concepts of suspension and restriction. This last one is referred as a “minor 
measure that implies reducing or constricting the exercise of rights and guarantees”, 
whereas suspension “corresponds to a more severe measure, as instead of limiting 
or reducing, it implies to deprive of the exercise of certain rights and guarantees”.373 
In both circumstances, the authorities are obliged to justify why they are choosing to 
suspend or restrict such right and guarantees.  
 It should be noted that the Mexican bill does not defined the concept of 
public emergency, which according to the Paris Minimum Standards is defined as 
“an exceptional situation of crisis or public danger, actual or imminent, which affects 
the whole population or the whole population of the area to which the declaration 
applies and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the 
state is composed.”374 
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 The reform also adds that violent conflicts are not the only situations that can 
be classified as “severe danger or conflict”, as the reform also establishes that: 
“…circumstances that generate affectations to the population for sanitary, ambient, 
climatic, chemical or physical reasons, as well as actions that would expose (the 
population) to disasters or emergencies, these being of natural or anthropogenic 
origin”.375  
Here, the phrase generating affectations to the population does not follow 
the spirit of what the HRC has expressed, as they have clearly stated that these 
natural disasters must constitute “a threat to the life of the nation”.376 Clearly the 
term affectation is not severe enough to implement suspensions on certain rights, 
according to the spirit of General Comment 29. It would be appropriate for the 
Committee to establish a similar recommendation to the one issued for Uruguay 
regarding their state of emergency framework, in which it is recommended that “the 
State party restrict its provisions relating to the possibilities of declaring a state of 
emergency, and constitutionally specify those Covenant rights which are non-
derogable”.377 This recommendation has issued as the Committee established that 
“the grounds for declaring an emergency are too broad and that the range of rights 
which may be derogated from does not conform to article 4 of the Covenant”.378 In 
the case of the Mexican reform, the non-derogable rights are indeed harmonised 
with article 4 of the ICCPR, but the legislators should have been more specific in 
order to establish the terms on such a delicate subject. 
 This reform has just been approved at the moment of this writing, so its 
outcome and the consequences of its potential use are still unknown. The question 
here relies on the political will of the Mexican State to submit the requested reports 
to the international organisations in case that a state of emergency is declared.379 
The fact that complaints against the army have been at the centre of the spotlight in 
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recent years, and the fact that the authorities fail to provide essential information 
about disappeared persons –even where there is evidence of State officials 
involved380-, damages the legitimacy of the real compromise of the State, apart from 
fulfilling their international obligations by establishing the new legal mechanisms. 
Under the new reform, any accusations of torture or enforced disappearance by 
officials would constitute a serious breach of Mexico’s obligations upon the 
international institutions, no matter if the victims of these abuses were members of 
the most dangerous drug cartel. The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 
established in the Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras case that: 
…regardless of the seriousness of certain actions and the culpability of the 
perpetrators of certain crimes, the power of the State is not unlimited, nor may 
the State resort to any means to attain its ends. The State is subject to law 
and morality. Disrespect for human dignity cannot serve as the basis for any 
State action.381 
Now that the State has fully issued a proper state of emergency 
constitutional provision, it has an obligation to submit very detailed information, as 
according to the rationale used by the HRC in the Jorge Landinelli Silva v. Uruguay 
case, the mere invocation of exceptional circumstances does not give legitimacy to 
the State party to evade its obligations under the Covenant; the State has the duty 
to “give a sufficiently detailed account of the relevant facts when it invokes article 
4(1) of the Covenant.382 The former phrase would mean that any actions that the 
Mexican State does not justify extensively would result on a lack of commitment to 
their international obligations. 
 The reform of constitutional article 29 has been a turning point in the 
development of the Mexican State’s security policies. This has been the 
consequence of years of international organisms issuing recommendations and 
campaigning for the updating of an important legal gap in the Mexican legislation. It 
seems like a positive step in the development of legal conditions which would 
submit the government to stronger mechanisms of accountability and would allow 
international bodies to have in-depth information about the details and development 
of a potential state of emergency. On the other hand, there are certain phrasings 
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that are vague and could allow a state or emergency to be issued under a 
discretional justification. The main point made by organisms like the ANAD is based 
on their lack of trust from the current administration, and their fear of the new 
provision to be used with political means. The reform does include all the points that 
the Paris Minimum Standards, the ICCPR and the American Convention on Human 
Rights establish, and therefore it cannot be said that the reform in unconstitutional 
or violates international treaties. It is a well-structured regulation, but unfortunately 
suffers from an incorrect phrasing that understandably creates tension among 
certain sectors of society, due to the number of accusations against the security 
forces in the past. 
3.2 Contemporary civil-military relations 
Modern democracies have achieved positive standards of civil-military 
relations by establishing strong civilian controls and accountability mechanisms. As 
the Council of Europe has stated, the establishment of democratic controls over the 
armed forces has been fundamental for the shaping of “democratic peace” among 
States.383 At a domestic level the strong civil controls are even more needed, as a 
democratic order always “presumes unlimited civilian supremacy over the command 
of the armed forces – anything short of that defines an incomplete democracy”.384 
Huntington states that civil-military relations have been understood as a part 
of the national security policies, which combine military security with domestic and 
situational security policies.385 Important characteristics that are essential to explain 
contemporary civil-military relations are those which have been defined as “a 
strategic interaction carried out within a hierarchical setting”.386 This is why 
academics like Ngoma argue that an approach to civil-military relations based on 
the realistic paradigm will entail negative relations between the army and society, 
because it “is essentially modelled to protect the interests of the state and is not 
necessarily focused towards national interest, which in effect could mean only 
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regime protection and regime interests.”387 Apart from the hierarchical interaction, 
the soldier´s professionalism is another central part of civil-military relations theory. 
Huntington states that professionalism constitutes a fundamental part of the 
objective civilian control over the armed forces.388 
A contemporary understanding of the hierarchy addressed by Huntington 
can be described as the feeling of power that civilians have over the army, and not 
vice versa. A State that can provide its society with strong mechanisms of control 
over the military will create a sense of real citizen empowerment. This 
empowerment would naturally get expanded when civilians can have control over 
strategic areas that do not necessarily involve decisions at a field level. This is part 
of what the liberal paradigm entails, as society cooperates more with the armed 
forces.389 Creating a civilian figure that would control political decisions regarding 
the army would be positive, even if the people involved in it do not have any military 
expertise, because this figure would leave the technical areas to the commanders. 
P. Feaver states that this strategic force management is divided in: structure, 
strategy, and operations.390 So, this model comes close to the theories for 
enterprise management, where there are specialized areas, but also political 
planning and general infrastructure. The sense of civilian control would undoubtedly 
be beneficial for society as a whole. 
 The European Commission for Democracy through Law has stated that at a 
domestic level, civilian control is exercised by the executive, legislative and judicial 
powers.391 This consideration is the opposite of the mechanism established for the 
deployment of the armed forces in Mexico, as Calderon unilaterally issued a 
presidential decree without consulting the other powers of the State. A set of 
constitutional provisions for monitoring the army was also lacking, and in the eyes of 
the Commission for Democracy, this form of constitutional power is fundamental, as 
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any governmental actions that involve the military would necessarily need a quorum 
to be legalised.392 
3.2.1 An appropriate civil-military theory for Mexico? 
Agency theory comes to mind when analysing the possibility of creating a 
civilian figure in Mexico. Such a theory sees the citizen as the “ultimate political 
principal”393, which means that civilians must act as monitors for the army. This 
comes from the power that citizens in western democracies have to elect their 
governments through vote; the public servant must not only be accountable to their 
voters and non-voters, but also guarantee that the institutions which he has been 
elected to administrate will work under their surveillance. According to its author, the 
main challenge of the agency theory is to “reconcile a military strong enough to do 
anything the civilians ask with a military subordinate enough to do only what the 
civilians authorize”.394 This is congruent with what Huntington and Diamond 
established about State control theory, as they state that the most important 
decisions should be controlled by elected officials, and particularly the military 
should be subordinated to civilian officers elected by vote,395 and the civilian leaders 
should also give some degree of independence to the military, which in exchange 
would imply that politics would keep a healthy distance from militarisation.396 
Janowitz by its part stated that it was preferable for the soldier to be politicised, 
because the armies were becoming constabulary forces that “provide continuity with 
past military experiences and traditions, but it also offers a basis for the radical 
adaptation of the profession”.397 While it is healthy for the armed forces to have 
representation in the government and for the soldiers to have a high understanding 
of the political context they are operating within, it is better to keep a strong 
institutional distance between military personnel and political positions. This is one 
of the reasons of an active member of the army should not be elected as National 
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Defence Secretary in Mexico, as this creates a conflict of interests between the 
institutions. 
The agency theory is directed at the relationship that the civilians and the 
armed forces have on a daily basis. Feaver established that the central part of this 
was not if the military’s actions were controlled by civilian decisions; it referred to the 
State’s decisions which affect the military, like their budget. The author established 
that a lack of control in these aspects might have severe consequences like 
unwanted wars, because the armed forces can find many ways to exercise their 
power, which would not always be in the best interest of civil society.398 The 
reluctance of the Mexican armed forces to be accountable and to submit information 
is an example of an exercise of power that goes against the interests of the 
population and is a direct challenge to the State.  
Another characteristic of the agency theory is the acceptance that there will 
always be imperfections in civilian control over the military; the most important thing 
is to find equilibrium between both parties’ interests, whilst ensuring that the most 
basic elements for a civil supremacy exist.399 The relation between both sides must 
be reformed as different situations and contexts unfold. The importance resides in 
establishing minimum requirements that regulate civil-military relations, especially 
before taking an extreme decision as a deployment, none of which existed when the 
armed forces were required as an aid for civilian security bodies in Mexico. 
Feaver was very aware of the complications in applying the agency theory in 
transitioning democracies. Cases like Mexico must work on various fronts, such as 
their electoral system, to reform its civil-military relations, because it is more difficult 
for a government that takes power with a deficit of legitimacy to build strong 
accountability systems, when their own existence is questioned by an important part 
of society. This explains another of the failures in the Mexican case; Felipe 
Calderón took office after a highly questionable electoral process, and an important 
part of society always questioned the authority of his government to implement such 
a controversial strategy, not because of the strategy itself, but because they always 
suspected his commitment to democracy. This brings to memory what Sapin and 
Snyder stated, as they addressed that “civilian supremacy is going to depend 
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essentially on the quality of the government’s civilian leadership”.400 Even though 
Feaver established that his theory would be hard to apply in places where civilian 
mechanisms of control are weak and the threat of a coup is high,401 Baker states 
that as long as there is a real government, meaning that is not just a façade of the 
army, the agency theory should be applicable, even though civilian monitoring might 
be extremely complicated.402 
 The agency theory has been criticised by academics like Nielsen for being 
negative in the sense that Feaver implies that the military will be insubordinate by 
nature and that the constant friction between civilians and the military is bad per 
se.403 Avant has also established that while there are always tensions between 
certain civilians and members of the armed forces, there exists a great respect for 
the military among civil society.404 The point to address here is that Avant made her 
critique within the US civil-military relations system, not in an authoritarian regime or 
developing democracy. As it has been established, Feaver was careful in order to 
point out that his theory would be harder, and for this reason, it can be inferred that 
he was correct in fact at being unoptimistic about the military’s reluctance to be 
subordinated to the civilians, as systems like the Mexican one proves. This research 
will provide with an adequate comparison between different military institutions and 
emergency frameworks with the current Mexican policies and institutions, but the 
agency theory is a strong model that has a democratic spirit has the centre of it. 
3.2.2 Militarism 
Militarism is defined as the “spirit and tendencies of the professional soldier; 
the prevalence of a military sentiment and ideals among people; and the tendency 
to regard military efficiency as the paramount interest of the state”.405 A more 
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simplified definition states that Militarism is “the domination of the military man over 
the civilian, the undue emphasis upon military demands, or any transcendence by 
the armed forces of true military purposes”.406 As Vagts states, is it important to 
draw the difference between Militarism and Military Way, defining the first one as 
the ideology, values and ideas that shape the way that military personnel perceive 
of themselves; this also explains why there are regions of the world more connected 
with such values than others. By its part, Military Way can be defined as the 
practical means in order to accomplish warfare in a successful way; it has to do with 
the specialized fieldwork rules and tactics.407  
While the military way can be shaped and used only during a specific time 
and context (such as war time, protection from a threat, or with the development of 
military schools), militarism exists as long as an army exists as an institution or as 
the military spirit continues to be engraved in the collective conscience of a specific 
society. Ideological postures in society also make an impact inside the barracks, as 
all members of the military were educated inside these values at a younger stage in 
their lives. As we have stated in the first chapter, recent surveys have established 
that the two most respected institutions in Mexico are the Catholic Church and the 
armed forces. This can give us an idea of the strong traditionalism of Mexican 
society. Most citizens tend to have a very limited comprehension of what academics 
have labelled as the military’s main goals; this means serving a variety of roles over 
contemporary history: uniting societies sometimes by force, other times serving as 
heroes that led to the independence from a foreign power, and other times by 
creating a sense of general unity through the means of conscription.408 However, no 
army can be left under complete freedom and detachment from a strong institutional 
control. 
The Mexican war against drugs has been the most prominent issue which 
has allowed cooperation between the military and the civilian State in the last two 
decades. Academics as Johanna Mendelson and Louis Goodman explain the 
issues that the current governmental strategy represents for the development of 
democracy and social evolution in Mexico:  
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It has not been easy to reconcile the measures needed to build democratic 
political systems and to fight drug-trafficking. Under the letterhead of military 
subordination to civilian authority, the dangers of the fight against drug-
trafficking as an army’s mission appear evident. Just as it happened in the 
counterinsurgency activities during the 1960s, direct participation of the Latin-
American armed forces in the fight against drug-trafficking would involve the 
army in political duties that are found, technically, inside the civilian domain. It 
would also demand a mastery of a complex combination of military and 
political abilities that would probably necessitate the expansion of military 
intelligence operations. This would erase the line between what is appropriate 
and what is inappropriate for professional actions; it would increase the 
directive roles that the army performs in national politics and political decision-
making.409  
Wesbrook states that military culture is contradictory to current western 
democratic thought due to the fact that it “demands authority, honour and 
obedience; political ideology demands agreement, coexistence and compromise…. 
Besides, liberal ideology directly challenges military profession, when considering 
professional soldiers as a threat for liberty, democracy and economic prosperity.”410 
If we applied the previous statement to the Mexican context, it can be established 
that the reason for the current conflict between the armed forces and society in 
Mexico is the consequence of the lack of an established democracy (at least 
according to global northern standards), and political citizen consciousness.  
The PRD, the main left-wing party, was the first one to publically criticize the 
army in 1999. In their demands, the need for civilian aid to the military members of 
the presidential team was stated. They also made accusations of corruption and 
lack of accountability.411 The same party has also stated that civil-military relations 
in Mexico have been different from the rest of most other third-world democracies 
due to very particular conditions, amongst them: the lack of civilian intervention in 
military internal issues (especially promotions), and an exaggerated emphasis on 
the principle of subordination during officer professionalization courses.412 Left-wing 
politicians have also stated that the officer-politician figure allowed for the 
communication channels which developed such particular civil-military relations 
during the twentieth century. It is important to point out that neither the conservative 
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nor the socialist parties had any type of influence in State decision-making until the 
mid-1980s; therefore, their input on civil-military relations was very limited. 
In conclusion, the concept of Militarism is useful to include in this chapter 
because it explains why some societies react differently to others, regarding their 
army. As it will be seen in the next chapter, Germany is an example of a country 
which completely reformed the ideology that prevailed within the army before World 
War II, and the modern concept which has allowed the military institutions to evolve 
vastly since then. Johnson’s “domination of the military over the citizen” can be seen 
in Mexico, where the armed forces have been granted a high level of impunity and 
are willing to use lethal force without resorting to less violent methods, as recent 
statistics show that the Mexican soldiers kill eight targets for every wounded one.413 
3.2.3 Different conceptions about military intervention at a domestic level 
There are different ways in which the military can take an active role in 
domestic civilian politics; these ones are: the coup, praetorianism, displacement. 
The coup is the most extreme of all this interventions; it is defined as “the infiltration 
of a small but critical segment of the State apparatus which is then used to displace 
the government”.414 At the moment of the intervention, drastic political or social 
changes do not occur; it is only the physical change of the group in charge of 
power.415.  
Another form of military intervention at a domestic level is praetorianism. 
Academics define this as “a politicised society where exclusive social and political 
groups are in collusion with the military”, Huntington also establishes two types of 
coups, oligarchical and middle-class praetorianism416. Even though such 
interventions tend to transform the political path of the country, only a very small 
percentage of the population participates in it. This argument can be applied to any 
armed conflict; even in the Mexican case, which can be considered one of the most 
violent conflicts at a global scale, the percentage of the population who has been 
involved, either as criminals or victims is low compared to the total population. 
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Other ways in which the military can intervene in domestic politics exist. 
These can consist in “displacement” or “supplantement” of a regime using various 
tactics.417 When a State is led by a weak government which was a lot of domestic 
opposition, the armed forces can become a balance between both sides. This tactic 
can be used to put pressure to the civilian leaders in order to gain concessions. 
Other times they can settle indefinite support for the government, in order to act 
against the population. 
While democratic –again, said in global northern terms- societies might have 
moved away from these “blackmailing” relations with its armed forces, the military 
can still apply pressure to the State in other forms. R. Betts explains two ways in 
which the military can influence it: indirect and direct.418 The first one can be 
measured by the level of access to classified information that the military has, 
another way can be a specific type of leadership. As Betts explains “a few people’s 
action, advice, and influence are relatively unconstrained by the formal limits of their 
office’s purview”.419 
Direct influence is easier to analyse, as it consists of institutional 
mechanisms of interaction between the armed forces and the civilian government.420 
In the case of Mexico, the group of federal deputies that form the National Defence 
Commission inside the Federal Congress and the Senators chamber is the most 
visible example of direct influence. The deputy group takes part in the analysis, 
opinions and legislation of everything related to the armed forces. The legal ground 
for their existence is stated in article 73 of the Mexican Political Constitution, which 
–among other attributions-, establishes that the commission must “lift and sustain 
the armed institutions of the Union, which are: the Army, the Navy and the National 
Aerial Force, and to regulate their organization and service.”421 It is important to 
address again that the Defence National Commission was not consulted by 
Calderon before the deployment of the armed forces was decided, even though they 
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are the maximum authority regarding military affairs in the legislative power of the 
civilian State.422 
 The level of direct military intervention in the Mexican State is difficult to 
measure. Active military officers have occupied positions in the federal government 
across the XX century (and the National Defence Secretary keeps being hold by a 
military commander until this day), and so far the federal government has not made 
any comments about the accusations against the military for human rights abuses. 
The current reluctance of the armed forces to be subjected to stronger civilian 
controls of accountability creates uncertainty of the way in which they would react if 
the State suddenly wanted to impose stronger mechanisms of enforcement. Mexico 
was one of the few Latin American countries who did not have a military joint or 
went through a coup in the XX century, because the government’s interests did not 
clash with the military ones. 
3.2.4 Civil-military relations in Mexico 
Ai Camp explains that there is a lack of familiarity between Mexican society 
and the military, constituting an obstacle for the consolidation of a real democratic 
State.423 Such unfamiliarity is the consequence of a cultural and physical isolation 
that the military went through the twentieth century; as we have stated in the first 
chapter, the only places in which the military performed security tasks where in the 
countryside and the mountains, as they seized and burned drugs, as well as 
repressing the guerrillas during the 70s.  
The military’s lack of professionalization is a recurrent topic. One of the main 
issues is that, according to Sarkesian, “military systems reflect society in order to 
keep their legitimacy; therefore, professional ethics, beliefs and attitude are 
developed from deep roots inside the political and social system”.424 If the army is 
isolated from the values and moral codes that civil society has built, there is a very 
low possibility of reforming their ethics and culture. As Ai Camp has stated, a lot of 
the time it is forgotten that a system of values and perspectives cannot be 
developed in a void.425 Regarding the military personnel, F. Nunn states that most of 
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them have strong negative feelings towards the upper classes.426 The author 
addresses that when the current Mexican State was in the process of early 
development; its forefathers had the idea that an army made of men from all social 
classes would be the best option to defend the country.427 Contemporary politicians 
tend to state that the army is formed by members of the “pueblo” (a common term 
for the working class, which has a similar meaning as the concept of volk), and not 
from the elites.428  
The lack of civilian legal control not only provides impunity for the army, but 
also leaves them unprotected when their own rights are violated; Ai Camp mentions 
the emblematic case of José Francisco Gallardo. On September of 1993, Gallardo 
recited a very controversial speech about the deplorable condition of human rights 
and the need for a military ombudsman429. Apart from asking for the development of 
such a figure, Gallardo’s speech asked why the inherent rights of soldiers and 
officers are violated, if, after all, the military institution serves as a guardian of all 
other guarantees, and states that military justice is selective and discriminatory, 
apart from stating that in order to make personnel respect internal discipline, cruel 
and degrading treatments are left in impunity.430 After that speech, that same year, 
he was arrested. The Secretary of National Defence at that time, Antonio Riviello 
Bazán, stated that he was detained for “spreading negative ideas about the Mexican 
military with the goal of dishonouring, offending and discrediting the army upon the 
public”.431 After being arrested he was prosecuted before a military court for charges 
related to the misuse of the military budget. The Inter-American Organization of 
Human Rights asked for his release various times while Ernesto Zedillo was 
president, without success. It wasn’t until after Vicente Fox had become president 
that, in 2002, he was granted his liberty, but was not granted a formal statement of 
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forgiveness.432 The former punishment was not only intended as revenge against 
Gallardo, but it seemed that its goal was to intimidate every other member of the 
armed forces from making public statements about their internal affairs.  
The Gallardo is an example of what happens when an army has no civilian 
sight and control, as Mexican personnel are more likely to be subjected and 
punished though informal systems than to be formally prosecuted and penalized. 
Rowe explains that the concept of informal disciplinary procedures “is intended to 
exclude acts by soldiers’ superior in rank to the individual soldier subjected to them 
which are illegal, such as any use of violence in the form of bullying, initiation 
ceremonies or otherwise”.433 The only critique that can be made to Rowe is that 
situations like the Gallardo case show us that, in undeveloped democracies, any 
member of the armed forces can be subjected to informal punishments, regardless 
of their position. It just depends if there is any other military on a position of higher 
power who can give the order to punish that certain member. 
3.2.5 Military attitudes towards domestic political issues and its 
relationship with the political class in Mexico 
The Mexican military had stability in part because, as Lopez Montiel 
established, the hegemonic PRI party gave political positions to several members, 
who would always call their affair with politics a “personal” matter, and not an 
institutional one.434 This means that the officers with powerful positions inside the 
army would be allowed to be a part of the political class, with all the corruption and 
impunity that has been part of the State included, but without having to establish 
upon Mexican society and the international community that the armed forces were 
intervening in the civil State’s decisions. 
Before the current security strategy began, both Mexican and foreign 
academics had asked themselves if the Mexican armed forces were prepared to 
solve domestic conflicts. In 1984, David Ronfeldt asked if the army was prepared to 
“assure Mexico’s stability and security” and how their behaviour “toward a serious 
political or foreign policy crisis” would be.435 Now the results are made visible for 
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everyone to see: the Mexican government continued to increase its reliance on the 
armed forces for security measures since the 80s, but they did not develop any 
significant reforms to adapt them to the new contexts and conditions. Ronfeldt was 
right when he stated that the new world order from the late 80s would affect security 
conditions, as regional tensions would be more exposed to the whole world; he also 
stated that conflicts between the public and private sectors would arise. He also 
established that with private-sector elites becoming subordinated to the State, 
public-private tensions would arise, as long as they did not have an equal status.436 
What happened is that instead of achieving a status of equality, neoliberalism made 
the private-sector elites take over the State and subordinate politics to the economy. 
As the world has seen, armed forces from all over the world became guardians of 
private economic interests, usually the most privileged sector of society. This can 
also be interpreted as a concession that the civil State made to the armed forces in 
order to keep their stability, even though there were episodes of political repression 
across all of the XX century, and it was a sign of their lack of political legitimacy. As 
Serrano establishes: “Military intervention in the political arena is often the result of 
the incapacity of civilian elites to build and consolidate stable political institutions”.437 
Although Ronfeldt stated that there would be an increase of nationalistic 
policies and independence from the US, which would create a rise in tension 
between the U.S.-Mexico relationships,438 the fact is that since the De la Madrid 
administration (1982-1988), the Mexican state has subordinated itself to the 
American interests, opened their markets to foreign (mostly US) investment and 
signed agreements like NAFTA and the Merida Initiative in order to get financial 
help, and in exchange for economic reforms. The author also concluded that the 
military would not object to the strengthening of the state-economy, as long as it 
was a mixture where private enterprises could be preserved.439 As it can be seen in 
the first chapter, the military has performed duties that tend to serve and protect 
private interests. The following Mexican federal administrations have had the same 
economic policies, and the militarisation of civilian spaces has been increasing 
gradually. This is not implying that the army is on the streets to protect the economic 
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policies of the State, but it illustrates how the economy has played a fundamental 
role in establishing a friendly relationship with the US, even among the current 
domestic security crisis. 
In the year 2000, Mexico made its first democratic State transition, as the 
conservative National Action Party (PAN) won the federal elections after 71 years of 
PRI governments. The new administration did not make significant changes the way 
the State had been organised and Mexico kept their military institutions without 
significant reforms. Benítez states that the same undemocratic practices continued, 
as he establishes that the president continued to be the “big decision maker and the 
armed forces kept their autonomy (from civilian influence) and avoided the 
intervention of unexperienced civilians”.440 For this reason, there was no military 
change of attitude towards the Mexican new political era, as their interests were 
kept intact. 
Academics state that the previous model of domestic civil-military relations 
evolved into the militarization of society. Arzt defines what can be understood as 
Militarization:  
…A process that includes three connected elements: first, the increase of the 
military (active or retired) in duties and spaces that is of civilian 
competence..... the second (element) would be the increase in the 
participation of the Mexican Armed Forces in strategic decisions in national 
and public safety policies, without the right escort of civilian counterparts, and 
the third (element), would be the growth of financial and material resources to 
the different instances where these martial elements are gathered, but that 
are in close entailment with the National Defence and Navy Secretary.441 
By its part, Astorga establishes that the political opposition stated about the 
dangers of a perceived militarisation in the justice system as early as year 2000, 
when ex-president Fox named an ex-military prosecutor (Rafael Macedo de la 
Concha), as the head of the General Procurator of the Republic.442 Even though 
Macedo sporadically used the military in certain antinarcotic operations,443 it would 
                                                          
440 R.G. Benítez Manaut, The Administration of Defence in Latin America Volume II: National 
Analysis (Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado, Universidad Estatal a Distancia, 
Madrid 2008) 19 
441 D. Ronfeldt  (n 435) 3 
442 L. Astorga, Security, traffickers and military. The power and the shadow (Tusquets, 
Mexico 2007) 63-64 
443 C. Resa Nestares, “The Trade of Illegal Drugs in Mexico” Notas de Investigación (May 
2003) <https://www.uam.es/personal_pdi/economicas/cresa/nota0503.pdf> accessed 6 May 
2016 
127 
 
not be until Felipe Calderón’s term (2006-2012), when the military would be used as 
a permanent aid to civilian forces. 
Another component of the military’s permanent deployment was civil 
assistance. This is composed of specific tasks that are set out to launch social 
development in areas with high levels of poverty and exclusion. It has been 
interpreted as political job done by the army on behalf of the federal government. 
Although analysts have described civic action as “apolitical functions for the political 
leadership”444, this is questionable; as such missions are clearly designed as part of 
a government’s social policies and cannot be detached from its ideological aspect. 
3.2.6 Contemporary military control in Mexico 
As we analyse the current Mexican context, questions arise about the 
liability of the Mexican State itself. Huntington stated that weak institutions have 
severe problems developing strong mechanisms of civilian control. According to this 
author there are two kinds of society, “civic” and “praetorian”.445 The first one 
involves a system with low levels of political participation but a strong 
institutionalization; the second one is characterized by a higher involvement of 
civilians in politics but a weaker institutional tissue. Huntington continues explaining 
that in praetorian societies people would protest either through positive or negative 
channels and these might consist in corruption, protests, mobs or coups. While this 
classification might be accurate, it falls short of explaining current contexts like the 
one in Mexico -which has proven to embrace corruption as a form of political 
system, and also has opposition from students, trade unions, and other social actors 
who engage in opposition in protests-, but has also proven to have long-lasting 
institutions. We have established before that Mexican society went through the 
twentieth century co-existing with a State system of vices, yet their institutional 
system never went through severe crises like most of Latin American societies. 
Two methods for military control have also been established. The Subjective 
Control theory states that the military will be subjected to the monitoring of the 
civilian population at every level and stage; this means guarding even their internal 
affairs. The former tends to make the armed institutions move to civilian ones.446 
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The other theory is Objective Control; this one establishes that the civilian State 
gives a relatively complete freedom to the military, in exchange for their total 
subordination.447 Mexico has been following the Objective theory since the new 
State was created after the revolution. Such theory contrasts with the new 
democratic system of the European models, but the Mexican case is far more 
negative. As we have previously stated, the military was subordinated to the 
authorities in exchange for political positions and passive tolerance of the 
repression against civilian groups who opposed to PRI during the twentieth century. 
This has resulted in a highly undeveloped accountability culture inside the armed 
forces, as General Cienfuegos addressed in a 2015 interview, regarding the 
investigation on the disappearance of 43 students448 in southern Mexico, stating: “I 
cannot allow my soldiers, who did not commit any crime, to be interrogated”.449 The 
next part of this chapter points at the most important issues which the military is 
facing, in order to achieve a democratic system of accountability and civil-military 
relations. 
 This topic illustrates how the Mexican State has given the army a complete 
freedom, which has resulted in impunity. Independence between the State and the 
armed forces is positive, when there is a strong civilian control over them. This is an 
issue which will be explained with more depth in the next chapters, as the lack of 
controls have created a culture within the military that has not been rooted in 
democratic principles. 
3.3 Flawed points of the Mexican army 
Undeveloped mechanisms for accountability, transparency and access to 
information 
Lack of accountability and corruption is also due to the military monopoly 
over the administrative functions. This is not only shared by the political opposition, 
but also by specialists and intellectuals that have followed the development of 
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security institutions in Mexico.  As R. Benítez noted, one of the only times that the 
army exercised their veto power in order to stop an official action, was when a 
Commission for the Clarification of Facts from the Past was created.450 This was 
done in order to prevent army officials from being prosecuted. 
Arzt establishes that one of the main issues with the militarization of public 
security in Mexico is the lack of a mechanism that would enable the monitoring of 
the army’s actions and “measure the real impact that is generated to mitigate 
criminality”.451 Although the army has been submitting data to the general public, it 
is still unknown how effective the strategy is, comparing the use of the army with the 
use of civilian forces. Although the Fox government set up the Transparency and 
Access to Governmental and Public Information Law, it states that national and 
public safety will be kept in reserve.452 The articles at issue state the following: 
Article 13: Information can be classified when its broadcasting can: 
Compromise national security, public security of national defence....453 
The current law contains a provision, which in theory prevents certain 
information from being reserved: 
Article 14, fraction VI: “....The character of reserved cannot be invoked in the 
case of the investigation of serious violations of fundamental rights and crimes 
of less humanity.454 
Even though the former provision should be enough to allow most of the 
current trials against military personnel to issue public information, the names and 
details of the current investigations in military courts are still reserved, as it was 
established in the first chapter. 
The former article could be interpreted as the legitimate need of the State to 
preserve some information, for national security, although keeping every detail of 
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the military criminal files and military personnel from the public does not fit with 
democratic principles. This law needs to be reformed jointly with the emergence of a 
new accountability mechanism. As with the recent reform to constitutional article 29, 
the success of current accountability mechanisms depends on the political will of the 
State to investigate and request information from the military. At the moment, even 
the GIEI, which is a creation of the Inter-American Committee on Human Rights, 
have not been able to access requested information (informs, binnacles and 
documents) from the National Defence Secretary regarding the Ayotzinapa case, 
not only denying information to the GIEI, but also to the General Procurator of the 
Republic.455 There needs to be the political will to request information, and also to 
penalise and also investigate the military bureaucrats who are denying it, as at a 
domestic level this violates the Mexican Army Code of Conduct, whose 
Transparency principle establishes that the military must “allow and guarantee 
access to governmental information”;456 and constitutional article 6(1), which 
establishes the public quality of all governmental material. 
Impunity for complaints on human rights violations 
Arzt does not give a deep explanation about this issue, but the lack of a 
strong civilian counterpart to the armed forces makes it difficult to guarantee respect 
to human rights in security duties (not even civilian forces have developed the 
needed figures to prevent abuse). Astorga has also established that civilian 
complaints against the military for violations to human rights, arbitrary detentions 
and rapes have been presented,457 also establishing that the history of the army’s 
deployment for counterattacking the drug cartels in the 1970s had been negative, as 
no kingpins were captured, and the military’s presence created animosity against 
them in certain parts of the country.458 
Lack of coordination with civilian institutions 
Ai Camp enlists three points that influenced the relationship between certain 
officers and members of the civilian government. The first one is the Presidential 
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Mayor State, which can be described as the president’s personal security body. 
Camp states that 3 of every 10 superior officers in the last 30 years have been part 
of such group. The second point is the security task in the most important 
embassies, in which a certain group of officers have been committed to escort 
relevant politicians. The third point is the membership of the Army or National 
Defence mayor state; inside this group numerous relationships are created between 
military personnel and powerful members of the federal government.459 Although 
institutional cooperation between the military and the political sphere has been 
positive in practical terms (for the control of civilians, but, as stated previously, not 
for intra-personal relations), since the creation of the modern State, military 
personnel had never interacted with the common citizen until the war against drugs 
began. The same author states that the lack of professional civilians inside the 
military has also made civilian influence less strong, even though soldiers share the 
public space at the moment. Astorga establishes, that when the army is employed in 
security matters that belong to civilian forces, the natural evolution of the State’s 
civilian structures is obstructed and the military are given powers which could 
undermine the democratic process in the future,460 implying that the civilian power 
decreases with the presence of military personnel in civilian security tasks 
As a consequence of the army’s civil detachment, politicians rarely 
understand everyday needs of the soldiers. This is explained by a military 
commander:  
The government has always maintained (the armed forces) isolated from the 
civilians by fear of political consequences of such contact. The last five or six 
presidents have not known us that well, and that has an extraordinary impact 
over who is elected of assigned to the highest positions. In other words, the 
same military has more power over this decision than the president, due to the 
lack of personal touch with the high rank officers.461  
Such statements paint Calderon’s decision for public deployment even more 
irrational, as clearly there is a lack of knowledge and control. 
It can be suggested that the armed forces’ current absence of control and 
accountability deficit is a shared responsibility. The State’s lack of communication 
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was very comfortable for the military commands, who at the same time restricted 
the personnel from discussing their inside life. As an officer has stated:  
….it is true that we don’t have any social contact……. I’m being serious; they 
don’t want us to talk with anyone to prevent making comparisons between our 
life and civilian life. In fact, I cannot think of any other army in the world in 
which this separation is more pronounced. During our development we have 
been intentionally isolated from the civilians.462  
 It is clear that the lower ranked soldiers feel separated from society. This 
can be attributed to the fact that there is no figure which will serve as a link 
between the lower ranked personnel and society. It has been simpler for the 
higher commanders to have direct contact with society, because, as it has been 
addressed in this chapter, they have been given political positions and have 
always had a very stable relationship with the civil State. 
Concentration of power in the higher commanders 
The lack of inside information has allowed high rank officers to accumulate 
vast power in decision-making and subordination. To illustrate the immensity of the 
power gathered by the higher commanders it must be pointed that during the López 
Portillo administration, the Defence secretary -Felix Galván-, was the one and only 
public servant who could give authorization to the US army for flying over Mexican 
territory. Another officer with a lower rank once gave the same authorization without 
the secretary’s licence, and he was jailed for three days as a consequence.463 An 
officer that was told off by the sub-secretary for “thinking too much”, recalls: “Indeed, 
in this country the Defence secretary is like a small god, in the sense that he can 
send some here or there, or change his position, without any existing appeal at 
all”.464 The former illustrates the level of repression from the higher commanders to 
the lower ranking sector of the army. Again, a lack of a figure that will listen and 
work on the complaints and issues of military personnel has left the common soldier 
with no resources to make his voice heard. 
Institutional fragility 
The lack of a civilian political culture has kept the governments away from 
the pressure needed in order to build strong mechanisms which would enable a 
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better understanding between current parties in conflict. To illustrate how 
contradictory the Mexican military discipline is in relation to the values of western 
democracies the following must be noted: an officer who asked to remain 
anonymous stated: “I remember that once the Defence sub-secretary told me that I 
had a problem. I asked the general what it was. He told me that I thought too much, 
“and in this army we don’t think””.465 As Samuel Huntington explains, military 
discipline sets the individual in second place after society, whilst also developing a 
system based on hierarchy, order and function division, as well as underlining the 
permanency of irrationality.466 Based on these concepts, it could be stated that the 
liberal democracy which Mexican society won after PAN took power in 2000, after 
71 years of uninterrupted PRI governments, took a step back with Felipe Calderon’s 
decision to put an institution whose principles are contradictory with modern political 
values, as the safeguard on civilian security. 
Mexico has developed a civil-military situation that has differed from the rest 
of Latin America. While countries like El Salvador, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina 
experienced military dictatorships during the twentieth century, Mexico started to 
build civilian institutions after the revolution began in 1910. In part -as it was 
explained in the first chapter-, this was accomplished by creating an authoritarian 
“network”, which was controlled by a single political party (PRI), whose “centre” 
condition made possible the incorporation of representatives from all segments of 
society. It can be established that one of the main reasons for which PRI managed 
to keep their legitimacy (at least until the questioned election of 1988), was that its 
members were the inheritors of the revolution, like Fr. Brandenburg states, they 
represented “familia revolucionaria” (revolutionary family).467 Academics at that time 
suggested that, contrary to most of Latin America between the 50s-80s, Mexico was 
not in danger of a military coup due to the fact that members of every social layer 
were represented in the PRI, and to the system’s ability to resolve conflicts without 
destabilizing the State institutions.468 Mexican politics in the twentieth century were 
considered unique; the main issue was the corrupt dependence of every state 
institution on the political class. 
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An ironic aspect to this situation is that, even though military officers were 
given political positions during a large part of the twentieth century, the armed 
forces’ position in the federal congress is very weak compared to more developed 
political systems. At the moment, the sole representation in the legislative is the 
National Defence committee, which is composed by deputies from different political 
parties. Samuel Fitch states that this is common to Latin-American regimes. In the 
Mexican case, the lack of military representation in congress lasted for 60 years 
(1930-1990)469; this made it impossible to request data and general information from 
the army, which explains why high rank officers show reluctance for any 
accountability reforms.  
Analysts who worked for the party also stated the need for judicial reforms to 
grant independence in trials. They stated that past reforms have been mere patches 
that were not the solution for the roots of the issue, which according to them should 
be “the establishment of tribunals that will have independence and autonomy in 
order to issue their own judgements, endorsing a correct handling of justice inside 
the Mexican army, preserving the principle of discipline as its spinal cord and 
ensuring the right to access to justice for all the citizens”.470 Even though, as it has 
been said in the first chapter, recent reforms have allowed civilian courts to try 
military personnel in the case of human rights abuses (such reforms were done after 
PRD’s statements); this has not resulted in genuine judicial independence, and as 
the left-wing stated, it has not solved the root of the accountability problem. 
Mexico’s military institution has also been damaged by a failed bureaucratic 
denomination. The PRD -through a recent analysis-, has stated that the Defence 
Secretary contains three different attributions. It operates at a field level, but also at 
an administrative (the analysis points out the need for a civilian figure to manage the 
army from an administrative outlook that would only leave the operative tasks to the 
military personnel) and judicial level.471 The current status of the secretary violates 
the separation of powers -one of the Mexican State’s principal values-; executive 
and judicial powers are meant to be totally independent, but the army currently has 
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both attributions. As it has been stated in the first chapter, a recent reform allows 
civilian tribunals to judge military personnel who violate human rights; unfortunately, 
the referenced reform suffers from ambiguity and leaves a wide criminal spectrum at 
the hands of the military judicial system.   
3.4 Equality, pre-trial procedures and contemporary human rights standards 
The international foundation of contemporary standards on equality and pre-
trial procedures is found in article 14 of the ICCPR, in which the General Committee 
has set minimum essential rights for a person from the moment of his detention until 
his trial comes to an end. As the Committee has established, article 14 does not 
only apply in the moment of determining the criminal charges of a person, but “also 
to procedures to determine their rights and obligations in a suit at law”.472 For this 
reason the State parties have the obligation to determine such concepts in an 
intricate form, which the Mexican State only did recently with the adoption of 
important reforms to the Military Justice Code, as there was a gap that prevented 
even the minimum standards of contemporary human rights frameworks to be 
applied to the victims of military personnel. On this subject, the Committee has 
stated that various states have had trouble in understanding that, while the 
Covenant does not forbid special courts, it does indicate that “the trying of civilians 
by such courts should be very exceptional and take place under conditions which 
genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated”473 Although Mexico became a State 
party since 2002, it took 12 years of both domestic and international pressure to 
motivate the executive and legislators to develop legal changes. 
The Human Rights Committee has established that not only criminal legal 
frameworks which apply directly to the security conflict in Mexico like the AMHR are 
relevant, but also the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (especially the 13th 
point)474, are especially relevant in cases like the Guzman brothers’ one, as it states 
that the prosecutors have the obligation to “consider the views and concerns of 
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victims when their personal interests are affected and insure that victims are 
informed of their rights in accordance with the Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power”.475 This last document is 
especially important to incorporate in this discussion, as the complaints of victims 
like the Guzmán brothers’ father were based in the lack of cooperation from both 
civilian and military prosecutors. The Declaration was adopted in 1985 by the UN 
General Assembly, and it dedicates a part to the provisions that should be given to 
the victims in order to access justice and an adequate treatment. In particular, the 
annex about Victims of Crime establishes in its principle 6 that such victims should 
be informed of all the details of the process and the disposition of their respective 
cases, especially where their interests can be directly affected. This principle also 
states that an adequate assistance should be provided to the victims. This is 
relevant to the current system of gathering evidence in Mexico, as according to 
Human Rights Watch, in various cases, the relatives of the victims have been 
accused themselves for having some degree of participation in the crimes 
committed against their relatives.476  
To establish the level of harassment from the military authorities towards the 
victims, it is appropriate to mention a brief example. Claudia Janeth Soto Rodríguez 
was taken to an investigator from the Military Prosecutor’s Office who asked her to 
give details about the disappearance of her husband. As the HRW report states, 
she felt very threatened to be in a military base, as she had accused the National 
Defence Secretary as a participant in the disappearance in the past. The agent that 
interviewed her made various intimidating questions and at the end of the interview 
the military investigator threatened her.477 The former conduct violates article 5 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights (right to humane treatment), which 
among its provisions establishes the inherent right that every person to have a treat 
that avoids any inhuman, cruel or degrading conducts, as well has having his 
mental, moral, and physical well-being respected by the State.478 The statement that 
verbal abuse and intimidation constitutes a form of violating the right to humane 
treatment, has been established by the Inter-American Court on the Raquel Martin 
de Mejía v. Perú case (no. 10.970), in which the Court stated that in order to 
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establish that torture has been committed, there are three key elements: “1) it must 
be an intentional act through which physical and mental pain and suffering is 
inflicted on a person; 2) it must be committed with a purpose; 3) and it must be 
committed by a public official or by a private person acting at the instigation of the 
former”.479  
Therefore, even though the Mexican military investigator’s behaviour against 
Ms. Soto Rodriguez did not constitute torture, it violated article 5 by mentally 
harassing her with the clear intention of making her stop in her search for her 
disappeared partner, because there were various precedents of the family trying to 
file complaints through the Federal Prosecutor’s Office (General Procurator of the 
Republic) (AP/PGR/COAH/TORR/AGII-I/178/2009), and the state’s prosecutor’s 
office (LI-H3-AC.007/2009, April 24, 2009). HRW documented all the errors that the 
authorities committed on Uribe’s case; these included: “failing to promptly secure 
the crime scene, which allowed crucial evidence to be damaged and removed; 
refusing to open a prompt investigation into the crime; passing the case back and 
forth between state and federal prosecutors; misplacing key evidence; failing to 
conduct adequate forensic analysis; and, in one instance, even lying about having 
conducted an interview or at least mistaking the identity of an interviewee in official 
records.”480 These violations not only violate article 5 of the American Convention, 
but the right to liberty and security of a person, established in article 9 of the ICCPR. 
The behaviour shown by the military investigator while questioning the 
relatives of Mr. Uribe, like the tactic of intimidation to relatives in order to stop them 
from requesting justice when military personnel has been involved in a human rights 
abuse are breaches of article 14 of the ICCPR. The delays on military investigation 
also prevent the victim from arriving to the stage of a trial, which would constitute a 
violation to article 8 of the American Convention (right to a fair trial). The provisions 
contained in the Convention open a legal path for these types of victims in a broader 
sense that other HR conventions, as its article 44 states that “Any person or group 
of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more 
member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission 
containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State 
Party”481; these would mean that even if the petitioner is not a direct victim, he/she 
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might still be entitled to put the complaint. Another important point to make here is 
that the commission has to consider such petition, being that only they (or a 
member State), have the faculty to submit it to the court.482 The case of the Guzman 
brothers (which has been described in detail in the first chapter), would also be in 
total contradiction with article 9 of the ICCPR, as such article is the foundation that 
protects civilians from arbitrary detention, and assures them personal security. 
Joseph, Schultz, and Castan state on their analysis of article 9 that there is a clear 
distinction which is the right that every State has to arrest a citizen as a legitimate 
policy of control, and the deprivation of freedom on an unlawful or arbitrary way.483 
Until the reform which was voted the 24th of May of 2014, Mexican civilians had no 
legal path for denouncing arbitrary detentions by military personnel, as their 
jurisdiction left them out of any part in the process. On the cases of Isaías’ wife, the 
threats made to her by a military investigator would also be violating article 9 of the 
Covenant, as the IAHRC determined in the Páez v Colombia case (no 195/85), that 
imprisonment is not strictly needed to jeopardize the safety of a person. The court 
established that the State must interpret article 9 in a broader sense, so that they 
cannot ignore life threats to their citizens.484 In the specific case of Claudia Soto, 
she was not specifically life-threatened, but it could be inferred that she could fear 
for her life, due to the enforced disappearance of her husband at the hands of the 
same institution that threatened her. 
The lack of commitment to the ICCPR from the Mexican armed forces has 
been well documented by Human Rights Watch, as they have stated that the 
military prosecutors are unsuccessful  on opening investigations or to even conduct 
the proper preliminary stages, such as enquires,485 this is crucial to collect evidence 
as the crime has just been committed. There is a much more urgent issue when 
civilians are arrested and kept in military facilities for days or even weeks; the new 
reform makes it compulsory for the military to immediately refer to civil jurisdiction 
any case in which a civilian is involved,486 so the outcome at a field level is still to be 
seen at the time of this writing. Before this reform, the arrest of civilians and its 
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imprisonment in facilities which had no jurisdiction over them, contradicted article 14 
of the ICCPR,487 which according to Joseph, Schultz, and Caspan, not only applied 
in the administration of justice by the police, but also to prosecutors,488 which in 
subject of the illegal imprisonments and arrests made by the Mexican armed forces, 
meant that situations like the interrogation and threatening made by a military 
prosecutor to Claudia Soto were incompatible with article 14, as such state agent 
had no jurisdiction over her or her husband for that matter. On this topic, the Human 
Rights Committee has established that the principle of equality before the law 
“mean not merely equality between one citizen and another but also equality of the 
citizen vis-à-vis the executive”.489 
It can be seen that Mexico’s legislation has complied with the essential 
standards for investigations, but a lack of action from the investigators, both military 
and civilian, have prevented victims like Claudia Soto and her family from accessing 
justice. The 2014 Military Justice Code reform has not had needed impact, because 
the civilian authorities are slow and have not carried on with the investigations with 
the required urgency.  
3.5 The judiciary power should have the monopoly of the authority to 
elaborate judgements which are within its jurisdiction. 
At an international level, the most important human rights charter was 
developed in 1988 by the UN General Assembly (The Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment). It 
mentions among its principal points that the “inherent dignity of the human person” 
should be essential during the state of arrest.490 The rest of the principles establish 
the values that should be respected during the whole process starting with the 
detention, custody and stage of investigation. The fact that most of the victims get 
arrested without a warrant and are simply taken to military bases without giving 
proper information to their relatives –even when they are present at the moment of 
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the arrest-, contradicts the American Convention on Human Rights, which Mexico is 
a member of. This legal framework establishes in its article 5 the “Right to Humane 
Treatment”491, that establishes the obligation of the State of protecting and 
respecting the dignity of any person that has been deprived of their freedom 
(Monroy Cabra addressed that this right has been a result of recognising human 
dignity, and it harmonises with articles 7 and 10 of the ICCPR492). 
This is relevant to the context of the severe human rights abuse that various 
civilians have suffered at the hands of the military in the context of the war against 
drugs, as even underage citizens have been objects of degrading treatments. To 
put an example of the last statement, HRW documented the sexual abuse of four 
girls who were arrested during an operation in which hundreds of soldiers who were 
seeking for the aggressors of five soldiers in the state of Michoacán in 2007.493 The 
underage girls stated that they were forced onto a helicopter where the sexual, 
physical and psychological abuse took place; after the abuse, they were taken to 
military facilities, in which they were fed an unknown chemical substance which 
caused them to lose consciousness. After waking up, they suffered from terrible 
pains in their bodies, apart from noting different kinds of fluids in their mouth, nose, 
and genitals.494 The whole situation was documented by the civilian ombudsman 
and established in the recommendation 38/2007, and instructed the National 
Defence Secretary to investigate and sanction the crimes which have been 
committed according to the evidence gathered. On the public file available on the 
Secretary website, it is stated that the recommendation has been received and an 
investigation was started, but it was established there was lack of evidence to try 
any military personnel.495 As in most of the other cases, the file does not state any 
other kind of details. 
Contemporary legal obligations also establish the rights that citizens need to 
be granted during the pre-trial detention. Article 7 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights (right to personal liberty), establishes that no citizen can be subjected 
to any type of arbitrary detentions; it also states that all information about the cause 
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of an arrest should be given, and a reasonable limit of time to decide if such citizen 
will be subjected to a trial being deprived of its liberty, or if legal guarantees to 
provide his subsequent appearance in court will be provided. In case that such 
citizen considers that his arrest has been unlawful, he can resort to the correct court 
in order to determine the matter. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
had already established recommendations to the Mexican State on article 7 of the 
American Convention, as they had received complaints of unlawful detentions;496 
the Commission recommended to “adequately regulating the principle of freedom of 
the accused during the trial phase, providing for specific exceptions in accordance 
with the guidelines laid down by the IACHR”.497 The guidelines referred in this 
recommendation are the Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons 
Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, as principle III establishes the conditions and 
circumstances in which a citizen can be legally deprived of his personal liberty.498 
The Human Rights Committee has established that the State parties must 
develop measures which will ensure the prevention of enforced disappearance, 
which the Committee states, often leads to deprivation of life. For this reason, the 
State has the responsibility to investigate and provide facilities to establish 
responsibilities in events where people go missing, and in which the violation of right 
to life might be involved.499 It should be noted that the right to life is not an absolute 
right, and the right of proportionality must be taken into account, as the State cannot 
go further than what is humanly possible to achieve in order to protect its citizens.500 
Therefore, this research has only selected cases of study where there are elements 
to establish that gross human rights violations have taken place. 
The behaviour of military personnel with the suspects also contradicts the 
principle of the presumption of innocent until proved guilty; such principle has been 
established in most domestic and international criminal systems, such as the ICCPR 
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(art 14[2]), on which the HRC establishes that such provision “imposes on the 
prosecution the burden of proving the charge, guarantees that no guilt can be 
presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, ensures that 
the accused has the benefit of doubt, and requires that persons accused of a 
criminal act must be treated in accordance with this principle”.501 The rationality 
behind the principle of a fair trial is also based on the theory which states that the 
judge’s decision must be elaborated through a well-thought analysis based on facts 
and legal groundwork, without external pressures or influences. The judiciary power 
should have the monopoly of the authority to elaborate judgements which are within 
its jurisdiction.   
3.6 Case studies  
The following cases were selected because they exemplify the current 
issues that civil-military relations in Mexico face. In order to establish the main 
points, a brief description of the background and facts is addressed; plus, the 
relevant domestic and international provisions that can be applied to them are 
established. The purpose is to demonstrate the legal and instructional flaws that 
have allowed severe violations of human rights to go unpunished. 
3.6.1 Case study 1 
The Guzmán Zúñiga brothers’ case 
On the 14th of November of 2008, neighbours saw a convoy of federal police 
and military personnel on the city of Ciudad Juarez, in the state of Chihuahua, 
Mexico. The federal police surrounded the house while the soldiers came inside. A 
few minutes later, the same witnesses saw the soldiers taking Carlos and José Luis 
Guzmán away in military vehicles; their current whereabouts is unknown.502 The 
family of the Guzmán brothers went to the headquarters of the 20th Motorized 
Horsemen Regiment of Ciudad Juarez, to investigate and try to get any information 
from military personnel, but did not get any response. After that they went to the 
civilian Chihuahua General Justice Procurator, but the personnel refused to give 
any help unless the family dropped any charges against the army.503 After 
establishing this condition, the only help they offered was posting pictures of the 
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missing brothers all over the city. With no other resource, they complained upon the 
Human Rights National Commission, whose investigation led to the issue of a 
recommendation. 
The Human Rights National Commission arrived to the conclusion that the 
soldiers had in fact broken the law because the victims had not been arrested while 
committing any crime; they had also violated legal principles by not putting them 
under the jurisdiction of any established authority.504 Such recommendation was 
accepted by the National Defence Secretary, but at the same time that they 
accepted the institution states, until the day of this writing, that a trial against 7 
members for the charges of “abuse of authority” is on course, and no military 
personnel has been sentenced.505 The governmental institution has not given any 
more public explanation about this evident contradiction (accepting a 
recommendation without establishing any responsibility to members of the army). 
In order to establish international competence, first we need to discuss the 
following: 
Relevant frameworks that apply to this case 
The only public information of the current course of the trial that is available 
is a public PDF file which does not give any names of details, other that the number 
of military personnel being prosecuted, and the crime that they are being accused 
of: Abuse of Authority. Concerning this concept, the Military Justice Code 
establishes the following: 
Article 293. - Abuse of authority is committed by the military that treats an 
inferior in a way that is contradictory with legal dispositions. This crime can be 
committed inside or outside of service. 
It can be seen that the legal description of this provision does not 
correspond with the evidence that the Human Rights National Commission gathered 
on its recommendation, as the passive subject of art 293 (“an inferior”), is referring 
to another military personnel, not a civilian. In this case, the suspects were being 
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investigated for a crime of a strict military discipline, but the passive was a civilian, 
so this article would not be applicable. 
. Until the day of this writing, there is not an alternative inside the Mexican 
domestic law to initiate a trial in civilian courts (on 2012, the National Supreme 
Court of Justice declared article 57 of the Military Justice Code as unconstitutional, 
and established that all human rights violations committed by military personnel 
would be accountable within civilian courts, but the Mexican legal system requires 
five judgements with the same criteria applied for it to be established as 
jurisprudence, so it is still not compulsory).  
Article 57 of the Military Justice Code established the crimes that are 
competent for the code, just stating (among others) the following: “the ones 
committed by the military on the moments of being on duty or as a consequence of 
it”. The article also states the monopoly of the military tribunals: “when on the cases 
of fraction II, militaries and civilians concur, the first ones will be judged by military 
justice”.506 As it was stated before, the criteria of the National Supreme Court of 
Justice that would allow civilian courts to try military personnel is still not 
compulsory. Therefore, a domestic resource for human right abuses that can prove 
effective still does not exist. 
The monopoly that the Mexican military has over military justice breaches 
the American Convention on Human Rights (which Mexico signed in 1981), 
specifically article 25, which establishes the Right to Judicial Protection and the right 
for a competent tribunal or court that ensures protection against violations of 
fundamental rights.507 The Mexican State is also violating article 2, which states that 
a State that has signed the treaty does not guarantee its citizens total respect to the 
fundamental rights contained in the treaty, it should compromise to adopt legislative 
measures in order to meet the standards that the convention asks for.508 Mexico is 
also not meeting the standards that the Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappeared of Persons (Mexico signed this agreement on 2002); its article I 
established the compromise of its members not to allow, tolerate, and practice 
forced disappearance of persons, not even when a state of emergency, or 
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suspension of individual guarantees is decreed.509 Article III also establishes an 
important point, as it states that forced disappearance will be considered to have a 
continued nature as long as the whereabouts or destiny of the victim is not 
established.510 This last statement would in fact, be enough to present a case in the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as until the day of this writing, the Guzmán 
brothers have not appeared –dead or alive-. 
3.6.2 Case study 2 
The murder of Sergio Meza Varela and the injuries against José Antonio 
Barbosa Ramirez 
On the 16th of February of 2008 in the city of Reynosa, Tamaulipas members 
of the armed forces opened fire against a vehicle with the intention of stopping it. 
Inside the car, Sergio Meza Varela was shot to death and José Antonio Barbosa 
Ramirez was severely injured. The National Defence Secretary later stated that the 
soldiers had shot their guns in order to repeal a fire arm assault, but later 
investigations established that evidence suggests that both men were unarmed at 
the moment of the attack.511 The Human Rights National Commission investigated 
the event and issued a recommendation; they stated that excessive use of public 
force and fire weapons have been applied; this violated the fundamental rights 
related to juridical safety, physical integrity, and life, all protected in articles 14 and 
16 of the Mexican constitution.  
Relevant frameworks that apply to this case 
As the local civilian authority is investigating the event at the moment, the 
Mexican domestic law must be exhausted first. The local prosecutor in Reynosa 
must apply the following articles from the state of Tamaulipas criminal code for the 
death of Sergio Meza Varela, which according to the evidence already gathered by 
the Human Rights National Commission would be the following: article 329, which 
describes homicide; article 330, which establishes the causal nexus of the homicide; 
article 336, which describes the concept known as qualified homicide (which would 
apply in this case because the evidence concluded that the military personnel had 
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used fire weapons while the victims were unarmed; this article would also apply for 
the case of Jose Antonio’s injuries); article 341, which applies to the case, because 
the soldiers did not shoot the victims to contest an assault, so it can be inferred that 
their actions were premeditated. In the case of Jose Antonio Barbosa Ramirez, the 
description about the concept of injuries are contained in article 319; article 321 
would also apply to this event, as it describes the sanctions for injuries that would 
put the victim’s life at risk, which according to the recommendation from the 
commission would apply to Jose Antonio; finally, article 322 would also be 
applicable, due to the disturbance in one of Jose Antonio’s superior limbs.512 While 
these should be the legal foundation in which the prosecutor should act, there is no 
denial that the lack of public information makes it impossible to see what the current 
criterion is.  
According to the public file available from the National Defence Secretary, 
the civilian prosecutor took charge of the investigation on the 6th of July of 2012.513 
The investigation done by the human rights commission gathers enough qualified 
evidence to support a case for the local prosecutor, so it is suspicious why there is 
no new advances from the case made public. The behaviour from the army is even 
more obscure, as we have stated that, according to most updated public file, they 
have supposedly fulfilled the recommendation in its totality. 
Regarding the international sphere, the commission also referenced article 
6.1 or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 4.1 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, and article 3rd of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, all of them which refer to the right to life.514 The commission 
finished its recommendation instructing the National Defence Secretary to 
compensate and repair all the damages (which would include the physiological, 
medical, and physical aspects), apart from repairing the car that was damaged, and 
last but not least, instruct the secretary to start an investigation and sanction all the 
military personnel according to their degree of guilt in the event.515 It should be 
noted the fact that in the public file made available to the public by the National 
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Defence Secretary, the military investigators opened a file (8ZM/05/2008), but then 
declined jurisdiction and sent the file to the civilian General Procurator of Justice of 
the state of Tamaulipas. The institution’s website does not have any of their files 
publically available, and there has been no new advances reported on the news 
until the day of this writing. It should be noted that the military file that is publically 
available states that the recommendation issued by the commission is “totally 
completed”.516 According to this statement, the solders should have been sentenced 
for the crimes committed –as the commission instructed-, but the file does not list 
any personnel being processed or sentenced, as it also states the fact that the 
investigation is now at the hands of the civilian prosecutor. 
These cases have established the lack of independence of the military 
investigators and the lack of resources that civilians have to access justice within 
the present military and civilian institutions, as the Human Rights National 
Commission does not have the needed level of enforcement to subject the military 
justice system to mechanisms of accountability. While the 2014 Military Justice 
Code reform establishes the faculty of civilian prosecutors to investigate military 
personnel accused of human rights abuses, the military justice institutions still 
handle the majority of complaints. Information requested to the National Defence 
Secretary from a newspaper on 2015, showed that of 4,525 soldiers that were being 
subjected to military trials, only 238 had been sentenced.517 The fact that the civilian 
investigation units have conditioned their aid in exchange of protection for the army, 
line on the first case analysed, makes the intervention of international mechanisms 
of accountability more urgent, as the victims do not have access to functional and 
transparent institutions inside Mexico. 
3.7 Conclusion 
 At the moment of this writing it is impossible to predict what the Mexican 
outcome will be, as the constitutional article 29 has not been employed yet. As it 
has been addressed in this chapter, the reform has the requirements that the 
American Convention and the Paris Minimum Standards establish, but the wording 
of an essential sentence (“other that puts society in severe danger or conflict”) can 
be subjected to debate. The lack of a strong government (a poll published on March 
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2016, shows that current president Enrique Peña Nieto only has 32% of citizen 
approval518), and a legislative also with low legitimacy (in 2015 the chambers of 
senators and deputies registered 5.2 and 5.3 points respectively over a scale of 
10519), does not constitute a strong precedent, as according to the reform, they are 
the powers that will establish a state of emergency. The Supreme Court of the 
Nation has powers to make decisions about the legality of the emergency provisions 
once they have been decreed, but this institution does not have a high reputation 
among the citizens either (it got a score of 6.3 over a scale of 10520). If emergency 
powers are established, the Mexican State would need to justify very carefully their 
decision, or they would be in risk of alienating a large part of society, a situation 
which would be severely dangerous for its current fragile democracy. 
 There is also the issue of the current deployment of the military; this 
deployment was established mainly on the basis of constitutional article 89 fraction 
VI,521, which gave way for the issuing of the presidential decree that gave 
attributions to military personnel to perform security duties aiding civilian forces. In 
the recent constitutional reform, article 89 was not altered at all. Here, a necessarily 
question arises: can be issuing of the presidential decree be considered as an 
example of emergency provisions? How do the constitutional reform harmonise with 
the current security strategy?  
 The fact that the Mexican armed forces have been deployed to do police 
duties for a decade represents a severe problem in terms of State accountability. 
Gross has talked about the importance of setting a clear temporality when a state of 
exception is issued,522 because the measures applied to the emergency might 
become normalised as time passes by,523 and ultimately be incorporated into the 
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legal codes, as the case of the prolonged arraigo524 measures. The Mexican context 
is even more complicated to place within the juridical sphere, as a state of 
emergency has never been officially declared, and it was only until 2016, 10 years 
after the security strategy was issued, that the federal congress included the state of 
emergency figure in the constitution. This is all part of the problem that Greene has 
addressed, which is the current lack of a clear line between normalcy and 
emergency.525 The author establishes that the judiciary must address the 
temporality of the emergency by putting special attention to the first paragraph of 
article 15 of the ECHR, specifically the phrase “threatening the life of a nation”, in 
order to establish at which point does the emergency cease to exist.526 If this 
rationale is applied to the Mexican context, the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico 
should take a proactive approach to the militarisation issue, and judge if the current 
security context requires the indefinite deployment of the armed forces. 
 The topic of civil-military relations also takes the discussion back to the 
legitimacy of the current regime. According to Feaver, the citizen plays the role of 
“ultimate political principal”527 because society monitors their own armed forces, and 
this entails that the military as an institution must be held accountable upon society 
in first place. The deployment of military personnel on Mexican streets has created 
a conflict between society and the army, which has been increasing over the years; 
commanders and soldiers have been reluctant to work inside a system of 
accountability that would make society feel empowered. This has been a 
consequence of their deployment before setting a proper mechanism, not only 
legally-wise, but also at an institutional level. The denial of the armed forces to 
submit information which should be considered public, and the reluctance to let their 
personnel be interviewed by investigators proves that the army’s internal 
regulations, federal laws like the General Law of Transparency and Access to Public 
Information, and Mexico’s status as a State party of treaties like the ICCPR and the 
ACHR, are not enough to guarantee access to justice to victims of human rights 
abuses. If the institutions in charge of investigating and prosecuting do not show 
political will to provide justice, and if the armed forces as an institution refuses to 
subject themselves to the established mechanisms of accountability. 
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 The second part of this chapter has addressed the points that illustrate the 
civil-military relations conflict in Mexico. The Mexican military culture established 
along with the creation of the post-revolutionary modern State was founded without 
democratic principles, with a State that granted them impunity in exchange for 
recognition and impunity. It can be established that there was a non-written pact of 
impunity between the political class and the armed forces which did not change with 
the democratic transition that Mexico went through with the change of regime in the 
year 2000. The case studies occurred while the PAN party governed at a federal 
level (after all, it was a president from this party who deployed the army to fight drug 
cartels). The PRI party won the 2012 elections, but did not change the security 
strategy initiated by PAN. The importance of explaining the social context of civil-
military relations is important in order to provide with the necessary cultural 
elements to make an appropriate comparative legal study at a later point of this 
research. 
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Chapter IV 
4. The German post WWII military reforms: a lesson for the 
Mexican case? 
 
The potential long-term impact of the recent military justice code reform in 
Mexico should not be underestimated, despite its flaws mentioned previously in this 
thesis. Hundreds of complaints against the armed forces in the last 7 years, plus the 
international pressure that international organisations put on the State, forced the 
legislators to make fundamental changes in military and civilian jurisdictions 
concerning the cases of human rights abuses where military personnel and civilians 
are involved. In this chapter, Germany has been selected as a comparison for the 
conducting of this research in terms of accountability and subordination as well as 
the status of the soldier with society, all this in addition to the strong civilian control 
over the armed forces that was developed as a reaction to move away from the 
Nazi regime and World War II. In this part of the chapter the post-WWII German 
military system will be examined and a comparison with the Mexican current system 
(including the new reform) will be established.  
Why is Germany selected as a source of comparison with Mexico? The 
German army went through a re-foundation, along with the whole State, after WWII. 
The main areas where qualitative reforms were done were the areas of 
accountability and the soldiers’ rights. This experience has been so enriching for the 
development of democratic civil-military relations, that parts of its system could be 
adapted for the Mexican context. In order to elaborate a comparative study between 
two countries with different historical contexts, the methodology selected for the 
study allows selecting parts of the legal systems which are functional in another, 
taking into account the cultural background and current context of the selected 
objects. As it has been addressed on this research, the Mexican soldiers are 
currently living among a strongly authoritarian military culture, which leaves no 
space for the soldier to act critically,528 following orders which they might view as 
incompatible with the values that they are supposed to guard. This chapter will 
unpack key concepts that show the ethics and goals behind German contemporary 
military culture. 
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4.1 The development of German contemporary militarism and the concept of 
dignity 
After 1945 there was a rupture in German History, as according to Tewes 
civilian power had not been democratised, but after the end of WWII the 
emancipation of civil society from the State became a reality.529 In the 1950s the 
Cold War climate created the need for the reorganisation of the military forces in 
West Germany; an agreement was reached in 1954 and the Federal Republic 
agreed to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. Such agreement stated that the Western 
Allies could re-occupy the West German territory if they considered it necessary, 
and in exchange the German State would agree to become part of the Western 
defence through the reorganization of its armed forces, called the Bundeswehr.530 
Behind the domestic constitutional problems in creating a new army in Germany the 
fear of recreating the Nazi experience existed, as Nolte and Krieger have 
established. The first half of the 20th century showed an authoritarian side of the 
German army which the new republic did not wanted to repeat. 
Dyson establishes that the Bundeswehr has employed four principal 
elements that encompass the policy subsystem of this institution: The first element 
is the shared identity, which is based on the constitutional provisions that regulate 
national defence, the provisions and doctrines of the NATO command structure, and 
the Innere Führung (IF) and its concept of “citizens in uniform”. The second element 
is the policy learning, which means that members like the defence commissioner of 
the Bundestag, the Bundestag Defence Committee, and the universities of the 
Bundeswehr will influence the shaping of the Bundeswehr policies. The third 
element refers to the Bundeswehr specialised units at a Federal and Land Levels 
that deal with activities like investigations, relationship building and diplomacy, and 
peacekeeping missions. The last element is the civilian influence, which does not 
only come from the IF, but, as the same author addresses, from the civilian groups 
like youth organisations, churches and trade unions, all of which take part in the 
shaping of the Bundeswehr policies.531  
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Post-WWII political forces created an army which would work hand in hand 
with civilians and would submit itself to a process of accountability upon civilian 
institutions, apart from incorporating a new ideology in military culture known as the 
“citizen in uniform”.532 This concept provides the soldier with an inherent right to 
dignity and freedom of conscience, which will be explained later in this chapter. As 
Berger has established, post-WWII German militarism has been developed in “the 
culture of antimilitarism”533, whose main goal is to distance the armed forces from 
the actions of the past (especially the Nazi regime). Precisely, the new military 
culture is based on the foundation of a positive relationship between the military and 
society, and where the concept of “the citizen in uniform” is rooted, as German 
society did not want to experience another dictatorial State who could have 
complete control of the armed forces. 
As explained above, the new German State and military culture directly 
detached themselves from the Nazi experience, as even local constitutional 
frameworks like the Constitution of the Free Hanse City of Bremen established that 
“dignity” had been disregarded by the National Socialists.534 But how does the 
German state defined the concept of dignity? As Bendor and Sachs establish, we 
need to refer to the “object-formula”,535 where one needs to identify if a person has 
been treated as an object in order to establish that his dignity has been violated, 
although this is not enough, as the authors establish that there are different 
elements that encompass this concept.536 By its part, Enders establishes that the 
concept of human dignity cannot be explained from a textual approach, although it 
emanates from the constitutional concept that “all law has to emanate from the 
individual’s status as a legal subject”.537 Human dignity has also been addressed by 
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Ebert and Oduor as a way to guarantee freedom and to empower citizens to debate 
key issues.538  
For this reasons, human dignity is a central piece of German contemporary 
militarism, as it confers them freedom at any points to take decisions based on their 
own judgement in certain situations. Plus, it protects them of being used as 
instruments for the commitment of orders that are contrary to the spirit of the 
German Basic Law. 
4.1.1 The constitutional provisions of the German military 
In order to explain the context of these provisions, it is important to analyse 
the current German constitution to establish the foundation of its armed forces. At a 
constitutional level the base for the existence of the armed forces is founded in 
article 87a(1) of the German Basic Law,539 which also references article 91 –the 
foundation for a state of emergency, or as the Basic Law states, an “internal 
emergency”-. Therefore, it is important to point that the commander of the armed 
forces is given to the figure of the Federal Minister of Defence, which has a civilian 
nature.540  
Perhaps what illustrates in a broader way the high level of civilian control 
over the armed forces is article 115a. Such article addresses the need for the 
Bundestag to determine if the German territory is under attack, and only with the 
consent of the Bundesrat, which is the other part of the legislative power, a decision 
will be taken (by at least two thirds of the votes). If the situation does not allow this 
measure to be taken the decision will be in charge of the Joint Committee, which 
consists of both members of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, with the first one 
providing two thirds of the total and the second one a third of the members. The 
Joint Committee will be in charge of taking decisions when a state of emergency is 
declared if the Bundestag cannot be assembled with enough time. Article 53(2) of 
the German Basic Law establishes that it is compulsory for the federal government 
to inform the Joint Committee if there is a plan on issuing a state of defence.541 
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Another basic point in article 115a states that if the German territory is being 
attacked by an armed force, the Federal President will issue a declaration which 
shall be consistent with the principles of international law regarding states of 
emergency, and only with the consent of the Bundestag, with the Joint Committee 
also authorized to take such decision in place of the Bundestag if the situation 
requires it.  
4.1.2 German civil-military relations and the role of the State 
To introduce the theme of civil-military relations, it should be addressed that 
all the provisions in the German Basic Law will apply to civilians and soldiers as 
equal, as this is a consequence of the “citizen in uniform” spirit. A strong civilian 
control over the military can be inferred from the sovereignty of the people, which is 
another basic principle of the free democratic order, as such phrase emanates from 
article 20 of the German Basic Law, which establishes that “all state authority is 
derived from the people”.542 This can be interpreted as the power that the citizens 
have to elect their representatives and grant them with State authority.  
Another basic point for the armed personnel to obey is the separation of 
powers, which means that the civilian executive does not have the ability to 
command the armed forces by himself or to take a decision upon them, as this 
attribute is only granted to the Bundestag or to the Joint Committee;543 it can also be 
interpreted as the inability of the military commanders to make decisions which 
might affect the democratic order. The principle of the responsibility that the 
executive and his ministers have with the parliament is related to the separation of 
powers, as the first one is always forced to report back all its actions to the 
parliament. This also affects military personnel due to the fact that the Minister of 
Defence is a civilian member (part of the executive government), so it constitutes 
the channel in which the military’s actions can be discussed and reported to the 
legislative. This is developed to be congruent with the lawfulness of the 
administration which the democratic legal order also points out.  
As this order also establishes the independence of courts as one of its focal 
points, it can be stated that separation of powers is probably the most important 
axiological legal principle in which the modern German State bases itself. According 
to the Innere Führung, the independence of the courts also forms part of the 
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principles which are of extreme importance to the military personnel.544 The 
military’s respect to the independence of courts is essential to provide society (the 
army included, as they have the same status as a citizen) with effective legal 
remedies and to guarantee efficient access to justice. Judicial independence also 
guarantees a strong civilian control over the armed forces, as the citizens can have 
prompt and transparent investigations in case that their rights are violated by 
military personnel. 
The leading position in the defence of the German territory belongs to the 
Minister of Defence; the constitutional base for this position is contained in article 
65a of the German Basic Law. Nolte and Krieger explain that the main aims of this 
position is to ensure that there will be a political position which will be accountable 
upon the Parliament, besides providing a strong civilian control over the actions of 
the armed forces.545 Article 65a of the Basic Law is the foundation of the command 
that the Minister of Defence has over the armed forces;546 this includes taking all the 
decisions that concern the aspects of such institution during peacetime and also 
during a state of tension.547 As it has been explained before, during a state of 
defence this power will be transferred to the Federal Chancellor, and such state of 
defence will be determined by the Bundestag with the approval of the Bundesrat.  
In the German established order the government does not have the power to 
lead the armed forces; article 65 of the German Basic Law addresses the power to 
determine policy guidelines and its limits. Article 65a especially states that the 
command of the military is appointed to the Federal Minister of Defence while 
peacetime, and article 115b establishes a special prerogative to the Federal 
Chancellor to take over the command of the armed forces if a state of emergency is 
declared. The federal government has a very limited degree of decision-taking 
regarding the military; this is contained in article 80, which gives a limited degree of 
power to the executive to issue statutory instruments whose contents shall be firmly 
grounded and stated in the law and should also have the approval of the Bundesrat. 
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Article 80a establishes an important principle: when a law that regards the general 
protection and defence of society is issued, it shall be approved only after the 
Bundestag has come to the conclusion that a “state of tension”548 exists. Only a 
state of emergency can exclude the previous approval of the legislative.  
The spirit of article 80 of the German Basic Law is aimed at limiting the type 
of power that the executive can directly apply to the military, which gets reduced to 
mere administrative matters, not including issues that would cause a change in the 
duties of military personnel. According to Frevert, after Germany signed the Bonn-
Paris conventions (which put an end to the Allied provisional government in West 
Germany) in 1954, “the civil power of the parliamentary armed forces” was 
established. This principle prevented the lack of civilian control of the Weimar 
Republic, when presidents and military high-ranking officers could establish military 
aims without needing consent from the parliament.549 These principles are part of 
the post-WWII demilitarisation of the German State. 
Article 115a of the German Basic Law decides especially the concept of 
“State of Defence” in which the German Parliament has a fundamental role on the 
case of an armed deployment. The Government needs to determine that the 
German territory is being attacked by armed forces or that an imminent armed 
threat to the civilian safety exists. After this determination the government submits 
an application which will require two-thirds of the votes, alongside with a majority of 
the votes from the members of the Bundestag (with the approval of the Bundesrat). 
The Joint Committee will make this determination if the situation requires a fast 
response, or if the nature of the attack prevents the Parliament from discussing the 
matter.550 The importance given to the discussion and multiple agreements between 
different civilian actors before taking a decision as transcendental as a military 
deployment should be noted. Even in a situation of extreme urgency such decision 
must be taken between different members of either the legislative force or the 
executive government, but never a unilateral decision. The constitutional base over 
the German armed forces is found in article 45a (1) and (2), which states that the 
Bundestag will appoint a Defence Committee whose main attribute will be to enquire 
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members of the armed forces. By its part, article 45b establishes a commissioner 
dedicated to the surveillance of the military. 
4.1.3 The Innere Führung and the “citizen in uniform” model 
The Innere Führung is a regulation that is considered fundamental for 
service in the Bundeswehr. Its preface states to contain “fundamental statements on 
the self-image of soldiers in a democracy”.551 P. McGregor has stated that the 
principal role of the IF is to “shape military efficient, democratically controlled and 
socially integrated armed forces”.552 This framework also aims to establish a rupture 
with the military culture of Nazi Germany and states that the soldiers need to 
understand tradition and evaluate current political events as part of facing 
Germany’s past.553 The Federal Ministry of Defence has explained the principles of 
the IF stating “that the members of the armed forces are citizens who must be 
integrated into our society, that the basic rights of citizens are guaranteed, and that 
the rule of law must be applied.”554 The same document establishes that the soldiers 
must require the classic military skills but there must also be an emphasis on other 
abilities such as the support for personal freedom, personal dignity and human 
rights, as well as the mediation between parties to resolve conflict before using 
violence.555 
The IF has been developed as a medium for the commanders and officers to 
guide their actions, but it is also used as a model of behaviour in military schools. Its 
structure is not dogmatic though, as it is continually being developed and reformed 
in order to adapt to the current geopolitical conditions. This code states the 
principles that soldiers must defend are freedom, human dignity, equality, justice, 
peace, democracy and solidarity.556 At a legal level international law, the German 
Basic Law and military legislation are on top of the IF.557 An essential point is that 
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this code also establishes that military personnel have the same status as the 
citizens, as it is explicitly stated that “the fundamental rights of the German 
constitution apply to Bundeswehr personnel”.558 There will be certain rights which 
are subjected to restrictions part of the military legislation, but the fundamental 
rights established in the Basic Law will be the same for everyone. 
The WWII events, in which thousands of military personnel, not only 
soldiers, but also nurses, doctors, etc., were forced to perform acts which went 
against their own personal values were taken into consideration at the moment of 
creating the “citizen in uniform” model, which is considered by the IF as the main 
element of the code’s concept,559 and will be the foundation for the conduct of the 
soldiers. The principles in which the “citizen in uniform” concept is referred are 
established more directly are established across the code; these include: mission 
command and shared responsibility,560 the soldier’s participation in organising 
activities,561 the political awareness,562 and their participation in decision-taking.563 
The soldier’s politicisation is what the code’s preface inferred when it established 
that this process helps the soldier to face the past and understand tradition; this 
politicisation is what Janowitz established when he stated that the armed forces 
were becoming constabularies that “provide continuity with past military experiences 
and traditions, but it also offers a basis for the radical adaptation of the 
profession”.564 
Van Doorn establishes that the main ideology behind the “citizen in uniform” 
concept is that it marks a clear difference with the military professional, as this last 
one has developed an expertise on the subject and serves society as a specialist in 
the military, whereas the citizen in uniform is an active member of society and is 
involved in its political aspects. He has been granted a right to possess weapons, so 
he uses this special power as a way of serving society. Van Doorn also defines that 
“the way in which armed forces are related to society is defined and controlled by 
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the societal environment”.565 This definition explains in a clear way how are the 
armed forces viewed in Germany: as servants to the community who are given 
special attributions but are still part of the same community; therefore, they should 
be subjected to the same rule of law as any other citizen.  
4.1.4 The rights of the soldiers in Germany 
The Basic Law makes explicit remarks about the fundamental rights of the 
military personnel in its article 17(1), which states that certain military and 
alternative service rights can be restricted while performing their duties. While this 
legal provision is restrictive, a much more liberal prerogative is established on the 
German Law on the Rights and Duties of Soldiers (SG or Soldatengesetz) which 
establishes that, although their rights are limited by the requirements of their military 
obligations, the soldiers have the same civil rights as any citizen566, taking direct 
inspiration from the Innere Führung and its “citizen in uniform” concept. Point (4) of 
the SG states that superiors may only issue commands that involve official (military) 
purposes, and such orders must always be subjected to the rules of international 
and domestic laws and regulations.567 Section 2.8 establishes that the soldier needs 
to recognise the free democratic order in the way that the constitution establishes it, 
and protect its existence through his duties.568 The advantage of the military 
recognising this order relies on the fact that they have been given the same rights of 
any citizen, so, by legitimising the principles in which contemporary German State is 
built upon, they are also legitimising their entitlement to all rights. Also, the military 
limits of actively becoming a member of the political class are also stated in the 
Soldatengesetz. The members of the armed forces can run for political office but 
they have to leave the armed forces before.569 This is a way to prevent a conflict of 
interests between the army and the civil state. 
A common justification from the soldiers (not only in Mexico, which is the 
main focus of this research, but also in other societies) who have been indicated as 
responsible for human rights violations, consists in stating that “they were only 
following orders”. A concept of modern German militarism is related to both the 
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power to command and the duty to obey. The SG states in its section 10(4) that 
there will be certain limitations to the powers of the commanders and their orders. It 
states that these powers must have a military purpose, must be performed under 
the rule of law, and must be congruent with public international law standards. The 
concept of the duty to obey is established in section 11(1) of the same code, as this 
states that the soldier has to follow his commander’s orders unless he is committing 
a crime, which he will be guilty of only if he knows it was a crime or if the 
circumstances made it obvious.570 This principle resides in the fact that military 
personnel must comply with the orders from their superiors without delay and giving 
their best effort.  
An aspect which is related to the concept of the “citizen in uniform” and that 
is important to analyse in this part, is that such section also states that a soldier has 
the freedom to disobey an order if it violates human dignity or if such order is not 
part of an official plan. If the soldier executes an order which contradicts the former 
assumptions, they will only be freed of any charges if they can prove that such 
command could not be avoided, or that its consequences were not expected for the 
performer.571 The Basic Law establishes the faculty of a person to be compelled 
against the use of arms in military service, as this is a consequence of the freedom 
of conscience which is inviolable.572 In this regard, the German Federal 
Administrative Court established that the meaning of complying with an order 
conscientiously means that the soldier must comply in a “conscious” way, 
establishing that “a soldier insofar has to act with all the diligence and responsibility 
possible to him and has to act accordingly”.573 Therefore, an unlawful order and the 
duty to obey unconditionally is not possible, as it would contradict the 
conscientiously compliance of the military. 
4.1.5 How do the German military personnel file a complaint? 
Which are the procedures for the modern soldier to file a complaint or 
express his dissatisfaction? A system of filing complaints was developed: even 
                                                          
570 Civic Rights of the Soldier (n 566) sect 2[11] 
571 Ibid [1] 
572 Basic Law (n 312) art 4[1][2] 
573 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Germany - Practice Relating to Rule 
154. Obedience to Superior Orders, https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_de_rule154, accessed 20 June 2016. 
162 
 
though such system is far from perfect and has been critiqued by academics,574 it 
has proved to be one of the most democratic military institutions in the West.   
Nolte and Krieger explain the different methods of filing such complaints: a) 
Formal complaints: article 19(4) of the German Basic Law is the constitutional 
foundation for any citizen to have access to any types of courts depending on their 
jurisdiction, or if such is not the case, to their ordinary courts;575 since the German 
military are considered no different than the common citizen, this constitutional 
regulation will also apply to them.  
The secondary law which has been developed to guarantee the legal 
protection for the complaints and wellbeing of the soldiers is the German Military 
Complaints Regulations (WBO). The WBO states that the military has “…the rights 
to lodge a complaint if they believe that they have been treated wrongly by superiors 
or by Bundeswehr agencies or have been harmed as a result of breach of duty by 
fellow soldiers.”576 This implies that they have the right to lodge a complaint not only 
against a person in particular, but also against the Federal Defence institutions 
themselves, which might involve administrative issues apart from human rights 
violations. Another very important feature that is a part of the “citizen in uniform” 
spirit is the prohibition from reprehending or taking any kind of actions that might put 
personnel in disadvantaged for having lodged a complaint without the proper 
fundament.577  
Nolte and Krieger establish that this section aims to protect a soldier from a 
possible intimidation from a superior, and also represents the separation of powers, 
as this right was introduced by an act of parliament rather than a governmental 
ordinance.578 The benefits of the WBO are numerous, as it grants the military 
personnel a sense of security and dignifies their complaints without having the fear 
of facing any backlash. The formal complaints might also be channelled through the 
Vertrauensperson, who is the spokesman that represents the military.  
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There are two types of complaints which can be processed: the disciplinary 
affairs complaint (Disziplinarbeschwerde) will take care of the issues arising 
between different ranks; an example of such complaint can be a soldier’s 
challenging of an order from a superior officer.579 The Guidelines for Determination 
of the Disciplinary Measure are stated in Section 38 of the Military Discipline Code 
(WDO), which establishes that different characteristics of the disciplinary offence will 
be taken into account. When such offense is not considered serious they will meet 
mild disciplinary measures; but more severe measures, including disciplinary arrest, 
can be imposed if other ones, such as disciplinary and educational measures, fail.580 
According to Nolte and Krieger, the complaints in administrative matters will involve 
issues that arise in the relation between a commander and a subordinate, this last 
one having the position of an employee.581 The WBO states in its section 23(1) that 
preliminary proceedings will take place if recourse for legal action is available in the 
administrative courts, and the complaint has a relation with a service status.582 As it 
can be seen, the difference between administrative matters and issues concerning 
orders and relationship between the personnel has been well defined and 
established in order to channel formal complaints through a clear and 
understandable path. 
The military personnel also have three defined paths to make a petition: the 
right to an informal complaint (a figure called Dienstaufsichsbeschwerde); the right 
to a parliamentary petition; and the right to make a petition to the military 
Ombudsman.583 The constitutional foundation for the right to make a petition is 
found in article 17 of the German Basic Law, but there are some defined limits for 
the military in service to this right. The WBO establishes in its Section 1(4), that joint 
complaints are not admitted for military personnel584 -making this a clear difference 
between the rest of society-, and entering in conflict with the “citizen in uniform” 
sprit. As Nolte and Krieger note though, most authors state that such collective right 
must be allowed, since a parliamentary petition does not carry the same risk as 
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making a complaint directly to a commander.585 The allowance of military joint 
petitions and complaints would indeed give protection to the basic personnel from 
the higher ranks, and can be considered as an adequate system to prevent 
unilateral controls inside the barracks. Nolte and Krieger also note that the informal 
complaint is congruent if we take into account that there are established 
requirements to submit a formal one, but a soldier might have a complaint that might 
not be met in a certain context.586 Again, the German Basic Law provides the path 
for lodging these informal complaints for the military, as its article 17 only restricts 
them from exercising certain rights but does not impose a restriction from lodging 
any form of petition. 
Another path which the military has for lodging a complaint is the petition to 
the Ombudsman (which works as another form of parliamentary petition as the a 
figure which is currently denominated as Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Armed Forces), is established in article 45(b) of the German Basic Law. This 
commissioner does not only monitor the armed forces’ actions, but also works on 
safeguarding their basic rights. Information on this figure is provided by the 
Bundestag, who states the following: “When acting on instructions from the 
Bundestag or the Defence Committee to investigate a specific matter, and dealing 
with petitions in which the petitioner expresses a specific grievance, the 
Parliamentary Commissioner has the right to hear the petitioner as well as experts 
and witnesses in person”.587 Finally, the last remedy that the military personnel has 
to lodge a complaint is the right to propose the change of an order to a superior, if 
the soldier thinks that such order might be illegal or inappropriate.588  
4.1.6 How do civilians file a complaint against the armed forces? 
Finally, the process that civilians have to put a complaint against the armed 
forces is also governed by the principle of the “citizen in uniform”, as, since the end 
of WWII, Germany has no military courts. The process for filing complaints against 
military personnel is done in the same way as the filing of complaints any other 
member of society; this implies contacting the local police station, as the German 
enforcement system is divided in states. In the case that a member of the armed 
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forces commits a crime that is only prosecuted upon request, the superior under 
which the military that committed a crime was serving to will file the request.589 In 
any other case, is the armed forces commit a crime against a civilian, whether they 
are on or off duty-, the civilian investigators will take the complaints and the civilian 
criminal court will handle the trial. 
4.1.7 The importance of a military ombudsman in the German 
contemporary system 
Why is a military ombudsman needed? The Geneva Centre of the 
Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) states that there is a need for the 
strengthening of civilian and democratic controls over the military; secondly, the 
rights of the soldiers are more protected if systems for handling complaints are 
established; thirdly, the factor of independence if essential, as a specialised 
mechanism to monitor practices, procedures and policies inside the armed forces is 
necessary.590 Also, public trust in the military increases as their administrative 
processes become transparent; also, the ombudsman helps shaping civilian 
democratic controls, as it strengthens the rule of law, human rights within the army, 
and good governance.591 As it can be seen, the figure of a military ombudsman is 
fundamental in the shaping and improvement of civil-military relations, as it helps 
strengthening civilian controls and improves transparency inside the armed forces, 
at the same time that military personnel are able to protect their human rights in a 
more direct way, as there is a figure who acts as their representative upon the 
State. 
The DCAF establishes six points that describe the relevance of such 
institution: being able to control the defence sector with democratic values, 
monitoring the respect to law inside the armed forces, providing surveillance on 
accountability and transparency, helping to get attention on strictly military issues, 
improving the effectiveness and response of the defence sector, and creating a 
stronger bond between civilians and military personnel.592 Basically, the figure of the 
ombudsman is of a supervisor which can monitor the activities of the armed forces 
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and can settle issues and disputes, both concerning events that take place in the 
military sphere, but also when problems arise between the military and the civilians.  
A set of attributions have been established for the Military Ombudsman in 
order to meet the required criteria to supervise the defence sector. These are: 
autonomy to investigate and initiate investigations; having the necessary protection 
to operate discretionally; receiving the funds to issue publications; granting the 
authority to issue recommendations that both military and civilian officers should 
consider, and asking for responses from them; having its own premises; and at a 
constitutional level, their attributions and limits need to be clearly defined.593 Having 
said that, the discussion of the Military Ombudsman in Germany, also known as 
Wehrbeauftragter des Bundestages (WB), is substantially important to have a point 
of comparison, as this institution was radically transformed over the second half of 
the XX century and it is highly regarded as an example of democracy and 
progressiveness in the protection of human rights. The figure of the Military 
Ombudsman will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
4.1.8 The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces 
This figure consists of a representative inside the Bundestag (which is the 
legislative organ established in 1949, after the fall of the Reichstag), he is elected 
through a secret ballot process by the members of parliament for a five-year term. 
According to the description from the Bundestag, the Commissioner is not a civil 
servant but neither is he a member of the parliament. The German law grants him a 
special power where he works in consultancy matters in both the parliament and the 
military personnel, assisting the rights of these last ones while monitoring them to 
present reports to Parliament regarding the conditions and activities within the 
armed forces.594  
Regarding human rights matters, the Bundestag indicates that most of the 
time the Commissioner initiates investigations and consultancy on his own will. 
Such investigations include events in which the rights of military personnel, such as 
freedom of speech, legal protection, or human dignity, have been violated. 
Accessing to such information through news reports, visits to the military 
headquarters, petitions from military personnel and information from the members of 
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Parliament is also included among the investigations.595 There are strong 
mechanisms to prevent behaviour which might be considered suspicious from both 
the public and other institutions, not only in legal terms but even in symbolic 
regulations -such as the fact that the Commissioner does not sit alongside the 
legislators from the Bundestag, and neither does he sit in the government bench-.596 
This gesture shows the advanced level of thought that this institution has put in 
order to avoid accusations of corruption or bias.  
The civilian nature of the Commissioner also has the benefit of being able to 
establish direct paths of communication with the military personnel. This means that 
if a member of the armed forces wants to contact him, such member does not need 
any type of approval or monitoring being done by his commanders.597 Such 
attribution represents a double benefit for both civilians and military personnel, as 
the Commissioner is neither put under political pressure from the executive, the 
Bundestag or the commanders in the army in the case that an issue between both 
spheres arises. The Commissioner has a high workload, as the situations that he 
needs to respond to are not only those which concern human rights abuses, but his 
supervision should cover all the aspects that come with militarism, being of 
administrative, social, and –in some cases-, personal issues.598  
The secondary law -which is the foundation for the Commissioners 
attributions-, is the Act on the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, 
which is also divided in sections. The functions of this figure can be summarised in: 
reporting his duties to Parliament and the Defence Committee (he is also entitled to 
submit individual reports when requested), monitoring and starting investigations -
apart from taking actions when at his or her discretion, a violation of the human 
rights from any military personnel, or when the principles of the Innere Führung 
have been violated-.599 His official powers are enclosed in section 3, which include 
the ability to demand records and files from the Federal Minister of Defence and his 
subordinates, visit the agencies and headquarters of the Federal Armed Forces, 
elaborate reports on how military discipline is being exercised, and the ability to 
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attend court proceedings even if the subject matter makes it necessary to exclude 
the public from it.600 Sections 7 and 9 refer to the faculty of military personnel to file 
complaints to the ombudsman without any superior revising any details of the 
complaint submitted. Such legal provision states that the members of the armed 
forces have the right to lodge complaints or contact the Commissioner without 
having to make their superiors aware of such complaint. As it has been stated 
previously, the complainer shall not be discriminated or intimidated in any form, as 
the Commissioner is entitled to keep this complaint confidentially if the petitioner 
asks for it.  
Section 10 goes deeper into the principle of confidentiality, as it requires the 
Commissioner to maintain secrecy towards all the issues that he might have 
knowledge of when his term of office ends; this includes not revealing or handling 
any evidence without permission. The main goal of this provision is to protect 
everyone that is involved in a complaint from repercussions or consequences for 
lodging complaints. The only point which allows the commissioner to report 
evidence is when the free democratic order is considered to be endangered;601 this 
last point is based upon the conception that the German State developed in the 
second half of the XX century, considering the free democratic basic order as a 
collective right of German society as a whole, which shall be a priority on top of any 
personal interests or issues. 
4.1.9 Final considerations about the German civil-military relations 
Even though the whole German State practically collapsed after the end of 
WWII, the political will of everyone involved in its restructuring made it possible to 
develop a complete transformation of the legal attributions of the military, the power 
of the executive and the military commanders over the armed bodies, and the 
development of the “citizen in uniform” concept. While the Basic Law itself provides 
a high level of protection to German society as a whole from an authoritarian 
decision (such as a unilateral declaration of a State of Emergency), the parliament 
is also given enough power to take similar decisions, while ensuring that a majority 
is in favour of such measure. 
The parliamentary commissioner serves two roles at the same time; at the 
same time that he represents the interests of military personnel, he also supervises 
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them and is accountable towards the parliament for reporting every matter regarding 
the armed forces. This is beneficial for both society and the military, as the 
wellbeing of both sides is being protected. Once again, this is made possible by 
granting the soldiers the same rights and obligations as the civilians. If there was 
less transparency of every matter that goes inside the barracks, the process of both 
submitting the personnel accountability, and also protecting their rights, would be 
more complicated. Because the soldiers have different paths to submit their 
complaints, these prevent the personnel from feeling isolated from society and 
relieve tensions between civilians and the army. 
4.2 In introduction to Mexico’s military issues: desertion and wage 
inequality  
The German and the Mexican military institutions are being compared in this 
thesis not only in terms of accountability, but also to compare the mechanisms of 
complaints for the own military personnel. To point one example of the current 
issues among the Mexican armed personnel themselves (apart from the crisis of 
current civil-military relations), it is relevant to address the fact that reports issued 
during Felipe Calderon’s administration state that more than 55,000 members of the 
armed forces deserted.602 These reports also state that during the Administration of 
Vicente Fox (2000-2006) the number was even higher (107,000 desertions). 
Guevara Moyano establishes that among the principal factors that influence armed 
personnel to desert are the lack of adaptation that militarism requires, and the poor 
wages that they receive.603 At the start of 2006, when the indefinite deployment of 
the army was established, the lowest-ranked soldiers only received 3,865.25 
Mexican Pesos per month (which equals approximately 180 British Pounds). This 
wage was gradually raised over Calderon’s administration, and in 2013 the monthly 
wage for base personnel per month was of 15,789 Mexican Pesos -which equals 
around 650 British Pounds-. While this is definitely a palpable increase, the contrast 
with the economic perceptions of the highest commanders is notable: in 2013, a 
Division Commander or a Navy Admiral received the total of 222,450 Mexican 
Pesos per month (9,000 British Pounds).604 Such disproportion shows the level of 
inequality between ranks, which is just one of many concerns that analysts establish 
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when explaining the lack of satisfaction inside the armed forces. A deep study of the 
events which have led to such high rates of personnel dessert has not been 
developed, but this economic factor is difficult to ignore. Although the economic 
aspect of the soldiers’ wellbeing might seem out of place in this discussion, such an 
issue cannot be ignored when understanding the deep root of the lack of democratic 
development inside the military barracks. 
4.2.1 The (insufficient) development of the Mexican Military during the XX 
century 
The Mexican armed forces did not have a central role during WWII; the 
government collaborated with the allies (especially with the United States), sending 
the aeronautic special body to the US in July of 1944 (this group would later receive 
the name is Expeditionary Aerial Force in 1945, and it was best known as Squadron 
201). In order to have a decently organised army, regional civilian committees -
which were formed by persons coming from different backgrounds (public 
institutions, social organisations)-, were under the orders of military authorities 
designated by the National Defence Secretary.605 After the 1950s, the Mexican 
State established reforms and created the Officer Formative Schools of Specialities 
and Application; Superior Schools; and Postgrad Schools.606 Certainly, institutional 
reforms were made, although these never gave civil-military relations the 
importance that Germany gave them after WWII. 
 The most important reform concerning accountability for the Mexican army 
has been the Military Justice Code reform of 2014, which has been addressed in the 
second chapter, but this has not been determinant in the evolution an strengthening 
of civil-military relations. The deployment of the army based only in constitutional 
article 89-VI and without the consent of the legislative is one of the prime examples 
of the undemocratic control the executive currently has over the armed forces. The 
number of institutions created in the second half of the XX century did help 
professionalising the military carers, but the army’s undemocratic relations with the 
political class prevented the State from establishing civilian controls and figures like 
a military ombudsman. The analysis made in previous chapter showed issues like 
the concentration of power in military commanders, the lack of coordination between 
                                                          
605 “From the Second World War to our current days” (National Defence Secretary ) 
<http://www.sedena.gob.mx/conoce-la-sedena/antecedentes-historicos/ejercito-
mexicano/de-la-segunda-guerra-mundial-a-nuestros-dias> accessed 02 June 2014 
606 ibid 
171 
 
institutions, the lack of independence in courts, and the institutional fragility within 
the armed forces.  
 In this part of the chapter, the Mexican legal base for the deployment of the 
military, the soldiers’ rights and ethics and the military courts are discussed, as this 
allows setting standards for the subsequent institutional comparison between with 
Germany in this research’s study. 
4.2.2 The constitutional base for the deployment of the Armed Forces in 
Mexico 
One of the most important features that distinguish the Mexican from the 
German army is the powers of the executive and legislative powers regarding 
control over military. The strong civilian and parliamentary control that Germany has 
over its armed forces serves as a point of comparison with article 89 fraction VI of 
the Mexican Constitution, which, as it has been stated previously on this research, 
gives absolute power to the President to dispose all the Army, Aerial Force and the 
Navy for the interior and exterior defence of the federal republic. Although fraction 
VIII establishes that the Federal Congress must legislate for the President to make 
use of the armed forces, in the case of the deployment taken place in 2006 ex-
president Felipe Calderón did not consult any legislative organ and instead issued a 
presidential decree on the Official Diary of the Federation, establishing the creation 
of a “special force body”, which would aid the civilian security forces in the war 
against organised crime. This decree has not been removed or reformed by current 
president Enrique Peña Nieto.  
The presidential decree which was issued on the 17th of September of 2007 
gave attribution to the army for defence duties supporting the civilian security forces 
on the operatives against organised crime.607 This presidential decree was only 
signed by ex-president Calderón; the Government Secretary, the National Defence 
Secretary and the Public Safety Secretary. Not a single representative of the 
legislative power was asked to sign the document. This represents the high level of 
subordination of the armed forces and the Federal Congress to the executive in 
Mexico, especially if we compare it to its German counterpart, as article 87a (3) of 
the German Basic Law establishes that the Bundestag or the Bundesrat have the 
power to stop the employment of the armed forces in the aiding of civilian force 
whenever they consider it. While a supporter of Calderón’s strategy might state that 
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the presidential decree which made the deployment legal was signed by various 
members of the government, it should be mentioned that Guillermo Galvan Galvan 
was National Defence Secretary at that point and a military commander in functions 
at the same time. This situation is contradictory with the spirit of a strong civilian 
control over the military actions; it is also important to point out that such decree had 
been signed 10 months after the first indefinite deployment of the army in December 
of 2006. 
To contrast with the strong German parliamentary control over the military,608 
the Internal Regulation of the National Defence Secretary in its article 10 fractions II 
explicitly establishes the involvement of the executive, as the National Defence 
Secretary is obliged to submit any issue regarding the Defence Secretary and its 
state modules across the country to the President. Besides, fractions IV and VI of 
the mentioned article state that the Secretary must perform the special functions 
and establish the commissions that the President confers to him and every legal 
initiative, legislative decree, regulation and agreement that concerns defence 
matters must be proposed to the President though the Juridical Council of the 
Federal Executive.609 These provisions refer directly to the constitutional attribute 
which gives the Mexican president the supreme command of the armed forces, 
putting him above the Defence Secretary in the hierarchical scale. 
4.2.3 Human Rights institutions in the constitution of Mexico 
In the case of Mexico, the power of the federal congress to establish the 
Human Rights National Commission is established in article 102 fractions B, which 
grants autonomy to such institution for establishing its budget, management, 
juridical personality, and its own patrimony. Consequently, the Mexican commission 
has established its own management in the Internal Regulation of the Human Rights 
National Commission, but such regulation does not grant any powers to the 
ombudsman (who is called President of the National Commission of Human Rights), 
over the armed forces. In this legal framework he is entitled to send representatives 
called visitors,610 which will be entitled to investigate and promote criminal 
investigations for human rights violations, but every attribution is strictly civilian. 
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That is the reason which has prevented the Human Rights Commission from 
accessing military files until now. This is also compared with the German Basic Law, 
whose article 45b creates the figure of the Parliamentary Commissioner of the 
Armed Forces in order to assist the Bundestag in monitoring the armed forces.  
To make a direct comparison with the Mexican Federal Congress, the 
Senators Chamber has also established a National Defence Commission, which is 
established in a secondary law (The Organic Law of the United Mexican States 
General Congress), whose article 90 point VII state that national defence will be part 
of the ordinary committees. Another secondary law (The Republic Senate 
Regulation) establishes that the Senators will have the power to approve or ratify 
the designations that the President of the Republic does of various positions -which 
include Colonels and other superior commanders of the Aerial Force and the Army, 
also with their equivalent in the Navy-. It should be addressed that the Mexican 
Constitution states that the legislative power will not have the legal attributions of 
ratifying the designation that the President makes neither of the National Defence 
Secretary nor the Navy Secretary, which are the highest positions in the armed 
forces.  This limits the legislative attributions over the armed forces in a 
considerable way, and that aspect, combined with the fact that the National Defence 
Secretary is a an active military commander himself, gives the President complete 
political control over the military, if we take into consideration that the Defence 
Minister position is given by the executive. These legal attributions are not up to 
date with the standards of civilian control that modern military institutions should 
meet. 
4.2.4 Ethics in the Mexican Army 
It can be established that the Mexican armed forces have a similar code of 
ethics that resembles the Innere Führung in some points, although it is much more 
undeveloped and does not establish a democratic relation between society and the 
armed forces. To explain the axiological principles which the military have to 
exercise in their daily actions, it should be addressed that the Military Code of 
Conduct refers article 113 of the Mexican Constitution, which states that public 
servants will obey the administrative laws in order to safeguard principles such as 
impartiality, loyalty, honesty, legality and efficiency in their respective tasks.611 By its 
part, the Code of Conduct addresses its main goal in the last version that was 
published in the Official Diary of the Federation, which establishes the “general 
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guidelines for the establishment of permanent actions which will ensure the integrity 
and ethical behaviour of public servants in the performance of their duties, positions 
or commissions”.612 This includes not only military personnel, but also any civilian 
who works for/with the State. The Mexican government’s aim in the Code of 
Conduct was to give the armed forces personnel the same logic of service and 
sense of duty than any other public servant, this creates a contradiction which is 
materialized in the existence of different juridical spheres being applied to the 
military personnel and their civilian counterparts, as all the civil security officers are 
subjected to the civilian rule of law, but their military counterparts are subjected to 
the military jurisdiction, unless a citizen’s human rights are violated. 
The basic ethic principles for the Military Justice Code are also taken from 
the Code of Ethics of the Public Servants of the Federal Public Administration, 
which again, does not make a distinction between the civil and the military 
jurisdiction. The principles being referred are: the common wellbeing; honesty, 
impartiality, justice, transparency, accountability, cultural and ecological 
background, generosity, equality, respect, and leadership.613 This code enlists a 
table of specific values which every military member must observe and then 
explains all of the concepts enlisted.  
The main point of comparison in this topic between the Mexican Military 
Justice Code of Conduct and the German Innere Führung is the concept of the 
“citizen in uniform”. For that matter, we must refer article IV point H of the Mexican 
Code of Conduct. The referred article in both its sub-points a and b does not imply 
that the soldier is a member of the community like its German counterpart, but 
instead establishes that the military personnel have the obligation of providing the 
citizens with “a fair, polite, and egalitarian treatment, with the aim of inspiring trust, 
credibility, and respect”.614 From reading this phrase, it can be stated that the Code 
of Conduct does not give the military personnel the character of a citizen, but of a 
military expert whose mission is to protect society, while at the same time giving 
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them an “egalitarian” treatment, which is a contradiction as the code does not see 
its personnel in the same position as a citizen.  
The second paragraph of sub-point b of point A of article IV establishes 
another situation which creates uncertainty and leaves the armed personnel without 
a clearly established mechanism of protection. The point in discussion states that 
the public servants of the National Defence Secretary must inform (in a written form) 
to their immediate superior about any procedure, resolution or statement of any 
issues in which the referred personnel might have a personal, familiar or business 
interest which would result in a benefit for him, his partner, blood-related, in-law or 
up to fourth grade of affinity relatives, or third parties which he might have 
professional, labour or business relations which could oppose to the interests of the 
National Defence Secretary.615 
4.2.5 The lack of a Military Ombudsman in Mexico 
The civilian system includes a national ombudsman which –as is the case in 
Mexico-, works on the issues from both civilian and military spheres. The 
Backgrounder - Security Sector Governance and Reform document on Military 
Ombudsman (elaborated by the DECAF), states that in order for this figure to 
develop a good accountability system, the institution needs to show that “it is truly 
independent, impartial, fair and effective in its recommendations”.616 One of the 
main problems concerning the institutional defence of human rights in Mexico is that 
the national ombudsman has generated suspicion among diverse sectors for not 
showing independence from the executive. Academics in Mexico have stated that 
the Human Rights National Commission has not generated any mechanisms 
towards the development of an accurate system of accountability that would 
generate trust and civilian participation for the protection and exercise of human 
rights.617 Ackerman has even stated that in situations like the Ernestina Ascencio 
case (described in the first chapter), the National Commission acted as an 
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accomplice to the government of Felipe Calderón.618 It has also been proved that 
public trust in the most important Human Rights institution in Mexico has been 
declining since the war against drugs started.  
While the figure of an ombudsman in Mexico is established in article 102 of 
its constitution, a strictly military figure has not been created at the moment of this 
writing. The main reason of why Germany was chosen as a point of comparison for 
this research is due to the fact that the figure of the German military ombudsman 
has served as an inspiration to similar reforms, such as the case of the Irish military 
ombudsmen (which will be analysed in the next chapter), and also its Canadian 
colleague, to name two examples of countries which have achieved positive 
standards of democratic policies. It should be noted that the first military 
ombudsman figure was established in Sweden in 1915,619 and it was given the 
name of Militieombusmannen. This figure was developed in order to supervise the 
military personnel and authorities, but apart from such aspect, this office worked in 
the same way as the civilian –Parliamentary, in the case of Sweden-, ombudsman 
worked.620 This early figure served as the main influence for the creation of its 
German counterpart when their armed forces were rebuilt.  
 The importance of a military ombudsman has been established earlier in this 
chapter (public trust in the military increases as their administrative processes 
become transparent; also, the ombudsman helps shaping civilian democratic 
controls, as it strengthens the rule of law, human rights within the army, and good 
governance).621 The analysis made of the current flaws of the Mexican armed forces 
has shown that there are no effective civilian mechanisms of control. This not only 
impacts negatively in civil society, but also affects military personnel, as they have 
no paths of channelling their complaints outside the military system, which has a 
deficit of transparency and access to justice is very limited at the moment. The 
human rights of the soldiers are not the only matters that an ombudsman would be 
able to address, but also issues of an administrative nature and general issues like 
the inequality in wages would be a subject that the military ombudsman would be 
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qualified to settle. The subsequent comparison between Germany and Mexico will 
also cover this topic, but we can conclude this section by stating that a 
commissioner of the armed forces that had a civilian nature and was accountable 
upon the Federal Congress would constitute a qualitative improvement for the rights 
of the soldiers and civil-military relations in Mexico. 
4.2.6 The use of military courts in Mexico 
Another very important matter of comparison between Germany and Mexico 
regarding military affairs is the use of military courts. With the recent Military Justice 
Code reform in Mexico, a soldier can be tried by civilian courts in the case of 
committing human rights violations against a civilian. In all other cases the soldiers 
will be tried in military courts at any point. In the German system the difference is 
broad: article 96(2) of the German Basic Law establishes that during peace-time no 
soldier will be tried by military courts for crimes committed inside German 
territory.622 This implies again that the State is being congruent with the principle of 
the “citizen in uniform”, and will not make distinctions between the military and 
society as long as a state of defence is not declared. The current security strategy in 
Mexico has been justified stating that organised crime groups represent a threat to 
Mexican society, but until this day no federal administration has declared a state of 
emergency -and until the 2016 constitutional reform of article 29 a state of 
emergency was not even contemplated in the constitution-. Up until the new reform, 
all domestic crimes committed by military personnel had been handled by military 
courts. Unfortunately, the recent reforms leave legal holes, such as not defining 
which jurisdiction will investigate and try the soldiers who commit crimes against 
civilians but do not violate human rights. Will the soldiers keep being tried by military 
courts, leaving the civilian victim defenceless from a jurisdictional view? 
As it has been established previously in this research, the new reform gives 
legal jurisdiction to civilian prosecutors and courts to investigate and try military 
personnel that are accused of being involved in a human rights violation against a 
civilian, but the figure of a military ombudsman has not developed yet. The current 
director of the commission does not have any type of special attribution that will 
separate him from both the executive and the legislative organs, as its German 
counterpart does have.  
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 As the army is deployed in Mexico without a state of emergency being 
formerly declared, the abolition of the military courts in non-emergency times would 
allow the citizens to have access to justice with transparency and promptness. The 
reach of civil justice regarding the soldiers should not be limited only to the judicial 
system; it should also include all the investigations. The new reform allows civilian 
courts trying cases dealing with human rights abuses where the army is involved, 
but the civilian prosecutors are very limited by the information that the military 
investigators provide. The handling of the cases should be exclusive to civilian 
authorities at any point of the investigation, as this reduces bureaucracy and 
increases transparency to the whole process. The Military Justice Code reform of 
article 57 is welcomed, but it falls short, because the whole military justice structure 
continues to work under complete secrecy and lack of accountability mechanisms. 
Unless the armed forces handle themselves in a culture of legality and state of law, 
civilian authorities should have the monopoly of handling investigations and trials. 
4.2.7 The soldiers’ rights 
The Mexican Military Justice Code establishes on its article 119 fraction VI 
that a soldier will not be responsible for following an illegal order as long as the 
personnel did not have knowledge of the unlawfulness of it; the same fraction 
establishes that such unlawfulness must not be “notorious”.623 This article does not 
give any further explanations as to what is considered as unlawful or “notorious”. To 
illustrate the lack of clarity of the Military Justice Code, it is relevant to analyse 
article 294, which describes the concept of “Abuse of Authority” (this article, as we 
have described previously on this research, has been used to prosecute military 
personnel for acts such as enforced disappearance). This provision states that there 
will be a penalty of four months of prison for the superior that gives an order to an 
inferior, which among other descriptions, might “….cause (the inferior), to engage in 
obligations that might be harmful to the performance of its duties”.624 This provision 
is unclear and does not explain the extent of freedom to object an order that a 
soldier has.  
If military personnel must behave and act upon International Law standards, 
then article 407 fractions V would contradict the freedom of military personnel, as it 
punishes the “muttering or censoring of superior dispositions”.625 The article does 
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not specify which type of order censoring or muttering would be punished, so it can 
be inferred that military personnel do not have any path to channel their discomfort 
(even the “murmuring”, which is interpreted as a confidential complaint), without 
facing any type of consequences. These prohibitions are also expressed on the 
Disciplinary Law of the Mexican Army and Aerial Force; its article 8 leaves no room 
for any debating –and even less the disobedience of any orders-, as it states that 
every military personnel that commands troops shall not allow or spread any 
“gossips, complaints, or dissatisfaction that could prevent the fulfilment of the 
subordinated, or lower their encouragement”.626 Under these assumptions, the 
possibility of any expression of discontent is completely restricted, even if it is not an 
aggression or an encouragement to violence.  
The Soldatengesetz summarises the way in which loyalty and freedom of 
conscience can coexist during the duties of military personnel. In the Mexican case 
it is harder to understand the limits of a soldier’s performance: the Code of Conduct 
mentions in its section N (a) and (b) that the application of Loyalty is the sincere 
devotion towards the nation, superiors, inferiors and colleagues. By its part, section 
O (a) and (b) states that military personnel must respect and guarantee human 
rights according to “the principles of universality, interdependence, indivisibility and 
progressiveness, as well as International Humanitarian Law rules”.627  
It is relevant to cite American militarism at this point. The American Air 
University (considered an intellectual think tank for the air forces in the US), has 
published academic debates in which they have recognized a large degree of such 
freedom for their military, with only the following acts being considered criminal 
laws: “disrespectful speech towards superiors; use of words or gestures that might 
provoke a fight; disclosure of classified information; discussing official matters 
outside of the military without proper authorization”.628 Where the US military codes 
have clearly defined the limits of speech, the Mexican disciplinary code is 
undeveloped and the restrictions are highly broad, which goes in direct contradiction 
with the German idea of the military having the same fundamental rights as a 
citizen. 
                                                          
626 Disciplinary Law of the Mexican Army and Aerial Force 2004 (MEX) art 8 
627 National Defence Secretary Public Servants Code of Conduct 2013 (MEX) sect O 
628 “Rights of Military Members” (Air University) 
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/rights_of_military_mbrs.pdf> accessed 09 July 
2014 
180 
 
The spirit of conscientious freedom that the basic personnel have in the 
modern German state contrasts in a clear way with the orthodox model of 
obedience and loyalty that prevails in Mexico. Not only the Mexican Disciplinary Law 
establishes very severe prohibitions against the censoring of superior orders, but 
the General Duties Regulation of the Military states in its article 26 that the 
personnel must not “manifest any repugnance in obeying superior orders in their 
conversations, not censoring them or allow their inferiors to do it, even when these 
might originate an increase in their fatigue”.629 It should be noted that this regulation 
was published by the Official Diary of the Federation in 1943, and it is still part of the 
legal order of the Mexican military at the moment of this writing. 
 It can be established that the relevant provisions concerning order 
obedience in Mexico are outdated and do not reflect the spirit of contemporary 
militarism in consolidated democracies. The lack of more information and academic 
discussion on these secondary regulations is the consequence of the secrecy and 
isolation that the military has been subjected to. In Mexico, any behaviour that can 
be considered as disobedience to an order from a superior is punished, and the 
most extreme provision, article 8 of the Disciplinary Law of the Mexican Army and 
Aerial Force, punishes any expression that might be considered as dissatisfaction 
for the order received. This is a contrast with the principles that the soldiers are 
asked to respect and guarantee (universality, interdependence, indivisibility and 
progressiveness, as well as International Humanitarian Law rules630). It is 
understandable why a high number of military personnel desert from the armed 
forces at some point; there is an oppressive culture that encourages submission, 
and at the same time, there is no figure or institution that will address their 
complaints and also work on the interests of every member of the army. 
4.3 Final considerations about the current Mexican civil-military relations 
Certainly, the authoritarianism of the Mexican State cannot be compared to 
the situation in Germany during the Second World War in terms of the global 
repercussions it had. However, civil-military relations in Mexico are highly 
undeveloped and the fact that the National Defence Secretary was leading the 
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number of complaints for human rights abuses at the end of 2013,631 paints a bleak 
picture of contemporary civil-military relations; no institution that can monitor and 
regulate these relationships has been developed until the moment of this writing.  
The Mexican military system would benefit from a whole institutional 
restructuring with similar elements like its German counterpart. The soldiers must 
feel part of civil society (entitled to the same rights and obligations), and it would be 
highly beneficial for the constitution to expressly establish a set of “citizen in 
uniform” principles that would not only benefit the relations between the armed 
forces and society, but would also provide the soldiers with more protection and 
would dignify their work. 
 The military commanders are still very reluctant to accept any scrutiny from 
outsiders, even when they are sent by prestigious international institutions, like the 
case of the GIEI and the Ayotzinapa case. In this case, only a combination of 
institutional and legal reforms can give the common citizen access to more influence 
on the shaping of military policies. The National Defence Commission in the federal 
congress must push for a proper set of constitutional guidelines made exclusively 
for the armed forces, which should establish the principles of a militarism based on 
conflict prevention.  
 The new set of constitutional provisions should also establish the creation of 
civilian mechanisms of control and policy shaping over the military. Constant 
collaboration between the legislative and NGOs specialised in conflict prevention 
and social re-adaptation would be ideal, as decades of constant isolation from 
society have shaped a highly undemocratic military culture. The creation of an 
ombudsman dedicated exclusively to military issues is a priority for the Mexican 
State if there is real political will to reform the armed forces. The military in Germany 
always has a focus on conflict prevention, resorting to violence only as a last option; 
this has been highly innovative as the military culture is design to kill, not to prevent. 
This is why an indefinite deployment of the military to perform security tasks in a 
domestic conflict is so dangerous. The lack of a culture of prevention on highly 
armed soldiers that are in direct contact with civilians on a daily basis can aggravate 
the conflict and alienate society from the military, as the current Mexican conflict 
exemplifies. 
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 The 2014 Military Justice Reform is a step forwards in the process of civilian 
accountability on the subject of human rights abuses. Unfortunately, this is not 
enough to improve civil-military relations in Mexico; the lack of a proper training to 
the soldiers, which would require educating all the personnel on a new style of 
militarism focused on conflict prevention and on a strong understanding of human 
rights, would allow the citizens to coexist with the armed forces in a positive light. 
The vast quantity of Mexican secondary regulations creates confusion and the 
principles which guide the conduct of the soldiers are difficult to understand, as they 
lack a coherent structure. The constitution should include an organised chapter 
dedicated to the armed forces, their main attributions, and the power that the civil 
State has over them. 
It is clear that there is a gap of legality and institutional development in the 
current public deployment of the Mexican armed forces, but the main focus of this 
research is to develop theoretical ground for an improvement in civil-military 
relations. Northern Ireland is the next comparison which will be made in contrast 
with Mexico, as its situation during the second half of the XX century draws various 
similarities with the current situation in the Latin American country. 
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Chapter V 
5. An analysis on the state of emergency in Northern Ireland 
during the 1970s and beyond: civil-military relations in a 
domestic conflict 
 
This part of the current research focuses on Northern Ireland as a source of 
comparison with the current Mexican domestic conflict. Why is this particular 
country selected for a comparison with, what seems on the surface, a Latin 
American country with a very different historical, sociological, and legal 
development?  
This chapter will address the way in which the Northern Irish government, 
and subsequently the British government, reformed legal structures in order to settle 
the presence of the British Armed Forces, declare a state or emergency and adapt 
the Northern Irish civilian security bodies. Civil-military relations are the main source 
of focus here; the aim is to provide a point of reference for the current civil-military 
issues which have become a crisis in Mexico over the past 9 years. There are 
certain key aspects which give legitimacy to this comparison: both countries 
experienced an internal conflict in which the threat to the State and the rule of law 
did not come from an outside power. Secondly, the sources that presented the 
threat to the State in both countries can be classified as a “non-State actor”, which 
means that the institutions and the wellbeing of society as a whole had been 
jeopardized by groups of actors within the same territory.  A third point of relevance 
for the purpose of this comparison is the fact that in both cases the State arrived to 
the conclusion that the civil security bodies did not meet the expectations required 
to counter-attack the threats; this became the main reason to deploy the armed 
forces on their own territory, even though, such security bodies were not prepared 
to perform on their own territory, clashing with non-state actors. As a result of this 
lack of knowledge from the armed forces, various conflicts arose between the 
civilians and the army; numerous episodes of human rights abuses have been 
documented in both cases, and they have caused concern and pressure from 
international legal institutions.  
The emergency regime caused a high level of collateral damage. For example, 
the Northern Ireland Criminal Law Act 1967 art 3(1) established the level of force 
that security personnel could use to prevent a crime or make an arrest. However, 
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this power was used by members of the security forces to make extrajudicial 
killings, where the targets were not a threat that justified the use of lethal force. As it 
is shown in this chapter, there is evidence that this behaviour was allegedly adopted 
by military commands, being popularly known as the “Shoot-to-kill” policy. This 
policy was not legally authorised by the British government, and as it will be 
addressed in this chapter, with the McCann and Others v The United Kingdom as 
case study, a number of officers were tried for breaching fundamental rights. 
This and other emergency measures are described here. The goal is to 
address the way in which they affected the democratic order and what were the 
consequences regarding respect to human rights. Testimonies from military 
personnel deployed in the areas of conflict are also included, as they give a deep 
insight of the whole situation from their perspective, which is congruent with the 
focus on the right of the soldiers of previous chapters in this research. Any analysis 
of any armed conflict cannot be regarded as complete without discussing the 
perspectives from every side. A mention of the most important commissions created 
after the conflict is also relevant, as many victims and their relatives are still claiming 
for justice, so it is an imperative for any democratic State to revise all the cases in 
which allegations of human rights abuses have been lodged. 
5.1 The background that gave birth to the armed conflict in Northern Ireland 
With the Act of Union of 1800 the integration of Ireland and Great Britain 
became a reality; such union divided Northern Irish society, and since the end of the 
nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth century, the differences between 
the supporters of Northern Irish independence and the unionists became 
increasingly problematic. As the island got split into Northern and Southern Ireland, 
the tensions on the northern side kept on rising since the republicans felt that they 
had no real sovereignty in important matters such the use of armed forces and 
foreign affairs, which were controlled from Westminster.632 According to Mansergh, 
the feuds and animosity between the protestant and the catholic community became 
more intense in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.633 Plus, the 
difference in the quality of living between the north and the south of Ireland became 
broader as time passed by.634 The industrial revolution bought an exponential 
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growth of the population in Belfast (Northern Ireland), but the workers lived under 
low wages and bad housing conditions, and in 1886 such issues became the 
subject of political alliances and got tied with a religious division. Mansergh states 
that after this year Protestantism became a synonym with Unionism, and 
Catholicism became a synonym with Nationalism.635 
The republicans did not approach the dependency from the British monarchy 
in a positive light. An important point to address here is the creation of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland that replaced the Royal Irish 
Constabulary (RIC). This body would also have additional aid, which was another 
body of civilian police called the Ulster Special Constabulary.636 This security bodies 
were given legitimacy under The Civil Authority (Special Powers) Act 1922, which 
can be considered as one of the first emergency powers acts in the twentieth 
century. This act gave powers to the Northern Irish Minister of Home Affairs, in 
order to “gave the minister power to make further regulations, each with the force of 
a new law, without consulting parliament, and to delegate his powers to any 
policeman”.637 Subsequent amendment’s to this legislation would include 
controversial measures such as Internment (detention without trial), which is also 
analysed in this chapter. 
As Mulcahy states, the RUC always faced a deficit of legitimacy in the eyes 
of the Northern Irish population, both republicans and nationalists, because the 
main purpose of this body was to police and apply enforcement to both groups;638 
such body had a specific political function, so this entered in conflict with civilian 
society. An important aspect, which can draw a social parallel with Mexico, is that 
the more privileged sectors of society were untouched by the State repression, as 
the author states that certain suburbs were under a different type of policing, or as 
he calls it, “normal policing”639. This situation also caused class tension and a sense 
of social oppression with a sector of Northern Irish Society.  
                                                          
635 ibid 186-187 
636 A Mulcahy, Policing Northern Ireland – Conflict, legitimacy and reform (Willan Publishing 
2006) 7 
637 M Farrell, Northern Ireland: the orange state (London 1998) 93 
638 A Mulcahy (n 636) 9 
639 ibid 
186 
 
5.2 An introduction to the twentieth century Northern Irish security legal 
background 
The first legal framework that gave power and legitimacy to the Northern 
Irish Parliament in matters relating security was the Ireland Act of 1920. In its 4th 
chapter, such framework states in its fourth section that both the Northern and the 
Southern Irish Parliaments will have power in order to legislate laws about matters 
like peace, good government, and order. However, the same framework also 
restricts both parliaments to legislate the process of making war or peace, and 
issues concerning a state of war. Predominately, Westminster had complete control 
over such subjects.640 This was the start of a process of resistance by part of the 
more radical nationalist sector, as they felt that Ireland as a whole had no real 
sovereignty from the United Kingdom. This situation was especially sensible among 
the republicans, who opposed to the English monarchy since the unification of 
Northern Ireland with the United Kingdom. In 1922 a new legislation was introduced 
to replace the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act (ROIA), this act was the Special 
Powers Act (SPA). As Donohue states, one of the main reasons for the Northern 
Irish society to become polarized and for the IRA to radicalize in a steady way, was 
the fact that the SPA was developed as a legal tool to be used under emergency 
situations. But as time passed by, it started to be engrained in the structural system 
of the security political structure.641 In Northern Ireland, the British Army had a 
garrison until 1969, when both the RUC and the B Specials failed to contain the 
protests and maintaining peace-keeping. Mcveigh considers this event as crucial to 
understand the subsequent changes in the security strategy, as the soldiers took a 
much more explicit approach to internal safety, with the State’s acknowledgment of 
such situation.642  
The SPA contained highly controversial points like the banning of different 
political expressions and newspapers; cultural events were also forbidden, such as 
the prohibition to celebrate Easter from 1926 to 1949. The ban was renewed 
annually after this year, which could coincide with the introduction of Freedom of 
Expression in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, but 
such coincidence is mere speculation. The article in question was located in 
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schedule 3, and it specifically stated that authorities had the power to restrict or 
forbid “the holding of or taking part in meetings, assemblies (in fairs and markets), 
or processions in public places”.643 It also included powers or arrest given to the 
civilian authorities in case of the violation of its regulations. There is an extensive 
amount of discussion of the period comprehending 1920-1968; but for the purpose 
of keeping the discussion centred on the stage where emergency powers were 
established, this chapter will be focused on the period after 1968, where the armed 
forces had the primacy of fighting the domestic situation. 
5.3 The “Troubles” and the deployment of the armed forces: its 
consequences among the population 
When the time came for the armed forces to be deployed on Northern Irish 
territory, their personnel was not ready for performing security tasks out of their 
environment. Hamhill established that the Army’s past experiences have always had 
a colonial aim; when they were deployed on Northern Irish streets, especially the 
cities of Belfast and Londonderry, they did not know who were they fighting, or if 
they were acting in order to help civilian security forces.644 It seems that the 
government did not realise that it is fundamental to give proper training to the 
soldiers before deploying them in a conflict dealing with non-state actors, as one of 
the basic matters is training its personnel to have a positive co-existence with the 
civilian population. The Hunt Report (which will be explained in more detail later in 
this chapter), established that the security experts based the decision on deploying 
paramilitary groups on experiences that they previously had in India, but had to 
acknowledge that the circumstances and historical context in Northern Ireland was 
highly different.645  
The feeling of bias and discrimination that a sector involved in the conflict 
sensed becomes relevant when a demonstration that took place on the 5th of 
October 1968 in Londonderry ended in extreme violence, as the police proceed to 
use water cannons and batons in order to disperse a civils rights march. The official 
from the media established that 30 persons, among them underage citizens and an 
MP (Gerard Fitt) were injured. The ground for making claims of discriminatory 
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practices was the fact that the march was organised by the nationalist supporters, 
who were in their majority Catholic, and the Ireland Civil Rights Association 
(NICRA), gave them support to organise the event.646 The main goal of this 
demonstration was to demand better social policies that would improve the 
conditions of the Catholics, among them employment and housing.647 Even though 
the early reports from the media stated that around 30 persons were wounded, 
recent reports -such as the one made by the Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland 
website-, state that around 77 civilians and 4 members of the RUC were injured. 
Approximately 100 persons had to be treated in hospitals, and more of them 
received first aid in public spaces.648 Although during the 1960s the situation 
between the IRA and the RUC had been hostile, it still had not caught the attention 
from outside until the television and newspapers reported this incident. 
After the Londonderry march, a series of protests continued during 1968 and 
1969, with another extreme violent clash taking place in Burntollet Bridge on 
Saturday 4th of 1969, as there was a confrontation between marchers from People’s 
Democracy and a loyalist mob. The protesters established that the RUC’s officers 
who were escorting the march did not meet their expectations, as they appeared to 
act passively as the loyalist mob attacked them, and when they arrived to Derry they 
were attacked again. After these events, a rally that was supposed to take place at 
the arrival of the march was broken by the RUC; this angered the protesters and 
riots began.649 These actions affected the legitimacy from the RUC, and accusations 
of bias and discrimination were raised.  
The government knew that they would have to make drastic changes in 
order to prevent the situation from getting out of control, so one of the first reactions 
from the failures shown by the security forces was the disbandment of the B 
Specials. This force worked as a type of paramilitary force to help civilian forces, 
and was created in 1920 by then Northern Irish Prime Minister Lord Brookeborough, 
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who regarded himself as the ‘father’ of such force.650 But what caused the structural 
changes in security matters? In order to analyse how the Northern Irish security 
strategy developed, it is relevant to explain the conclusions to which the Northern 
Irish government would arrive, that would lead them to giving the lead of security to 
the army. The government had recognised that the situation was getting out of 
control and that the security bodies had been the object of scrutiny under the 
population’s eyes. 
5.4 The Hunt Report 
The importance of this report resides in the fact that it was the first major 
institutional restructure after the violent events of the 1960s. It is relevant to see 
what were the decisions taken by the government, as the Northern Irish stability was 
at a very weak point. In order to make a subsequent comparison with the Mexican 
legal reforms, it is important to establish the arguments that gave way to the 
Northern Irish reforms.  
The Minster of Home Affairs of Northern Ireland appointed several members 
and consultants from the security minster to implement reforms in the security 
strategy, as they had realized that 1968 and 1969 had been years especially difficult 
for the development of the current strategy which the Northern Irish government had 
planned. It is interesting to see that the government blamed the media for 
“magnifying, in the minds of readers and viewers, the actual extent of the 
disorders”651 This was most probably related to the fact that a situation which had 
been ignored outside Northern Ireland, was finally exposed after the incidents of the 
march in Londonderry. Regardless of the former statements, the Advisory 
Committee had to accept that changes in the security strategy and new policies had 
to be implemented; their aim was to create a better relationship between everyone 
involved in the conflict. On the report conclusions it was established that the role 
that the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC) had been performing would be split and 
two separate forces would perform such tasks;652 the report also established that 
police force needed to be impartial and accountable, apart from having a civilian 
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nature, so it was decided that officers should only carry firearms and certain 
circumstances.653 This was probably a reaction to one of the main criticisms of the 
specialists, which was the lack of ability from officers to use non-violent methods, as 
it was stated that the senior officers viewed the strength of force as the only way to 
keep peace.654  
In total, there were dozens of recommendations made in the Hunt Report; 
among the most relevant ones were: the plea for separating the RUC from 
performing duties of a military nature; the creation of a Police Authority for Northern 
Ireland, the creation of the Police Advisory Board, whose main task would be 
establishing consultation between all ranks of force and the Minister; a civilian 
officer specialised in welfare should be appointed to the RUC, and such officers 
should stop using armoured cars; new policies to increase the entrance of Roman 
Catholics in the security ranks; a reform in the procedures for complaints against 
security forces; the establishment of responsibility for wrongful acts could now be 
attributed to the chief office of police; a committee specialized in police liaison would 
be established in Londonderry; and another important point that has a direct relation 
with State accountability was the recommendation for the Central Representative 
Body located in Northern Ireland, to associate with its counterpart located in Great 
Britain. This had the aim of enforcing members of the security bodies to be enquired 
about their wages and matters related, as the security bodies in GB were already 
subjected.655 As we can see, the main focus of the Hunt Report was on regulating 
the excess of power and impunity that the security bodies (mainly the RUC and the 
USC had), and also gather various military aspects from the security strategy. 
5.5 The government’s justification for the deployment of the armed forces 
In the context of the Northern Irish conflict, the first event which shocked the 
nation’s political stability and forced the government to make substantial changes 
was the Londonderry march in 1968. The events taken place obliged the 
Westminster government to develop a new kind of security structure that would 
replace the current one, which was getting out of control. After the political instability 
that Bloody Sunday caused, the government decided to implement the indefinite 
deployment of its armed forces, with the introduction of the Emergency Provisions 
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Act 1973, which is based on an emergency powers legal background; this 
legislation was the replacement of the Special Powers Act and the Detention of 
Terrorists Order.  
The EPA 1973 contained various controversial points that were established 
in an attempt to normalize the difficult chain of events. These provisions included 
the powers of the security forces for the arresting, search and seizure, and 
detention of any citizens who might fall under the suspicion of being involved in 
terrorism.656 Such attributes to search did not stop at a personal level, but the Act 
granted the right to the security bodies to search any premises or places where a 
person who falls under the suspicion of terrorism was based.657 Paragraph 5 of the 
same article makes no distinction in the judicial situation of a terrorist and a citizen 
who is under the suspicion of terrorism, as it established that such provisions would 
have an effect on the detention of both terrorists and persons suspected of being 
terrorists658, this last sentence is ambiguous at best, as it does not makes a clear 
description of the legal argument which would make a distinction between arresting 
someone whose terrorist activities haven been proved, or a citizen suspected of 
terrorism. The description leaves theoretical gaps, because it does not explain if the 
term “terrorist” is used on the case of arresting a person who has already been 
convicted of terrorism, while at the same time makes a distinction with persons who 
are suspected of terrorism. If a distinction was to be made, the Emergency 
Provisions Act should have also established the difference in the conditions that 
both types of citizens experience during detention time, as the ICCPR had already 
established at that time in article 10 paragraph 2(a), the need for a physical 
separation between accused and convicted persons in order for both to receive 
different treatments in this stage.659 
5.6 The emergence of the army as the primary security body 
The causalities which took place on Londonderry in 1968 and the 
subsequent riots, led then-governor of Northern Ireland (Chairman: Lord Cameron) 
to appoint a Commission which investigated the events that took place 1968-1969. 
It should be mentioned that by this point (1969), the number of soldiers on the 
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Northern Irish streets consisted of 8,000, which contrasted with the 2,000 armed 
personnel that were sent to do security tasks when the “troubles” started.660 Such 
commission addressed important points about the actions of the security bodies 
(mainly the RUC) in their conclusions. In its chapter 16 (para 230), the commission 
established that the RUC lacked legitimacy, as the people though that such force 
body operated as a “hand” of the Home of Minister Affairs and recommended to 
generate a truly impartial institution.661 In 1971 then-Prime Minister James 
Chichester-Clark launched one of the biggest offensives against the IRA after they 
lured and killed three soldiers who were off-duty having drinks at a pub; he 
proceeded to request from the British government a total of 1,300 troops.662  
Another episode of great importance that triggered a strengthening of the 
enforcement strategy was a soldier who was blown to pieces while he was urging 
both adults and children to evacuate a place in which an IRA member had dropped 
a suitcase containing explosives;663 he was posthumously awarded with the George 
Cross. Coogan has established that one of the main reasons which made the IRA a 
more powerful and radicalised group was the fact that by 1971 they finally had a 
large support of the Catholic population, which were much more reluctant to engage 
in criminal activities during the stage comprehending 1956-1962, but by 1971 the 
Nationalists would not accept any more repression from the Unionist government.664 
It is important to note that one of the key events which would set the political will to 
develop a more repressive strategy was the speech that prime minster Brian 
Faulkner gave to the army on 25 May 1971, in which he stated that any soldier may 
fire against any person who carried a weapon or acted suspiciously,665 even without 
an order from his superiors. This statement was not well received, and in fact, 
Faulkner was inquired about it, being forced to clarify that the phrase “acting 
suspiciously” was related to “circumstances in which firearms of explosives might be 
                                                          
660 K Jeffrey, “The British army and Ireland since 1922” in T. Bartlett and K. Jeffrey (eds), A 
military history of Ireland (Cambridge University Press 1996) 451 
661 Home Office Disturbances in Northern Ireland – Report of the Commission appointed by 
the Governor or Northern Ireland (Cmnd 532, 1969) [230] 
662 G Walker, A history of the Ulster Unionist Party (Manchester University Press 2004) 173 
663 TP Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal 1966-1995 and the Search for Peace 
(Hutchinson, London, 1995) 118 
664 ibid 123 
665 ibid 123 
193 
 
used”.666 Even though the ex-prime minster never referenced a legal framework for 
his statement, he might have been referencing is the Criminal Law Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1967 3(1), which referred to the use of force when making an arrest, and 
was in force when Faulkner made that statement. 
5.7 Bloody Sunday 
The events taken place on the 30th January 1972 marked a turning point on 
the whole Northern Irish conflict, as it was catalogued as the biggest massacre up 
until that point. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) organised a 
march in order to protest against the policy of internment. Even with the previous 
reports of human rights abuses made public, no march had been as successful in 
attendance as this one; official records estimate between ten and twenty thousand 
persons, including underage citizens and women. The atmosphere -although 
grounded on an ideology of struggle and protest-, was positive and had a positive 
feel to it.667 The British Army had previously banned the march, so the protesters 
relocated to the spot known as “Free Derry Corner” and at this point tension started 
building for some of the attenders, assaulting the soldiers with stones as a 
consequence 
According to the Saville Inquiry, a turning point for the fate of many peaceful 
demonstrators was the fact that one of the colonels (Colonel Wilford specifically), 
deployed more companies in vehicles than what he was authorised by his Brigadier. 
As the soldiers had previously identified the location of the rioters and the peaceful 
attenders, the deployment of armed personnel in a different place than the one 
agreed caused confusion to establish the identities of the attenders.668 The report 
concluded that Wilford did not set any limits to the Support Company on their 
actions, as he had not been given permission to chase the attenders in a certain 
area (Rossville Street).669 The Parachute Regiment began to arrest and 
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counterattack the protesters, and in a span of half an hour the armed forces had 
murdered 13 unarmed civilians (the soldiers involved in the shootings established 
that they had been attacked by bombs and guns, but subsequent evidence proved 
that no one had any weapons like the ones described);670 other reports indicate that 
another protester who was wounded died in the hospital a few hours later.671  
The Saville Inquiry assured that the soldiers were responsible for all the 
killing made by fire arms.672 An important point made by the inquiry was the fact that 
the soldiers did not respect the instructions of the “Yellow Card” handed to them, 
which stated the only circumstances under which they could open fire against a 
civilian, as it was established that the attendants murdered did not met such 
requirements.673 Northern Irish society was so outraged by these events, that 
support for the nationalists, and even for the IRA, grew exponentially and a couple 
of days later the British embassy in Dublin was burned by a mob on the 2nd of 
February of 1972.674 Bloody Sunday caused a crisis inside the Unionist government, 
as the Stormont officials were left with no legitimacy -even though they tried to 
reconcile with the relatives of the murdered, and also tried to release a large 
number of persons who were under internment at that point-.675 As a result the 
British government considered that their Northern Irish counterpart had to step apart 
and let Westminster to take complete control of everything related with security and 
order. The Stormont officials did not agree, but they were left with no other option 
than resigning.676  
As it can be concluded from both the Northern Irish and the British 
governments’ actions, State accountability was still a concept that had not been 
developed up to its current standards at this point because the kind of solutions that 
were looked were more politically than legally oriented. This is exemplified by the 
Widgery report of 1972, which was the first commission of inquiry set for 
establishing the fact and responsibilities of those involved the events of Bloody 
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Sunday. The facts used to justify the difficulty of establishing individual responsibility 
were based on arguments which come across as confusing, such as paragraph 63 
which establishes that “In two instances a bullet was recovered from the body, so 
that the rifle, and thus the firer, was positively identified. But several shots fired by 
the same rifle cannot be distinguished from one another and there is no certainty 
that a bullet hit the person at which it was aimed and whose conduct had caused 
the soldier to fire.”677 The arguments of this commission also incurred in 
contradictions on several places, as the Instructions by the Director of Operations 
for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland document (commonly known as the “Yellow 
Card”), established that the only situations in which the soldiers could fire their 
weapons is when, after a warning, there was an identified firearm or petrol bomb 
carried by the suspect, whereas a soldier could fire their weapon without warning 
when there was a shooting taking place, or to retaliate fire arms.678 Contrary to this 
principle, the Widgery report includes stone-throwing679 as part of the behaviour that 
can allow the armed personnel to open fire. The commission concluded the topic of 
soldiers’ responsibility by stating that they could not investigate further on each 
individual claim of a member of the army firing against an unarmed citizen, stating 
that in general the accounts given by the soldiers were truthful.680  
In contrast, the Saville Inquiry Report analysed the different violations which were 
committed during the events of Bloody Sunday; this inquiry stated first of all that the 
civil rights march which was organised and was the centre of the aggressions 
committed by the security forces was not the one to make responsible for the 
causalities. It also stated it was impossible to state that the attacks of the soldiers 
against civilians were part of a deliberate plan or strategy from the UK government, 
or as the complainants submitted, part of a “culture” from the army, due to years of 
emergency power legislation being developed.681 One of the main themes (which 
will be analysed later in this chapter), was the number of unlawful arrests made by 
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the army. In conclusion, the inquiry established that the use of military force in the 
event caused the opposite effect to the aim that the UK government had, as in the 
words of the commission:  
The firing by soldiers of 1 PARA on Bloody Sunday caused the deaths of 13 
people and injury to a similar number, none of whom was posing a threat of 
causing death or serious injury. What happened on Bloody Sunday 
strengthened the Provisional IRA, increased nationalist resentment and 
hostility towards the Army and exacerbated the violent conflict of the years 
that followed. Bloody Sunday was a tragedy for the bereaved and the 
wounded, and a catastrophe for the people of Northern Ireland.682 
5.8 The Northern Irish army and its relationship with society before and after 
the start of the “Troubles” 
While the Special Powers Act definitely had a high impact in the way society 
interacted with the armed forces, the Londonderry march and especially “Bloody 
Sunday” (after which, Westminster decided to apply “direct rule”, and prorogue the 
Stormont Parliament683), shaped a different path in the government’s strategy 
regarding civil-military relations. The new established order provided by the “direct 
rule”, became legalised in the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972. 
The first provision of its chapter 22 established that as long as the state of 
emergency kept being active, “the Secretary of State shall act as chief executive 
officer as respects Irish services instead of the Governor of Northern Ireland”.684 
Subsequently, the Northern Irish Parliament was abolished by the Northern Ireland 
Constitution Act 1973. It was not until 2007 when direct rule was derogated and the 
Northern Ireland Assembly was established again. 
In this context it is important to analyse what kind of perceptions and 
complains did the targeted groups, but also Northern Irish society as a whole, had 
on the army. As it has been stated before, security measures that were legalized or 
legitimated by an emergency situation eventually normalised through the time. As 
McVeigh states, a very important point to focus on was not the number of soldiers 
and civil security guards patrolling the Northern Irish streets, but the kind of tasks 
that such bodies performed while on duty.685 The main duties referred to the stop 
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and search, arrest, and eventually the right to shoot fire arms against armed 
civilians; it is important to point out that as early as 1975 the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland had to justify these actions by submitting a report to Parliament, 
which among other things justified the need to the extraordinary tasks in the 
following way: 
We have been set the difficult task of maintaining a double perspective; for, 
while there are policies which contribute to the maintenance of order at the 
expense of individual freedom, the maintenance without restriction of that 
freedom may involve a heavy toll in death and destruction. Some of those who 
have given evidence to us have argued that such features of the present 
emergency provisions as the use of the Army in aid of the civil power, 
detention without trial, arrest on suspicion and trial without jury are so 
inherently objectionable that they must be abolished on the grounds that they 
constitute a basic violation of human rights. We are unable to accept this 
argument, While the liberty of the subject is a human right to be preserved 
under all possible conditions, it is not, and cannot be, an absolute right, 
because one man may use his liberty to take away the liberty of another and 
must be restrained from doing so; where freedoms conflict, the state has a 
duty to protect those in need of protection.686 
McVeigh establishes three main elements of the security bodies in Northern 
Ireland; these were: The British Armed Forces, which in the official discourse acted 
as a peace-keeper; a specially recruited police force composed of local members; 
and, a military team also composed of local members, which served in emergency 
situations.687 The lack of accountability between the Northern Irish different security 
bodies was evident, as the RUC had a stronger control over their actions than the 
Royal Irish Rangers (RIR), and the British Army, which had no mechanisms of 
accountability and civilian surveillance.688 The Stevens Report also established that 
there was a “culture” of obstruction within both the Army and the Royal Ulster 
Constabularies, not only in terms of giving access to files and other evidence, but of 
destroying that very same evidence.689 
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5.9 Were the emergency measures applied proportionately to the scope of 
the Northern Irish problems? 
The type of armed personnel who were sent by the government has been 
described by academics like Coogan as disproportionate, as he establishes that at 
that time the IRA only had around 300 soldiers in its ranks690; wherever this data is 
highly precise or not, it is clear that there was a significant disparity between the 
number of soldiers and the members of the IRA who were actually armed and had 
some degree of military training. Jeffrey states that by 1972, when the “Operation 
Motorman” was carried on, the number of soldiers on the streets reached 21,800 
(around July of 1972)691. What is also important to note, is that the IRA did have 
thousands of “closet” supporters who would have been giving not only moral, but 
also material aid, as cases of IRA members being treated or/and arrested in 
hospitals is very low.692  
Donohue establishes that various provisions from the Restoration of Order in 
Ireland Act 1920 (ROIA) were directly copied to the Special Powers Act (SPA). 
Among these was the power to forbid public meetings and demonstrations, ban 
military outfits and uniforms that could indicate a membership to proscribed 
organisations; the power to establish curfews and; establish requirements to 
possess explosives, firearms, and even petrol.693 The SPA did not stop there, but it 
went further with more notions of enforcement with a repressive nature: it 
established a curfew that ordered people to stay indoors during a certain period of 
time, and various restrictions were imposed on public roads and passages. In a 
span of two years (1922-1924), the government established curfews a total of 
seventeen times.694 After this time, the curfew was used more occasionally, as it 
was less needed.  
Donoghue considers that provisions like the ones established in the SPA 
were highly effective, as the number of political crimes committed dropped down 
and even though it cannot be established with precision to which degree did the 
SPA contributed to the regulation of such types of crimes, Donoghue states that the 
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Act’s impact should not be underestimated.695 It is important to make another 
comparison here; the SPA was created in order to establish emergency powers 
amidst a conflict which the government considered of a strict political nature; if we 
analyse the results such act gave until 1968 (when the events from the Londonderry 
march ended tragically), it can be considered that the measures were successful.  
5.10 Internment 
According to Mulcahy, the change in strategy in favour of a more civilian 
based force had the intention of giving it a British focus,696 as the policy contrasted 
with the military, rigid, and authoritarian approach of the first half of the twentieth 
century. The downside of downgrading the level of repression was the fact that the 
IRA continued to scale the level of violence in their attacks; these actions provided 
the State with a solid argument to introduce the figure known as Internment. This 
concept refers to the faculty that the security forces had in order to keep a citizen 
detained without a trial; it was launched on the 9th of August of 1971, in the context 
of an operation called Demetrius, and such strategy was recommended by the 
Stormont Government to the British government. The Special Branch from the RUC 
went into zones which were considered Nationalist points and arrested 342 men. It 
was later discovered that many of these men had no connections at all with the 
Republican Army, and others were activists from the Civil Rights movement.697 The 
result had disastrous consequences for the government, as the human rights 
abuses committed inside the security forces’ headquarters became public, and 
outraged not only the members of the IRA, but the whole Catholic and nationalist 
community. 
According to the National Archives, the types of abuses that were committed 
forced the creation of the Compton Commission, who elaborated a report in 
November of 1971. Among the issues reported were: 1) throwing the detainees from 
a helicopter that stood four feet above the surface, but deceiving them into thinking 
that the altitude was much higher; 2) putting hoodies over them, depriving the 
detainees from sleep, starvation, and the use of white noise; and, 3) forcing the 
detainees to walk on pieces of shattered glass.698 The Republicans organised a 
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conference where they stated that internment would not intimidate them, and they 
would hold on still to their strategies and the campaign. By the end of 1971, 139 
people had been murdered after the introduction of internment (this is not to say that 
the purpose of internment was to take the lives of the detained, but such number 
shows a clear failure in the aims which internment proposed); around this time 
7,000 Catholic families were displaced from Northern to Sothern Ireland.699 As it can 
be seen, the decision to apply policies which contradicted the current standards of 
human rights only caused the opposite effect of what the Unionist government 
wanted: it strengthened the radicalization and support for the IRA. 
The powers of arrest (which are analysed later in this chapter), at the times 
of the “troubles” in Northern Ireland are also a controversial matter. The Act 
established that the forces on duty had the power to arrest without a warrant from 
the judge, and detain for a period or maximum four hours.700 Contemporary legal 
standards on the powers of arrest at an international level should be mentioned at 
this point; the UN developed the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons 
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment in its 76th plenary meeting (9 
December 1988); such framework is dedicated at establishing the minimum 
principles which must be used from the moment that a person is detained until he is 
sentenced. Referring to the concept itself, the UN plenary defined the term arrest as 
“the act of apprehending a person for the alleged commission of an offence of by 
the action of an authority”.701 Also, by the times of the “troubles”, a basic legislation 
on the methods of arrest had been discussed and issued in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on the 19th of December of 1966. The referred covenant set standards for 
detention on its articles 9 and 10, which establish the procedures that the authorities 
should follow from the moment of the arrest until the detained person is presented 
to a judge.702 Among the measures which the newly formed Stormont government 
developed was the concept of internment without trial. According to academic 
sources,703 such measure had been tested before when arresting fascists during 
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World War II. This measure was part of a security strategy called Operation 
Demetrius, and as modern analysis have established, security increased to some 
very limited degree, but it also made the resistance groups more radicalized, as the 
SDLP, which was the biggest Catholic party in NI broke relations with the 
government as long as internment remained a part of their strategy. Bew and 
Gillespie see the IRA as the main political beneficiaries of such strategy.704  
The RUC made a list of persons who were targeted as subversive and were 
being looked as possible candidates for internment. As Coogan states, the strategy 
went completely wrong as a large part of their lists were not updated; hence, many 
innocent people were targeted and detained, many of them suffering physical 
assaults by the armed forces.705 According to CAIN records, the internment was 
introduced in August of 1971, and was used continuously until December of 1975; 
the numbers of people detained were 1,874 Catholic/Republican and 107 
Protestant/Loyalist.706 Even in the case that these figures were not entirely accurate, 
a definite disproportion can be seen between the numbers of detained persons who 
were opposed to the Unionist government, and the ones who supported it. Such 
disproportion had as a consequence a lack of legitimacy in the goals which 
internment originally had. 
The amount of armed personnel who were patrolling the streets did not 
receive adequate/updated information about the citizens who were involved in the 
arrest of citizens suspected of terrorism, as 350 persons were arrested and 
subjected to internment on the 9th of August of 1971, but 104 persons were released 
because the authorities found out that the lists were out of date.707 These careless 
acts went completely against contemporary human rights standards by themselves, 
but the situation got aggravated by the fact that a large number of persons who 
were arrested were tortured and subjected to degrading treatments. Such actions 
were commonly known as the “five techniques”, which consisted of sleep 
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deprivation, starvation diets, white noise, hooding, and the enforcement of spread 
angling against a wall for hours.708 The complaints against the controversial 
measures taken by the government gave way to such a high level of polarization 
and complaints of human rights violations that a commission, led by Sir Edmund 
Compton, had to be formed in order to investigate the events; this report was 
elaborated in August 1971. The document stated that internment had been 
introduced in order to counter-attack the increase of the ruthlessness of the IRA’s 
actions, as according to the report, they had killed 104 innocent civilians between 
1969 and 1971.709 This fact -among other circumstances-, had forced the 
government to take measures as the subversive actions had reached a very difficult 
point with no signs of returning to a friendly relation. On the 9 August 1971, Prime 
Minster of Northern Ireland Brian Faulkner gave a speech in which he stated that 
the country was fighting terrorists that threatened the stability of the nation (his 
discourse bears some resemblance to the speech that Mexican president Felipe 
Calderón would give 35 years later, in order to justify the deployment of the armed 
forces). He proceeded to state: 
The terrorists' campaign continues at an unacceptable level and I have had to 
conclude that the ordinary law cannot deal comprehensively or quickly enough 
with such ruthless violence…..I have therefore decided... to exercise where 
necessary the powers of detention and internment vested in me as Minister of 
Home Affairs.710 
Faulkner’s decision was not shared by all member of the British political 
class; 1st Viscount Whitelaw stated that he thought this decision had been rushed 
and not planned enough to target the persons who were truly responsible for the 
troubles.711 An ongoing debate also took place during in House of Commons during 
the following months, as opinions were highly divided between members of the 
different ideological spectrums. It might have been understandable to visualize why 
the new strategy was controversial, if according to official records during January 
1972–February 1972, 2,078 persons were arrested to be questioned and 
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subsequently charged, and from August 1971–February 1972, 2,447 persons were 
arrested and detained or in many cases, interned.712 Between February and March 
of 1972, different groups of persons were interned, such numbers consisting of 108, 
89, 89, 78, 85, 66, 104 and 76.713 According to Spjut, the majority of persons 
detained were part of the IRA but various persons who had no connection to this 
group were also detained and interned.714 The government was aware that 
detaining so many persons –innocent or not- was creating more turmoil among the 
population, so a decision to stop the large number of detentions was discussed and 
decided. As a result, representatives from the government stated that this would be 
done in a gradual way, explaining that the decision to practice internment would 
depend entirely on the level of threat that each individual case represented.715 There 
were concerns from the most hard core Unionists, who established that the 
terrorists who were set free would commit crimes again; but as Spjut states, these 
fears had no real justification, as it was established that only the most radical and 
dangerous members of the IRA would be kept under bars, and that, as it has been 
established, the new deputy prime minister (Viscount Whitelaw) considered that the 
strategy had been rushed and not well prepared (as it was shown with the large 
numbers of persons who were detained and subsequently released, not before 
being subjected to the “five techniques”).716 The way in which the arrests and 
subsequent time in detention were carried on was the subject of a sentence by the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1978, due to a complain of the Irish 
government against the UK, which is analysed below: 
5.10.1 Ireland v The United Kingdom Case (18 January 1978) 
The Court established that between August 1971 and June 1972 around 
3,276 citizens were detained and processed in different centres, which were later 
replaced by police offices (in July 1972).717 Specifically, the case of twelve citizens 
who were detained the 9th of August of 1971 and another two persons who were 
arrested in October 1971 were analysed718; these persons were subjected to the 
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infamous “five techniques” that have been previously discussed. The methods in 
question were: wall-stranding (which was described as “spread eagled against the 
wall, with their fingers put high above the head against the wall, their legs spread 
apart and their feet back, causing them to stand on their toes with the weight of the 
body mainly on the fingers”719; hooding (putting a bag over the person’s head); 
subjection to noise (subjecting the detainees to long periods of hissing loud 
sounds); deprivation of sleep; and deprivation of food and drink.720 These 
techniques were never officially established but they were taught by word by the 
English Intelligence Centre.721 Previous commissions had been established in order 
to analyse such practices, which had become known to the public shortly after their 
applications (The Parker Report published in March 1972 is the first example), but 
as the commission led by Whitman had established, the UK Government did not 
follow previous recommendations. 
Also established were places where such treatment occurred: Palace 
Barracks, where 45 cases (then eight other cases were added) of ill-treatment were 
submitted to the Commission722; Girdwood park regional holding centre where 36 
cases were submitted723; Ballykinler regional holding centre, where the applicant 
government provided evidence for 18 cases724; and various other places (referred 
as “miscellaneous places”), where a total of 121 cases were referred to the 
Commission.725 The Court stated that between 31 March 1972 and 30 November 
1974 a total of 1,078 accusations of assault from the armed forces were made to 
the Director of Public Prosecutions,  had ordered to prosecute 86 of these cases by 
January 1975.726 An relevant figure is the high number (compared to the status of 
those soldiers accused in Mexico), of armed personnel who had been tried in NI 
during the 70s, as the Court established that between April 1972 and January 1977, 
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218 security force members had been prosecuted, and 155 had been convicted.727 
In a strictly legal matter, the purpose of the applicant to bring all these facts to the 
ECtHR was “to ensure the observance in Northern Ireland of the engagements 
undertaken by the respondent Government as a High Contracting Party to the 
Convention and in particular of the engagements specifically set out by the applicant 
Government in the pleadings filed and the submissions made on their behalf and 
described in the evidence adduced before the Commission in the hearings before 
them”.728 The applicant government alleged that the UK government had breached 
specifically articles 1, 3, 5, 6, and 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and also accused the UK of obstructing 
previous investigations.729  
The Court established that the use of the “five techniques” were indeed 
considered as breaches of article 3, as they constituted inhuman and degrading 
treatment; but the majority of votes established that the use of such techniques did 
not constituted a practice of torture in any of the detention centres.730 The reason 
not to consider this torture was that they caused mental and physical suffering, but 
not actual bodily injury. In addition to this, Judge Zekia established that in order for 
an action to be considered torture, the individual characteristics of each person 
have to be taken into account.731 Regarding the derogations made as a 
consequence of the state of emergency, the Court established that even though 
they have acknowledged that extrajudicial detentions took place, they did not 
exceed what was considered as a requirement for the situation.732 On the right to a 
fair trial established in article 6, the Court considered that such derogations were 
also in tune with the state of emergency established in article 14.733 The UK 
Attorney General established that, upon considering the use of the “five techniques”, 
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the British government had established that they “will not in any circumstances be 
reintroduced as an aid to interrogation”.734 
This is especially relevant, as the Irish government has requested the 
ECtHR to revise the case, as recent information held in the British public records 
office has been uncovered, which suggests that 12 men who were detained in 1971, 
were subjected to practices which had been considered as torture735 since the 
moment of their arrest by international standards. The complainant based its case736 
on the violation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, citing articles 3, which explicitly prohibits torture; article 5, 
which grants the rights to liberty and security, both while on a state of freedom and 
on a state of detention; and article 6, which grants the rights to a fair trial. The 
judges’ decision established back then that there was not enough evidence to 
suggest that the practices used by the British army constituted acts or torture, and 
that the acts committed were legitimate, as a state of emergency permitted the 
derogation of certain human rights standards, as the British government had been 
informing the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of the measures been 
taken and had justified them correctly.737 At the moment of this writing, it is uncertain 
if the ECHR will revise the case and change its previous judgement. 
It is also pertinent to mention the subsequent civilian attempts to establish 
commissions dealing with human rights abuses. In 1992 a gathering of non-
governmental associations gathered in order to discuss and analyse the state of 
human rights in Northern Ireland; the legal frameworks used as the base for the 
analysis were The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Legal 
academics and specialists from different continents were invited to discuss and 
analyse the situation in comparison with the treaties mentioned above, which 
Northern Ireland had signed (as an anecdote that highlights the severity of the 
security measures applied, one of the participants was arrested on its way to the 
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assembly under the PTA provisions738). The report from the assembly is highly 
relevant to this part of the chapter, as it gave very straight-forward conclusions to 
the human rights crisis that the security strategy and the emergency legal provisions 
implemented side-effects caused. 
In this report, Commissioner Lois Whitman focused in the concept of 
degrading and/or inhuman treatment, article 7 of the ICCPR, article 3 of the ECHR, 
and article 5 of the UDHR739; plus, the United Nations Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment was 
constructed purely with the goal of establishing defined provisions on the freedom 
against torture (the convention was adopted in 1984, and came into force in 1987; it 
obliged the State parties to adapt their domestic legislations in order to compel with 
customary international law). The importance of this convention resides in the fact 
that reports about the “five techniques” –described earlier in this chapter-, fit in the 
definition of torture established in the UNCT.740 Whitman states that when a method 
of distinguishing the concept of torture from ill-treatment does not exist, certain 
factors need to be taken into account (as examples he mentions the age, health, 
and sex of a person, plus the particular circumstances in the way that each 
particular events took place).741 The Assembly gathered evidence from different 
groups, non-governmental organisations, academics, lawyers, prisoners and ex-
convicts in order to make an analysis of the recommendations needed.742  
According to Caitriona Ruane, who was in charge of coordinating this 
commission, four categories of submissions that evidence violation of human rights 
in Northern Ireland were established: the abuses committed in the interrogations 
taken place in Strand Road, Gough Barracks, and Castlereagh; strip-searches; 
                                                          
738 Northern Ireland Human Rights Assembly, Broken Covenants: Violations of International 
Law in Northern Ireland (National Council for Civil Liberties, London 1993) 11 
739 ibid 66 
740 Article 1 (UNCT 1984): For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any 
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on 
a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.  It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions. 
741 Northern Ireland Human Rights Assembly (n 738) 31 
742 ibid 
208 
 
degrading treatment of citizens while being imprisoned or in police custody; and ill-
treatment and harassment in public places.743 Ruane made an important 
observation: although the Assembly focused exclusively with the human rights 
violations committed by the British security forces and government officials, 
paramilitary groups were also committing abuses. She cites International 
Humanitarian Law and article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention as the main 
institution that needs to work on such situation.744 This is especially relevant if the 
Mexican security strategy is to be approached with a comparison with Northern 
Ireland; as it has been specified previously in this thesis, Mexico gathers all the 
requirements needed for International Humanitarian Law to intervene. In the 
Northern Irish case, the IRA is to be considered a non-State actor, being a threat to 
both civilians and the government; and a similarity with the role of the Mexican drug-
cartels can be drawn; this will be discussed in the conclusions. 
The Commission lead by Whitman focused also on the allegations about ill-
treatment; he stated that this had severe consequences as it was done with the 
purpose of causing “severe pain or suffering whether physical or mental”.745 This 
behaviour went specifically against article 1 of the United Convention against 
Torture (UNCT), which defines the concept of torture. Whitman stated that previous 
recommendations had been made in centres of detention like Castlereagh, which 
had made the rate of allegations decrease; still, the commissioner established that 
the most important thing was to ensure that such treatments would completely 
cease and not be repeated.746 As we have stated previously, the list of physical and 
psychological mistreatment is extensive, but the report also mentioned as examples 
of these the assault and blows to both genitals and ears, and extensive use of 
threatening, which sometimes went as far as becoming death threats.747 This 
commission established three points in respect to the allegations of ill-treatment; the 
British Government had tried to counterattack the allegations by stating that these 
had been done by citizens who were suspects of terrorism. In this regard the 
commission established that the human rights of every person need to be 
guaranteed and respected regardless of the status of the accuser. In their own 
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words, “torture and other forms of ill-treatment are never justifiable, no matter what 
a person is supposed to have done or is suspected of having done”.748 In its second 
point the commission stated that ill-treatment and torture are more likely to be 
performed by officials when the detainees are isolated or incommunicado from any 
kind of witnesses or lawyers.749 Finally, it was established that prestigious 
organisations such as Amnesty International had been stating the veracity of many 
allegations, and that the refusal from the UK Government to establish mechanisms 
that guarantee respect to human rights showed their lack of commitment to stop 
such practices.750 The Ireland v The United Kingdom case certainly illustrated the 
lack of human rights safeguard during the period of detention. 
5.10.2 Post-internment measures 
Eventually, the authorities replaced the figure or internment with another 
type of procedure, in which ministers had more emphasis.751 An important legal 
figure established by the Emergency Powers Act was the Commissioner752 (the 
Mexican government developed a similar figure which will be mentioned later in this 
chapter). As in other cases, a legal figure called Interim Custody Orders (ICO) was 
used, this figure allowed the authorities to keep a person detained for a period of 28 
days; after following these steps the commissioner would decide if the person in 
question needed more detention time. If it was concluded that detention was 
necessary, the Commissioner would issue a Detention Order; in other case, the 
detained person would be set free. The Emergency Provisions Act 1973 was the 
legal ground for these new resolutions, but it still violated human rights principles, as 
Schedule I of the EPA stated that:  
A person shall not be detained under an interim custody order for a period of 
more than twenty-eight days from the date of the order unless his case is 
referred by the Chief Constable to a commissioner for determination, and 
where a case is so referred the person concerned may be detained under the 
order only until his case is determined.753 
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The provision mentioned above does not set any limits for the time of 
detention of a determined person, which left a legal gap open that could be used to 
violate general principles, as the House of Commons discussed in 1972.754 The 
government also used data from the number of releases of arrested people in order 
to gain political support, as official records said that almost 40 per cent of those 
detained where released.755 These numbers were used to state that the 
commissioners had indeed exercised their powers with independence from the 
government, although, as Spjut states, the majority of detained persons continued 
to be Republicans.756 There was an ongoing debate in this period regarding the use 
of the ICOs; even though it is not possible to confirm that such figure was being 
used as a substitute for internment, respected media like The Economist stated that:  
The British authorities may come up with a system which would have some of 
the advantages of internment (holding men long enough for their friends to be 
suspicious of how much they may have given away) without having a Long 
Kesh to explain to Gerry Fitt’s constituent.757  
Finally, it must be stated that Human Rights Watch recommended he UK 
government to “have prompt and regular access to counsel of their choice and 
detainees should be allowed to have their lawyers present during interrogations”, to 
“be able to notify family members or friends immediately following arrest”, and also 
recommended that “All interrogations should be audio and video taped. Detainees' 
attorneys should have access to all audio and video tapes of interrogations”.758 
5.11  The powers of stop and search, arrest and detention 
 In order to set the context for this topic, it is relevant to state that the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 was created specifically to establish provisions 
that would enable both the civilian constabularies and Her Majesty’s Forces to 
exercise special powers when they encountered terrorists or suspects of this crime. 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act was reformed in the years of 1976, 1984, and 1989 
respectively; in the year 2000 the PTA was replaced by the Terrorism Act, which 
changed its focus from a regional approach on terrorism to a global one. The power 
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to arrest and search without a warrant was given to the constables in section 7(1)(2) 
of the PTA 1974; in the PTA 1989, this power was established in section 14(1). 
Such provisions only allowed the security forces to make this type of arrest when a 
person was being found instigating, committing or preparing any act of terrorism, 
when a citizen was subjected to an exclusion order or when they were members to 
a proscribed organisation.759 
 The so-called powers of “stop and search”, and detention were granted in 
the Emergency Provisions Act of 1973 in its second part, specifically section 12 
concerning the army, as it established the power of the soldiers to detain any 
person which they consider might have committed an offence for a maximum of four 
hours, regardless of the offence being scheduled or not. This principle would 
become one of the most consistent provisions across both the PTAs and the 
EPAs;760 its main goal was to prevent terrorism and be able to identify possible 
suspects before they could commit any crime. Hillyard states that this measure was 
used to create a database which was big enough, and at the same time stigmatising 
the whole Catholic population as possible suspects.761 While this last statement is 
impossible to verify, it can be inferred by the testimonies of the soldiers that 
Catholics were much more likely to be stopped (as opposed to Protestants, 
Catholics tend to wear crucifixes around their necks, which makes them easy to 
identify), searched and eventually arrested/harassed than the Protestant 
community. The level of surveillance was indeed high -similar to the protocols that 
modern security systems use to target suspects of terrorism-, and as Hillyard stated, 
“Each card contained information not only on the individual but on other family 
members and included religion, occupation, car details and lists of associates. 
These cards were cross-referenced to house cards and to a number of other card 
indices, including those for vehicle records”.762 
 This information contributed to create the database that the security forces 
were building in order to prevent future acts of terrorism. The numbers obtained 
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from the building of the database were highly secretive, as the same author 
established that the Catholic community was indeed affected by this strategy, 
because the government kept information about the number of persons stopped and 
searched away from the public spotlight and only after the Gardiner and the Baker 
reports surfaced, more information was made public.763 Regarding the lack of 
information of the citizens being stopped and searched, it should be pointed that 
Commissioner (this commission is independent, as it was assisted by the 
Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme and the International Helsinki 
Watch Committee) Professor Dader Asmal has recommended that the security 
officers to: 
 …should be required to keep a log of the date and time of every occasion on 
which a person is stopped or searched, the identity of the individual 
concerned, the length of time the person is detained and the reason for the 
stop/search. This log should be available for inspection in the case of any 
complaint. Unwarranted use of stop/ search powers should be made a 
disciplinary offence. Statistics should be published showing the number of 
people stopped or searched, analysed by religion, gender and outcome.764 
 The issue of lack of information from the army was not only addressed by 
the Northern Ireland Human Rights Assembly, but also by the Independent 
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, which were shocked to discover that 
there were no requirements needed in order to save the records for roadblocks, and 
stop and search activities, which made it impossible to investigate and make 
observations.765 In order to get a scope of the level of harassment that a sector of 
the Northern Irish population suffered, it should be noted that Commissioner Lois 
Whitman’s team found that various citizens made complaints of being stopped more 
than five or six times in the same day, either by members of the armed forces or the 
constabularies, with some cases of physical assault, threats and sexual 
harassment.766  
 These measures violated universal principles, such as article 13 of the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights (right to freedom of movement within the borders of a 
State), and also article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, as the citizens 
were subjected to degrading treatment. The Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern 
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Ireland) Order 1989 gave the constables the power to arrest without a warrant 
anyone how would fall into a category established as “the reasons”.767 In relation to 
the concept of degrading treatment, the United Nations Human Rights committee 
has established criteria which “recalls that persons deprived of their liberty may not 
be subjected to any hardship or constraint other than that resulting from the 
deprivation of liberty; they must be treated in accordance with, inter alia, the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners”.768 The UN Committee 
also imposes an additional requirement on States when it is considered that article 7 
has been violated as the Committee has established that “once a complaint about 
ill-treatment contrary to article 7 has been filed, a State party must investigate it 
promptly and impartially.”769 
 The importance of considering a citizen as suspicious of committing a crime 
was not based on any grounds when they were stopped in a public place; as 
Commissioner Professor Richard Falk stated in his investigation: “power to stop and 
compel answers can be exercised without any requirement of suspicion. In Northern 
Ireland people can therefore be stopped and questioned at random”770. This meant 
that everyone in the public spotlight could be a potential terrorist, or at least an 
accessory, as the main objective of these protocols was not only arresting citizens, 
but also finding ammunition. Professor Whitman also established that if a search 
implied the removal of clothes, a person of opposite sex should not be present at 
the time771, but this again contradicted the accusations of sexual harassment by part 
of the security forces. 
 Section 10 (EPA 1973), explicitly gave the security forces the power to arrest 
any person who they considered suspicious of terrorism, which included breaking 
into private properties of anyone suspected. By its part, section 16 (EPA 1973), 
gave both the army and the constables the exceptional power to stop and question 
anyone with the purpose of recollecting information about such person’s activities 
and identity, and also gather any information about third parties who might had 
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participated in actions involving terrorism. There was a penalty of £400 or even 
detention that refused to stop and/or give the information enquired. Even when 
compared to the EPA of 1996, the legislation had barely been modified, with the 
only difference being that the only penalty for refusing to follow the armed 
personnel’s orders only contemplated a fine, but not detention (and the fact that the 
section’s number changed to 25, not 16). It should be pointed out that legal holes 
existed in the EPA since its creation in 1973, as Greer stated that the kind of 
answers that the person question could give were not described in the Act, and 
forms of intimidation such as the soldiers taking photographs of the persons 
questioned were not considered illegal.772  
 Once again, this behaviour went against the aforementioned provisions from 
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant (articles 9 and 10); this situation also 
described the lack of well-established mechanisms of accountability and human 
rights training. Greer also described more legal holes in article 25 of the EPA 1996, 
which can also be attributed to article 16 of the EPA 1973, as fraction (a) 
establishes that one of the main purposes of the “stop” ability that armed personnel 
had, was to assert such person’s identity. The author establishes that the concept of 
identity is not described in a clear way, and this might cause confusion where there 
are people in the same family with the same name; plus, the level of detail that such 
questions should carry is not well established either.773 Although It can be 
concluded that no framework can establish the type of tasks that security forces can 
exercise in order to get the information required in an absolute manner, it can be 
established that such enquires should always follow basic human rights protocols 
and not infringe article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant. 
 Walsh’s analysis of the main differences between the powers of arrest in 
“regular” institutional times and a state of emergency is that civilian security forces 
were forced to act in the limits of what the law established; with the issuing of 
special powers of arrest, these limitations disappeared.774 Walsh’s main contribution 
to this topic consisted in describing how the police crossed the line of separation of 
powers basic to any democratic State; he established that when the SPA (and later 
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the EPA) gave powers of questioning to the security forces, the line between the 
executive and the courts disappeared, as the questioning in order to gather 
evidence belonged in a trial. Secondly, Walsh stated that, being the security forces 
an extension of the executive power, they were acting as its representative. Using 
this logic, it can be said that judicial functions which belonged to the justice system, 
were given to the representatives of the executive.775  
 Although Welsh’s theory can be contested by stating that both the civilian 
police and the army are institutionally part of the executive power, and therefore no 
legal provisions were broken, this theory illustrates one of the main debates 
concerning the boundaries between the grounds of State institutionalism and 
emergency regimes, when special powers are given. Walsh finished this topic 
expressing that “the corruption of the criminal justice process is therefore inherent in 
the structure and aims of the statutory special powers”.776 It seems excessive to 
state that corruption is an integral part of special provisions, but what cannot be 
denied is the difficulty of establishing special powers without damaging the free 
exercise of fundamental rights to some degree. While a state of emergency can be 
used with corrupt aims, one does not necessarily involve the other. If the soldiers’ 
testimonies are taken into account, they seemed to view the British government as 
cold and indifferent, but they did not conceive their deployment as an act of 
corruption; regarding the soldiers themselves, they seemed to believe that they 
were truly doing a task with good intentions. A point in which most specialists do 
agree at a certain level, is that both the armed forces and the constabularies 
committed many acts of excessive force and incurred in severe violations (mainly 
due to the lack of training in human rights), which -as it has been in the case of 
Mexico-, was devastating and counterproductive for their image,777 and legitimacy; 
and as a consequence, the animosity created among the civilian population grew 
with time. 
 Greer also established a relevant point here; the EPA 1996 (this legal issue 
continued from the conception of the first EPA in 1973), stated that any person 
could be arrested for an unspecified offence, regardless if it is considered a terrorist 
offence or not. The author only points out that the EPA (from its fist incarnation), 
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stated that the soldiers had to make a clear statement establishing they were acting 
as members of Her Majesty’s Forces.778 This did not change the fact that there were 
a high number of complaints against the constabularies for harassing during the 
public stop-and-search operations. The problem resided in the fact that the army did 
not have many restrictions in terms of making a decision for considering which 
behaviour represented an offence. 
 The power of armed personnel and constabularies to search premises or 
even a private home to verify if communication devices and ammunition are located 
is established in section 13 of the EPA 1973, and section 20 of the EPA 1996. Since 
it includes public places,779 the EPA 1996 established the concept of public place as 
“a place to which for the time being members of the public have or are permitted to 
have access, whether on payment or otherwise”780. This is relevant in order to 
evaluate the high level of control that the security forces had over the population, as 
such section indicated that the concept of privacy drastically changes during the 
time in which an emergency is declared. It is also important to point out that the 
EPA established legal provisions in order for military personnel to enter a private 
home (section 26(1)). This legal authorisation needed to come from the Secretary of 
State, or if the entrance to such place was an urgent matter that could jeopardize 
peace in case of not being performed then such authorisation would not be 
required.  
 Professor Whitman concluded that the powers of stop and search were in 
fact prone to be abused. He stated that the main problem when it comes to 
searching in public places was the harassment of random citizens when the security 
forces had no grounds for suspicion.781 There is a description of this concept 
contained in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (UK) 1984, which establishes the 
following (although this act refers exclusively to civilian security forces, it is relevant 
in order to judge the protocols of both soldiers and constabularies in Northern 
Ireland): 
Reasonable grounds for suspicion depend on the circumstances in each case. 
There must be an objective basis for that suspicion based on facts, 
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information, and/ or intelligence which are relevant to the likelihood of finding 
an article of a certain kind or, in the case of searches under section 43 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000, to the likelihood that the person is a terrorist. Reasonable 
suspicion can never be supported on the basis of personal factors.782  
 At a domestic level, the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland established in 
the McKee v Chief Constable for Northern Ireland case that: 
…the definitions of "terrorism" and "terrorist" in section 31(1) of the Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 were wide, and that on the true 
construction of section 11(1) of the Act of 1978 the suspicion there referred to 
related to the state of mind of the arresting officer and no one else, and that 
that state of mind could legitimately be derived from the instructions given to 
the arresting officer by his superior officer; that the arresting officer was not 
bound, and indeed might well not be entitled, to question those instructions or 
to enquire upon what information they were founded…783 
 These factors are to be considered circumstantial evidence in most cases, 
and it can lead up to find reasonable grounds for suspicion, such as the Northern 
Ireland Court of Appeal stated in McClean and McCreary v The Queen:  
“It has been said that circumstantial evidence is to be considered as a chain, 
and each piece of evidence as a link in the chain, but this is not so, for then, if 
any one link break, the chain would fall. It is more like the case of a rope 
comprised of several cords. One strand of the cord might be insufficient to 
sustain the weight, but three stranded together may be quite of sufficient 
strength. Thus it may be in circumstantial evidence - there may be a 
combination of circumstances, no one of which would raise a reasonable 
conviction or more than a reasonable suspicion; but the three taken together 
may create a conclusion of guilt with as much certainty as human affairs can 
require or admit of.”784 
 In the specific case of citizens who were arrested for the suspicion of 
terrorist activities, the Review of the Operation of the Northern Ireland Emergency 
Provisions Act 1978 comes to reference; published in 1984 and known as the Baker 
Report. It refers to the subject of suspicion or reasonable suspicion: 
Only a lawyer or a legislator would suspect (or reasonably suspect?), a 
difference. But there is one because, say the judges, with whom I agree, 
Parliament by using the two phrases must have so intended. The test for 
Section 11 (of the EPA 1978), is a subjective one: did the arrestor suspect? If 
his suspicion is an honest genuine suspicion that the person being arrested is 
a terrorist, a court cannot enquire further into the exercise of the power. But 
where the requirement is reasonable suspicion it is for the court to judge the 
reasonableness of the suspicion. It is an objective standard. The facts which 
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raise the suspicion may be looked at by the court to see if they are capable of 
constituting reasonable cause. Reasonable suspicion is itself a lower standard 
than evidence necessary to prove a prima facie case. Hearsay may justify 
reasonable suspicion but may be insufficient for a charge.785 
Stating that reasonable suspicion must be based on an objective standard 
was used by the ECHR in the Fox, Campbell and Hartley v The United Kingdom 
case786, as the Court established that what was considered as “reasonable” 
depended in the particular circumstances of the crime being tried, and terrorism fell 
into a different category than other crimes because of the high danger and risk 
involving human lives: For that reason, “reasonabless” could not be “stretched” to 
the point of impairing the essence of article 5.1 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (Right to liberty and security), at the time of making an arrest.787  
The Emergency Provisions Act 1973 also makes a direct reference to the 
term “intention” in its paragraph 3 of article 11, when it establishes that security 
forces have the power of seizing any object that they suspect “is being, has been or 
is intended to be used in the commission of a scheduled offence or an offence 
under this act which is not a scheduled offence.”788 The Act does not address to 
what extent can an act or behaviour be considered an intention, and at best leaves 
such term open to various interpretations. 
 It is pertinent to discuss and analyse the use of force in the Northern Irish 
conflict, but in order to understand an essential part of the emergency regime a 
description of the strategy used for submitting al citizens accused of terrorism to a 
juryless trial needs to be pointed out. 
5.12  The Diplock Courts 
 According to specialists as Jackson and Doran, the Diplock courts were 
another institution created by the emergency system.789 After the tragic events of 
Bloody Sunday, the Parliament presented the Secretary of State of NI with the 
Diplock Report (named after its chairman, Lord Diplock). The goal of such report 
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was to make legal amendments and create new institutional paths in order to “deal 
with terrorist activities”790 in the Northern Irish territory. Among the conclusions, the 
necessity of prolonging the state of emergency as long it was needed was 
established.791 The commission expressed that there was a lack of testimonies and 
the citizens did not press charges due to fear and intimidation of the families and 
witnesses by the terrorists.792 Therefore, in order to protect the population which by 
the principles of Common Law needed to serve as jury, the commission established 
that scheduled offences (which were referred in the report as acts of terrorism) 
should be tried by a Judge member of a County Court, or a member of the High 
Court; this trial would be conducted with no members of the jury, just the judge on 
its own.793 The use of public funds to keep the special courts running became a 
waste of budget: in 1986 only 34 persons were tried by these courts, but such 
measures became normalised as they had become part of the regular justice 
system in Northern Ireland by the 1980s.794  
 The Diplock Courts continued to work until a group of Members of 
Parliament saw the need to reform this institution in order to take a step towards 
normalising the Northern Irish institutional system in 2005. A consultation paper 
called Replacement Arrangements for the Diplock Court System was issued by the 
Northern Ireland Office in 2007. The consultants established that “some form of 
non-jury trial will be necessary for Northern Ireland for exceptional cases where 
there are likely to be paramilitary or community-based pressures on a jury”795, but in 
general they stated that the Diplock courts should be abolished. The Justice and 
Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 indicated the reforms on its Schedule 1(1) (2) 
(3) (4), which basically stated that only under certain conditions and where the curse 
of the trial and the security of the jurors was jeopardised, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions for Northern Ireland can issue a certificate in order to establish the 
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procedure of a trial without a jury.796 The existence of the Diplock Courts for more 
than 30 years is essential to understand the number of complaints for unfair trials 
during the times of the troubles.  
 According to Jackson and Doran, various judges expressed their desire for 
the Diplock trials to be kept to a minimum, as they thought that the traditional 
umpireal or contest mode of the Anglo-Saxon system was better than the 
accusatory system of the special courts.797 The degree of intervention from the 
judges did not vary from the jury courts to the special courts, although most judges 
found that the special trials required them to be more inquisitive in some parts, such 
as the questioning of the defence witnesses.798 One of the main conclusions that 
Jackson and Doran made was that, contrary to the common thought, the judges did 
not adopt a behaviour that would result in an increase of conviction rates or guilty 
pleas.799 The authors expressed the fact that in all cases the accused was facing 
what they call an “adversarial deficit” in two aspects: the first one is that the judge 
took a deeply extended range of view of the case, which according to Jackson and 
Doran should not be allowed. The second aspect is that a professional trier always 
had a bigger influence over the course of a case than lay triers (jury), and it was 
easier for a professional trier to get inside information on a case than it is for lay 
triers.800 The authors concluded stating there was the need to establish a 
mechanism to counter the judge’s conclusions before the judgement was 
pronounced.801 As it can be seen, the fact that the existence of lay triers is always a 
better way to balance the interests of all parties involved should be addressed. 
 As time passed by, it became more common to use the Diplock courts for 
crimes which did not fall in the description of terrorism, as in 1987 -as the EPA went 
through various reforms, and search and seizure provisions took a more defined 
role-,802 such provisions became normalised because the State did not consider 
various emergency provisions as temporary anymore. The author also mentioned 
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robbery as an example of a crime for which various citizens went through the 
Diplock Courts, even though this was not a scheduled offence.803 The 
consequences of being tried by these special courts have been mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, but in the report made by the commission led by Lois Whitman and 
presented to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Assembly in 1992, various factors 
which affected the right to a fair trial were established. Among such factors were the 
lower standards for admitting evidence compared to the ordinary courts; the fact 
that the obligation to submit evidence relied on the defendant instead of the 
prosecutor; and everything said while uncommunicated also had a bigger impact on 
the Diplock Courts.804 Even though the state of emergency legitimised several 
derogations to the covenants and treaties signed by NI, it was clear that the use of 
such extreme measures had to be applied to crimes that also had an extreme 
nature. The prosecution in special courts of persons accused of minor crimes 
breached the legality of article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
which states that emergency measures must be taken to “the extent strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation”.805 It can be concluded that he trials of juryless 
courts for minor crimes breached both the right to a fair trial and the principles of 
proportionality between the emergency provisions and the crime committed. 
5.13   Use of force 
 The Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 conceptualised the use of 
force in Northern Ireland. In its section 3(1) the act allowed a person (implying that 
any citizen had this right) to use force as long as it was “reasonable in the 
circumstances in the prevention of crime”, or to aid in a lawful arrest.806 The EPA 
1973 also granted the constabularies with the ability to use “reasonable” force in 
order to take data of an arrested person such as fingerprints or photographs.807 
When it came to entering places, vehicles, vessels, etc., the security forces were 
able to use force if needed; this was found in section 18(2) of the EPA 1973, and 
section 28(4) of the EPA 1996.  
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 Professor Kader Asmal, member of the commissioners of the Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Assembly 1992 started his analysis explaining that the Right 
to Life was the first essential provision that had been violated several times while 
employing State force.808 Although such right is established in all contemporary 
treaties and covenants, Asmal bases his argument in articles 6.1 of the ICCPR and 
article 2 of the ECHR, which states the right of every citizen to have his life 
guaranteed and protected by law. At the moment of the analysis made by the 
assembly, the Criminal Law Act 1967 was still active and Asmal stated that the use 
of force allowed for the security forces entered in conflict with the right to life, as: 
 Some of the dicta which have come from the courts of Northern Ireland on 
the use of lethal force are extraordinary. Judges have drawn parallels with a 
Wild West posse, implying that the correct standard for the security forces to 
adopt is the bringing back of a target dead or alive. In another case the judges 
referred to victims being ‘sent to the final court of justice’. Such attitudes on 
the part of the courts do not assist in maintaining respect for the right to life.809  
 The shoot-to-kill policy was a recurrent topic in which the concept of use of 
force was analysed, as it constituted the most extreme use of a legal provision in 
order to justify the security of the Northern Irish population in general. Finally, in his 
recommendation to the State Asmal established that the concept of “reasonable 
force” should be changed by a new one based on the use of “minimum force which 
is no more than is absolutely necessary”.810 The change in adjectives might not 
seem as important at first sight, but when the State guarantees a minimum of force 
it is also obliged to take the needed measures to avoid using any kind of force, 
which was the rationale behind the judgment of the majority in the McCann and 
Others v the United Kingdom case. 
 The concept of what was considered reasonable was also a subject of 
debate among judges, especially when it came to dealing with suspected members 
of the IRA. It is important to refer the McCann and others v The United Kingdom 
case, as the ECHR stated that the decision to use lethal force needs: 
 The relevant domestic case-law establishes that the reasonableness of the 
use of force has to be decided on the basis of the facts which the user of the 
force honestly believed to exist: this involves the subjective test as to what the 
user believed and an objective test as to whether he had reasonable grounds 
for that belief. Given that honest and reasonable belief, it must then be 
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determined whether it was reasonable to use the force in question in the 
prevention of crime or to effect an arrest.811 
 Also, at a domestic level, the Belfast Crown Court established in the Martin 
Raymond Jude Murray, Liam Patrick Kevin Murray, Kevin Michael Charles Toye, 
William McDonagh & Kevin Murray v The Queen, that a person is entitled to use 
reasonable force when two circumstances (which are subjective and objective 
respectively), are met: 
(I) a genuine belief in facts which if true would justify self-defence is a defence 
to a crime of personal violence because the belief negatives the intent to act 
unlawfully. 
 (II) An objective test is required in respect of the degree of force used. The 
degree of force used by an accused may not be regarded as reasonable if he 
uses excessive force or has over-reacted. Of course a person defending 
himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his necessary 
defensive action.812 
 The Court must decide whether the defendant honestly believed that the 
circumstances were such as required him to use force to defend himself from an 
attack or a threatened attack. The defendant must be judged in accordance with 
his honest belief, even though that belief may be mistaken. 
 These principles have been reflected by the Council of Europe, as they have 
established that “For the purpose of performing their duties, the law provides the 
police with coercive powers and the police may use reasonable force when lawfully 
exercising their powers.”813 The Commissioner was clear when addressing the limits 
of enforcement, as he also stated that “There may be no attempt to conceal, excuse 
or justify the unlawful exercise of coercive or intrusive powers by a police officer by 
reference to his or her lawful recourse to coercive and intrusive powers”.814 
 Greer established that, although the use of force in an excessive manner by 
the security bodies could be subjected to prosecution, there was reluctance from the 
security system to try them, and when they did, the existence of the Diplock courts 
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made the judgements the subject of controversy.815 According to this author the 
great majority of the cases where an accusation of excessive use of force existed, 
the courts would justify it under the state of emergency that the country had 
established.816 Jennings explains that before The Criminal Law Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1967, a precedent which gave the constabularies and soldiers the option to 
use lethal force did not exist.817 The only way to use force in order to kill a citizen 
before the Act was: 1) when it is absolutely necessarily in order to stop a crime; 2) 
when the consequence of not killing the potential criminal would have been more 
severe than the death of the criminal itself.818 These would be the only two 
circumstances in which the murder of a civilian be justified enough to stand up for a 
case in court. This pre-1967 position on the use of force is mentioned in order to 
establish the correlation of a stronger enforcement with that the government viewed 
as an emergency situation, which the courts subsequently justified. 
5.13.1 “Shoot-to-kill” unofficial policy 
 Even though such strategy did never carry that name in an official policy, the 
provisions established (Criminal Law Act of 1967 in its section 3(1)) created legal 
gaps which specialists considered as the ground for the murder of citizens that in 
many cases were not even carrying weapons. In 1985 an inquiry report issued by a 
group of international lawyers established that: 
The evidence we have heard leads us to conclude that an administrative 
practice has been allowed to develop in Northern Ireland, by which killings in 
violation of the European Convention and the International Covenant are at 
least tolerated, if not actually encouraged. Undercover units of the British 
Army and the RUC are trained to shoot-to-kill even where killing is not legally 
justifiable and where alternative tactics could and should be used. Such 
administrative practices are illegal in domestic and international law. They 
should be stopped and training for them should be discontinued 
immediately.819 
 This policy had been highly subjected to scrutiny after the Good Friday 
agreement in order to establish commissions of truth that would make justice to the 
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families of the citizens who were unlawfully killed. The Historical Enquires Team (a 
united specialised in investigating the unsolved murders during the Troubles 
between the years of 1968-1998), carried on various investigations on the alleged 
shoot-to-kill policy. A clear example is the case of W. Francis McGreanery, who has 
killed by a member of the armed forces in Derry in 1971. The Historical Enquires 
Team (HET) worked on the case not to resolve if McGreanery had been killed by a 
member of the armed forces –as this had been established-, but in order to 
establish his intention and proving whether he had a firearm or not.820 The HET 
concluded stating that the soldiers were right in believing there was a real threat, as 
hours before the incident another soldier had been murdered.821  
 The enquiry team addressed that the witnesses stated that McGreanery was 
unarmed, but the HET also established that the soldier who shot him accepted his 
mistake, stating that he actually believed that the victim had a rifle. In conclusion, 
the enquiry team established that he was not carrying any arms, and therefore he 
did not represent a threat that would justify the soldier’s action.822 The Aidan Mc 
Anespie case is also relevant, as he was fatally shot by a member of the British 
army, who established in his statement that he was manipulating the machine gun 
with his wet fingers and this caused them to slip and action the trigger, firing three 
shots, one of which hit Mc Anespie in the back, killing him.823 The HET carried an 
investigation and concluded that the soldier’s version “could be considered to be the 
least likely”.824 The HET main goal in this investigation was not to uncover the full 
truth, which was very unlikely to be established, but it was the best way to give 
some peace to Aidan’s family, who always contradicted the official version. 
 A consequence that the indefinite deployment of the armed forces -in terms 
of giving the security bodies the power of using lethal force when they consider it 
necessary- is the fact that corruption can arise, as the Stevens Enquiry concluded. 
This report was created with the aim of clarifying past cases where people had been 
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killed or wounded by security agents; the report also explained how the authorities 
obstructed the investigations.825 Such document stated that there was “collusion 
between the loyalist paramilitaries, the RUC and Army”.826 The Enquiry referred to 
the Patrick Finucane (a solicitor from Belfast) murder, which had been previously 
covered in detail by the Report of the Patrick Finucane Review elaborated by the Rt 
Hon Sir Desmond de Silva. Both the Desmond de Silva and the Stevens reports 
analysed the role which the Armed Forces played in Finucane’s murder, which had 
hired an officer called Brian Nelson who was involved in his and others’ murders; it 
was established that various senior Army officers knew about Nelson’s activities.827 
The Stevens report concluded that there had been a lack of accountability from 
those investigating the murders of Finucane and Lambert, as there were many 
records not available, there was evidence withheld, and the spread of intelligence 
was not up to the required standards.828 Among the recommendations made by the 
report to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) were the following: to 
introduce the National Intelligence Model; to establish a model for investigating 
terrorism with the help of an Assistant Chief Constable; an internal investigation 
department that would deal with allegations of corruption and collusion; and an 
independent audit of the recommendations dealing with the armed forces.829 
 By its part, Jennings has established that this policy has been used in two 
different ways, as he describes: 
The first is what can be termed the habitual and excessive use of force by 
ordinary members of the security forces, the most common example of which 
is teenagers being shot and killed whilst joy raiding and failing to stop at 
roadblocks. The second category involves the use of special anti-terrorist 
squads employed to stake out and kill suspected terrorists.830 
 It is important to establish that the European Court of Human Rights 
pronounced itself on an emblematic case which was centred on the shoot-to-kill 
policy. In 1992 Pearse Jordan was killed by a firearm used by the RUC after a car 
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chase; at the moment of the shooting Jordan was unarmed.831 At a domestic level, 
the relevant provision used was section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, which 
legitimises the use of lethal force in certain circumstances.832 At an international 
level the most relevant framework to this case was paragraph 9 of the UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.833 The 
applicant stated that his son had been murdered as part of the shoot-to-kill policy 
that the UK government carried on in Northern Ireland, and he established that, 
based on reports made by human rights watch and enquires such as the Stalker 
investigation, there had been various cases where suspects were killed instead of 
being arrested as part of the security practices.834  
 The court established that the rationale behind the use of lethal force on 
“absolutely necessary” situations mean that “a stricter and more complete test of 
necessity must be employed from that normally applicable when determining 
whether State action is “necessary in a democratic society””.835 The court concluded 
that there was no doubt that the deceased had been unarmed at the moment of the 
shooting.836 It must be added that the police had not carried out a truly independent 
investigation, and that the proceedings in general had not been carried in a 
deliberate way.837 They declared that article 2 of the Convention on Human Rights 
had been violated “in respect of failings in the investigative procedures concerning 
the death of Pearse Jordan”.838 
5.13.2  The McCann and Others v The United Kingdom case study 
 An emblematic case that is essential to mention and analyse in order to 
understand the scope of the alleged shoot-to-kill policy, is the McCann and Others v 
The United Kingdom (18984/91). On the 4th of March of 1988, members of the 
Special Air Service forces (SAS), arrived to Gibraltar under the assumption that a 
terrorist attack was being planned by the IRA, on the 8th of March 1988 in the British 
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peninsula of Gibraltar. As it was stated in the trial, the main aim of the operation was 
“to protect life; to foil the attempt; to arrest the offenders; the securing and safe 
custody of the prisoners”.839 According to the Commissioners operational order, the 
SAS personnel were to base their operation in “police surveillance and having 
sufficient personnel suitably equipped to deal with any contingency. It was also 
stated that the suspects were to be arrested by using minimum force, that they were 
to be disarmed, and that evidence was to be gathered for a court trial.”840 One of the 
main arguments of the soldiers in order to justify the use of force resided in the fact 
that they had been advised of the existence of a “button job”, which consisted in a 
radio-controlled device that would detonate an explosive.841  
 A statement which can be referred to the discussion of what is considered as 
reasonable and what is considered as a mere assumption, was the fact that the 
soldiers stated that the suspects would detonate the explosive if they were 
confronted, in order to achieve media success.842 Even though the suspects had a 
record of previous acts of terrorism, the assumption of giving a situation for granted 
based a potential ideological triumph on the media is not sustainable enough. The 
fact that the soldiers could not give concrete information about the supposed radio 
detonator, constituted another indicator of the lack of consistency in the defence’s 
argument. 
 One of the soldiers stated that there were different changes to the plan, and 
they had opted for disarming the suspects and try to defuse the bomb.843 According 
to the testimonies, the soldiers started following two persons (that later met with a 
third person), all of whom were identified with an 80% of accuracy.844 The soldiers 
then proceeded to inspect a car which one of the suspects had left parked near the 
place where the event was supposed to take place, and according to his testimony, 
they decided not to arrest them, but to go and examine the car left on the spot. The 
soldiers state that they concluded it was a “suspect car bomb”, because its aerial 
looked old and out of place with the model of the car, which looked “newish”, while 
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they stated that from the examination he could confirm that “they were dealing with 
a car bomb”. Another soldier also stated that he “believed 100 per cent that there 
was a bomb in the debussing area, that the suspects had remote-control devices 
and were probably armed”.845 After receiving the report of both the activities of the 
suspects and the examination of the referred vehicle, their Commissioner took the 
decision to have them arrested. In the signed form to perform such operation he 
explicitly stated to his subordinates “that you proceed with the military option which 
may include the use of lethal force for the preservation of life”.846 One point that is 
illustrates the lack of experience of the soldiers dealing with civilians is the fact that 
they had to be trained by the police on the procedures to arrest a person. During the 
training they were taught to approach the citizens with their weapons uncovered and 
say “Stop. Police; hands up”847 (this is textually what the soldiers’ testimony stated, 
which implies the fact that they were not identifying properly, as they were not 
members of the constabularies, but of Her Majesty’s forces, which violated section 
12(2) of the EPA). 
 One of the soldiers testified that as he was approaching McCann to make 
the arrest, this one made a sudden movement which the soldier interpreted as a 
potential threat, as he thought that he might activate the explosive, and he and 
another soldier shot him in the back (even though as he stated, the suspect was not 
farther than three metres away from him848). The armed personnel then established 
that when Farrell saw this she made an attempt to grab her bag (they also thought 
that she might tried to activate the bomb), so the second soldier fired her until she 
was lying on the ground; one of the soldiers expressed that he killed McCann in 
order to “stop him becoming a threat and detonating his bomb”.849 Meanwhile, 
Savage was being approached by two other soldiers, and according to their 
testimonies, when they heard the gun shots being shot at a nearby point (where his 
previous companions were getting shot) he reached out for his hip area (in his right 
side), and one of the soldiers shot him a total of 9 times.850 One of the militaries 
established that the intention was to kill him because that was the training they had 
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received.851 The attack commander also confirmed this, as he stated that this was 
the standard procedure for any soldier who opened fire.852  
 After these events, the security forces searched the bodies of the three 
bodies and Farrell’s handbag. They did not find any detonators or arms,853 although, 
they did find a pair of keys with a registration number in the handbag. This number 
was used to locate a car where the Spanish police found another pair of keys 
belonging to another car that indeed contained an explosive device.854 During the 
investigation of the murders the representative of the applicants made questions 
and inquired the theory of the UK government giving the order to shoot the suspects 
beforehand; all of the soldiers involved (including the commander) denied that such 
orders had been given with anticipation.855 After hearing the testimonies from the 
soldiers and the coroner, the jury’s verdict was lawfull killing and the applicants 
started actions in the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland against the Ministry 
of Defence.856  
 It is relevant for the legal scope of the case to establish that the 
Commissioner of Police had annexed a document -along with the details of the 
operation-, called “Firearms - rules of engagement”, which contained the main 
points in order to fire a gun, and also another guide for police officers titled 
“Firearms: Use by Police” was attached. At an international level the Court based 
the use of firearms mainly under article 9 of UN Force and Firearms Principals.857 In 
the topic of the use of lethal force by members of the State, the court established 
that paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Convention does not concern only with 
intentional killing, but the real intention behind such paragraph is to describe when 
the use of force, “which may result, as an unintended outcome, in the deprivation of 
life”.858 
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 Among the arguments that the applicants submitted was the statement that 
the murders had been the result of the incompetence of the anti-terrorist operation, 
which did not respect the right to life of the deceased. They also pleaded for the 
court to examine the possible liability of the UK government, as the behaviour of the 
soldiers might have been a consequence of false information received.859 By its 
part, the UK government justified the soldiers’ actions stating that these were 
absolutely necessary in order to prevent a large number of causalities, as they 
stated that the fast movement in the suspects arms when they were confronted with 
the soldiers gave a reasonable suspicion to think that they were trying to activate 
the explosive, a fact that was corroborated by witnesses.860 They also established 
that the background they had of the suspects and the previous activities of the IRA 
gave them enough information to consider the persons killed as a threat to the 
Gibraltar society.861 The Commission established that this concern for the lives of 
the people in Gibraltar was reasonable enough to shoot the suspects as prevention 
for unlawful violence. The fact that there was enough of a possibility for the 
suspects to activate a bomb was also taken into account by the commission as a 
sign that the use of lethal force was justified.862 
 Finally, the court’s assessment established that the military was in a very 
delicate situation as they had to protect the civilian population, but they also had to 
follow the protocols for the use of force established in the law. They also stated that 
it was impossible for the armed forces to have full information on the suspects’ 
plans and motivations.863 The Court also addressed that the soldiers had acted in 
good faith, truly believing that the suspects carried weapons and an explosive; plus, 
all the personnel involved admitted that they had aimed to kill the suspects.864 It was 
established that the soldiers had made an attempt to arrest the suspects as a first 
option, and the effort to proceed with this plan was corroborated.865 The fact that 
neither of the soldiers was an expert on explosives was also taken to the court as 
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an argument to consider that the use of lethal force could not be avoided.866 
However, although the Court considered the fact that the military personnel did in 
fact establish that they had no other resource but to open fire when they tried to 
detain the suspects, they also addressed the fact that the deceased were given 
entrance to Gibraltar knowing that such persons where already been profiled by the 
security forces, and that a surveillance team at the border, which collaborated with 
an arrest group existed.867  
 The Court established there had been a “serious miscalculation by those 
responsible for controlling the operation”,868 as the government’s argument stated 
that at the time of their arrival to Gibraltar they still did not have enough elements to 
press charges against them, but the majority of the judges considered that the 
safety of Gibraltar’s population was a priority. By consequence, if there were any 
suspects of terrorism entering the country, they should have been stopped at that 
moment.869 The soldiers’ testimony which stated that they were indeed trained to kill 
at their first reflex was considered by the court as below the standards that security 
forces should have in contemporary democratic societies, even in the case of 
suspects of terrorism.870 For this reasons, the Court established by majority871 that 
there had been a breach of article 2 paragraph 2, established in the European 
Convention of Human Rights.872 Regarding this article, the Council of Europe 
developed an analysis on The Right to Life on their series of Human rights 
handbooks. On the topic of the use of lethal force by State agents, Korff references 
article 148 of the McCann and Others v The United Kingdom case, regarding the 
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intention of article 2-2 to describe under what conditions can the use of force be 
exercised.873 
 The main point to address here is the study of rights violated that the court 
did, and by their judgement one can infer that they established that it was preferable 
to violate certain rights such as freedom of movement. After all, by violating “less 
fundamental” rights, the right of life of both the population and the terrorists 
themselves would have been more protected. The fact that the suspects did not 
carry any weapons or explosives with them, and they were shot by the security 
forces just because it was a natural reflex for them, provided the argument that 
there was indeed a shoot-to-kill policy a strong support. This was a behaviour which 
was taught to the soldiers while in their training; in modern democratic systems, the 
focus on the rights of all civilians -even those suspected or accused of a crime- 
must be a priority of the state. A formal training in matters of human rights was 
encouraged to be trained in the military culture. The Report of the Independent 
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland established that it was necessary to 
minimize the risks for the security forces, but if the State wanted to normalise the 
situation they would have to move towards a goal that involved routinely unarmed 
police, which should be subjected to periodical reviews that analysed the current 
situations.874 
5.14 The violation of human rights on Northern Ireland 
The context of the human rights violated in Northern Ireland and the long-
lasting situation of unconventional provisions which were set up in order to attend 
what was considered an emergency situation should be addressed here. In this part 
of the chapter the emergency provisions and its consequence on human rights 
violations will be analysed besides the case studies of citizens whose fundamental 
rights were jeopardised or blatantly violated. An important aspect to consider  was 
the fact that both the PTA and the EPA were intended to be used in a temporal way, 
as a state of emergency policy cannot be indefinite (it was until the year 2000, when 
the PTA changed its scope to focus on terrorism on a global scale, and the EPA 
went through various amendments until the Good Friday Agreement took place in 
1998, that most of the EPA structure was repealed; now the Civil Contingencies Act 
2004 would be the framework which is most related to the EPA). The conflict in 
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Northern Ireland went through different stages; not only in the development of the 
IRA’s development, but also in the way that the British government responded and 
the reforms that they introduced in order for the police to take the primacy over 
security duties in a gradual way.  
The struggle of human rights activists to have the army removed from the 
main security duties took various years; Hillyard points out that apart from the 
emergency provisions established, a strategy of military enforcement was 
developed on par.875 This statement is supported by the figures that the author 
presents: when the British army was first deployed in 1969, the number of 
constabularies consisted of 3,044 officers who had thousands of auxiliary members, 
but only 100 were full-time employees. By 1973 the figure had gone up to almost 
35,000 security members, with the majority being full-time workers. By 1990, the 
whole security policy had involved the work of an estimated 21,500-23,000 security 
forces.876 The primacy of the army was stronger between 1972 and 1976, as it was 
estimated that 80 per cent of the security personnel who were in the Northern Irish 
streets were military personnel. It was until then-Secretary of State Merlyn Rees 
changed the strategy and strengthened the constabularies in order to put them at 
the front of the security tasks.877 Hillyard points that the majority of constabularies 
were Protestant, stating that employment in security had become a very important 
matter to the community, and added that this situation created “a vested interest in 
the continuing emergency”878 for the Protestants. The emergency situation that gave 
way to the legislation of the referred provisions was seen by many as the only 
option left, because the acts of terrorism committed by the IRA were considered as 
a way to overthrow the government in turn.879 A change in the structure of security 
was accompanied by a change in the view of seeing the political actions as a 
different type of crime, as at first it was seen as a matter of national identity.880 This 
was clearly a way of simplifying not only the social repercussions of the security 
strategy, but also to change the structure of the legal paths developed to deal with 
this issue. 
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5.14.1 The Northern Irish emergency legislation and its consequences on 
human rights 
According to Human Rights Watch the emergency regime violated civil 
liberties through the Emergency Provisions Acts and the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act, both of which were used to intimidate and harass people.881 The same report 
also established that “emergency laws, such as those in force in Northern Ireland, 
often serve to perpetuate political violence by creating an environment in which 
individual human rights are routinely violated”.882 The Report of the Independent 
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland also established the government to 
drop the emergency legislation in favour of the same law as the rest of the UK when 
the British Government issued a document883 which established that a new 
legislation concerning terrorism should be issued with the same standards for all the 
UK.  
The commission led by Asmal expressed that one of the main problems that 
came as a consequence of the settling of emergency provisions was the lack of 
protection from abuse of the security forces, as the strategy had various 
consequences including situations of injustice, lack of independence at the time of 
detention, and the absence of a system that could be implemented to file complaints 
against the security officers.884 The commission explained that while many legal 
changes had been made in order to deal with the political violence, very few reforms 
had been done in order to protect society from abuses, especially the non-state 
actors who were responsible for the violence constituted a minority in the Northern 
Irish society.  
The analysis by the commission finished the topic of emergency powers 
stating that these provisions did not work in order to stop the violence, but only a 
political settlement would indeed put an end to the conflict.885 The rationale behind 
this argument was that violence could not be contested with more violence, as the 
conflict had a political origin. Commissioner Professor Richard Falk expressed that 
the security strategy employed by the State needed to have the support from the 
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Northern Irish community, and because of this the emergency provisions should 
only be applied when absolutely needed, as transparency and publicity were 
important factors to be taken into account (he explained that the strategy needed to 
gain more popular support, and for this reason the stop and search mechanisms 
needed to be reformed). We can conclude establishing that the Northern Irish 
security strategy lost most of its support when it interfered with the rights of people 
who were not connected to the parties in conflict. If a strategy affects the normal life 
of the common citizen, support will decrease the longer such strategy is maintained 
without reforms that guarantee the minimum protection to citizens’ fundamental 
rights. 
5.15  The State’s duty to investigate deaths in which officials are involved 
 Article 2 of the ECHR has addressed three duties on the State;886 among 
them is the obligation of the State to investigate any deaths in which State officers 
are involved. The McCann v UK case referenced article 9 of the Principles on the 
Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary 
Executions,887 as the Court established that in order for the State to compel with 
article 2 of the ECHR, that “the State must provide an effective ex post facto 
procedure for establishing the facts surrounding a killing by agents of the State 
through an independent judicial process”.888In R (Middleton) v West Somerset 
Coroner, the United Kingdom House of Lords addressed that the procedure of an 
investigation “must work in practice and must fulfil the purpose for which the 
investigation is established”.889  
 The current requirements for the State regarding the protection of its 
citizens’ life has gone even beyond the deaths caused directly by officials; in 
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Anguelova v Bulgaria, the ECtHR established that “Persons in custody are in a 
vulnerable position and the authorities are under an obligation to account for their 
treatment. Consequently, where an individual is taken into police custody in good 
health but later dies, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation 
of the events leading to his death”.890 It can be established that the State has the 
obligation to procure the safety of the citizens when they are in the reach and 
physical sphere not only of its agents themselves, but also inside or within the 
scope of institutional protection. The duty to investigate in relation to art 2 of ECHR 
was determinant in subsequent trials in Northern Ireland, to grant access to justice 
to the victims of State officials.891 
5.16 The rights of the soldiers 
 To end this chapter, the importance of an integral system that guarantees 
respect to the soldiers’ human rights needs to be discussed. An integral part of 
modern democratic military systems is focused on the basic rights of military 
personnel, whether the subject is a commander or a private, as the rank is irrelevant 
in this matter. As members of an institution in charge of one of the most complex 
and high-risk tasks in any society, an adequate system that guarantees not only the 
fulfilment of their tasks but also the human rights of their own personnel is essential. 
 Which is the fundamental base for the modern status of the armed personnel 
that can be used to compare past and present conditions of the army, both in the 
Northern Irish and the Mexican case? The discussion about Germany in the 
previous chapter brought a basic theoretical approach which has been materialised 
in the concept of the “citizen in uniform”, which, as its paragraph 132 reads, 
established that “a citizen serving in the armed forces makes a personal contribution 
to the protection of freedom and the safeguarding of peace while at the same time 
retaining his rights as a citizen., to the extent that the necessities of military service 
arising from the mission make restrictions inevitable”.892 As the Innere Führung 
address in its fundaments, there are essential matters which should be addressed 
when developing the legal and sociological background of any institution, and 
human rights should to be a top priority. The Innere Führung establishes the 
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“preservation of peace in freedom”,893 which is considered a basic ground for the 
legitimacy and democratic order of the armed forces.  
 The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security is 
relevant here. This framework was established in 1994 and it has been considered 
a breakthrough in security affairs that addressed military nature. The US 
Department of State conceives this code is the commitment of “States, inter alia, to 
maintain only such military capacities as are commensurate with legitimate 
individual or collective security needs, and stresses the right of each participating 
State to freely determine its security interests and to choose its own security 
arrangements - including treaties and alliances”.894 Leigh and Born establish four 
main principles established in different articles contained in the framework:  
The primacy of constitutional civilian power over military power (paragraphs 
21-26); the subjection of armed forces to international humanitarian law 
(paragraphs 29-31 and 34-35); respect for the human rights of members of 
the armed forces (paragraphs 23, 27-28, and 32-33); and limits over the 
domestic use of force to what is commensurate to their legal mission and 
restricting interference with the peaceful and lawful exercise of human rights 
(paragraphs 36-37).895 
 It can be stated that these primacies are the base for any democratic army, 
as such principles are minimums required to build a positive relationship with civil 
society in the case of deployment, and even more important when the conflict has a 
domestic nature. 
 The Code of Conduct explicitly establishes essential standards for States, as 
its paragraph 32 states that “Each participating State will ensure that military, 
paramilitary and security forces personnel will be able to enjoy and exercise their 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as reflected in CSCE documents and 
international law, in conformity with relevant constitutional and legal provisions and 
with the requirements of service.”896 Indeed, it is important, as Leigh and Born point 
out, that the principles of this code (in particular, the “citizen in uniform” aspect), are 
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introduced in different ways, depending on each country’s particular context.897 This 
is where the issue that gave birth to the deployment in Northern Ireland and Mexico 
differed drastically, as the counter-insurgency strategy against the IRA was created 
with a very different outcome in mind that the Mexican strategy set to fight 
organised drug cartels. The same authors also establish that the same freedoms 
and rights applied to common citizens should also be applied to the armed 
personnel. As Leigh and Bonn mention, establishing a clear-structured human rights 
framework prevents the governments from misusing the army in prejudice of the 
population.898  
 During the “troubles” in Northern Ireland various allegations of human rights 
abuses committed by the British army were reported by civilians; such allegations 
included strip-searching, sexual assault, psychological torture (such as the 
exhibition of pictures featuring mutilated limbs), death threats, physical assault, and 
deprivation of medicines to the ill.899 These abuses took part mostly in detention 
centres, which also showed the institutional fragility of the strategy dealing with the 
handling of suspects. The animosity between the civilians and the British army in 
everyday life during the “troubles” increased in hostility as the deployment continued 
with the same strategy; as one marine described: “We used to go out on patrol 
every night and have a gunfight, every night, guaranteed. You’d go round next 
morning doing the daytime patrols and you’d get a character standing at a doorway 
saying, ‘Get any of us last night? Try again tonight.’ And you knew he would too.”900 
Another sergeant testified the following: “…whatever we did would be interpreted as 
the exact opposite: if you helped an old lady across the Falls Road you were trying 
to push her in front of a taxi – there were no ifs or buts. We were normal everyday 
blokes, professional blokes, doing a job, like what a priest does – it’s a vocation to 
be a good soldier, a soldier in Northern Ireland. Nobody else could do that job – the 
Yanks, forget it, that’s a joke; the UN, forget it, they wouldn’t understand, wouldn’t 
have the mentality. The British tom is so vastly underrated by our own people.”901 
Such recollections were the result of a failed strategy, which increased the sense of 
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abandonment that the soldiers felt from the political leaders that took the most 
important decisions regarding the security policies. 
 As stated above, the guidelines contained in the Code of Conduct provision 
are relevant in any operation where the armed forces are deployed, because they 
point out the obligation of States to adapt their domestic legislations and institution 
regulations to the standards of such code; Leigh and Born have considered the 
following paragraphs as the most relevant in matters of human rights for the 
soldiers902: paragraph 23, which establishes the need of political neutrality in the 
fulfilment of their personnel’s civil rights. This obligation has as its main goal the 
guaranteeing of an equal treat to every citizen when the armed forces deal with an 
emergency or security threat. As it will be seen, this principle was not fulfilled during 
the years of the “troubles” in Northern Ireland. Arthur903 collected hundreds of 
testimonies of military personnel of all ranks who were deployed during the 70s and 
80s in Northern Ireland, and among such testimonies were allegations which 
indicated that soldiers were not given a full explanation of the political conflict which 
was taking place, as they were only given orders to fight the IRA. One Corporal 
explained it in the following way: “Before, most English soldiers were not really 
aware of the Protestant/Catholic divide; that was a political issue. They didn’t like 
the Catholics because the IRA came from there, and because they only saw 
Catholics in conflictual situations, but when they faced the Protestants in Belfast 
they began to see the other side of the picture, to understand the ways in which 
Catholics were discriminated against.”904 This view was a consequence of a lack of 
understanding of the political context, which had a consequence the escalade in 
violence in Northern Ireland. This contrasts with the approach that the German 
military took, where they were educated on the social context they were part of, in 
order to politicise the soldiers.905 
 Until what extent the basic human rights of the soldiers can be limited? 
There might be obvious concepts such as the right to life that would be pointless to 
question, but there are certain rights such as the right of being treated with dignity 
(article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant establishes this as “degrading 
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treatment”906), which tends to be a usual complaint made by the armed personnel 
every time they are deployed on long missions. The Northern Irish soldiers had a 
sense of abandonment from their political heads; as a Lieutenant stated, “The men 
felt very much that they were being used…… the British soldier in a far-flung post 
somewhere, where the climate is bloody awful, the equipment they need doesn’t 
arrive, the press they get is bad press and the politicians at home don’t care 
anyway. There is a tremendous ‘useful resignation’ about the British soldier.”907 
Article 8 (2) (b) (xxi) defines degrading treatment as “the severity of the humiliation, 
degradation or other violation was of such degree as to be generally recognized as 
an outrage upon personal dignity”.908 If we use the “citizen in uniform” concept as a 
base to judge the complaints of the British soldiers deployed in Northern Ireland, a 
violation of this right can be established, as the behaviour of the British State 
jeopardised the army’s morale and did not provide them with enough support on 
mission that involved such a high risk. Leigh and Born also establish that adequate 
training is highly important for military personnel, not only in technical and practical 
matters, but also in human rights law; according to the authors, this is will enable a 
better relation between troops,909 and it can be added that a change in the dynamic 
of their inner-relationships would also impact in their duty. The phrase “useful 
resignation” is also an indicator of the level of dissatisfaction and lack of 
conscientious objection that members of the British army suffered from. Regarding 
this concept, it is relevant to address the Innere Führung and its guideline 5, which 
refers to matters regarding order and obedience. The referred provision establishes 
that in order to obey orders from their superiors the personnel must proceed in a 
conscientiously way, always taking into account that obedience has its limits.910 A 
co-relation between freedom in decision-taking and a higher morale can be 
established, as the sense of duty and obedience is not taken with a feeling of 
resignation (which impacts in the way of their interaction with civilians). 
 The importance of an adequate training is essential to set a standard of 
behaviour and a critical stance about the responsibilities that being a soldier implies. 
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Setting a standard is important for the reason that each soldier comes from different 
background and life-experiences, a fact that influences their behaviour. Two 
testimonies from the British army exemplify this last statement: a corporal stated 
that soldiers were not required in Northern Ireland. Instead, he said, there should be 
“peacekeepers, policemen, civilians who are nice to people twenty-four hours a day; 
diplomats, whatever. But not soldiers; I mean, they gave me thousands and 
thousands of pounds’ worth of training to get me to this stage and I’m wasted on a 
street in Belfast”.911 Meanwhile, another corporal expressed the following: “get the 
idea that many soldiers go to Northern Ireland with big expectations and come back 
disappointed because they haven’t fired a shot. It’s a bit like going to Spain and 
coming back without a suntan”.912 These two examples from members of the same 
rank are self-explanatory: both soldiers viewed the conflict from opposite 
perspectives; this underlines the importance of developing human rights training, as 
a minimum standard is necessary in every troop. 
5.17  Conclusions 
 The violent relation between two well-defined groups (Protestants and 
Catholics) proved to be a much more difficult task for both the Northern Irish and 
British governments than what they expected. The first attempts at restabilising 
peace during the 1960s did not work and the British Army had to aid in counter-
terrorism tasks. As the facts can prove, there was not a lack of political will from the 
State in order to settle the internal disputes that polarised the Northern Irish society, 
but the government did take decades in order to understand that the root of the 
conflict could not be solved just by legal and institutional reforms; a political 
settlement was also needed. The Londonderry march and Bloody Sunday were the 
consequences of the lack of political analysis of the real scope of the situation done 
by the government; it should be noted that the security strategy of strong 
enforcement became more severe after these events. The Hunt report was one of 
the first steps to reform the security strategy, but these measures would be the start 
of an era of enormous instability for the Northern Irish society and the UK 
government. 
 The emergency regime only gave brief positive results before new terrorist 
tactics were learned and employed. Plus, commissions such as the Stevens report 
established that as time passed the security bodies became more engaged in 
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corruption and more resistant to be subjected to accountability reports. One lesson 
that can be taught is that the army’s legitimacy decreases the longer they are 
deployed on a determined territory, especially when they are confronted with non-
state actors in a domestic Conflict. The fact that analysts like Coogan established 
that the number of soldiers was disproportionate to the number of armed 
Republicans, shows that civil-military relations during the 1970s in Northern Ireland 
were far from achieving positive cooperation. It can be stated that one of the most 
positive decisions taken was the gradual replacement of the army by civilian 
security bodies, as the shoot-to-kill policy antagonised both sides of the conflict and 
increased the violent reaction from the terrorists. 
 Internment was another controversial measure which needed to be replaced 
in a short space of time, as the number of mistakes and innocents that were 
subjected to human rights violations contrasted with the State’s rhetoric of searching 
for peace. The use of the “five techniques” and other methods of torture only 
created more animosity between the nationalists and the government; the issue of 
the lack of an efficient system of accountability arises here again, as the abuses 
committed in the detention centres were left in a state of impunity most of the time. 
Regarding the Diplock Courts, it can be stated that they were in fact very useful, as 
it was proved that the behaviour of the judges did not change in a radical way when 
they received more power and control over the evidence in a trial. The powers of 
stop and search, and arrest had highly negative consequences, as it alienated both 
the Catholic and the Protestant community against the security forces who were in 
charge of these measures due to the high level of harassment and assault 
committed in public spaces. The concept of what was the reasonable suspicion to 
search and eventually arrest a citizen was the subject of controversy, and without a 
defined mechanism it proved to create more animosity between the security forces 
and the Northern Irish population. 
 The Northern Irish experience also shows that the longer a state of 
emergency is active, the more society gets affected. Large parts of society are 
directly and indirectly damaged by domestic armed conflicts, and as security 
measures increase their enforcement, the number of human rights violations rises. 
Northern Ireland has been establishing various commissions of truth, which most of 
the time are the only way in which the victims of State abuse and their relatives can 
access to justice, even if it is in a symbolic way. If the establishment of an 
emergency regime does not have a well-established plan, it can become the main 
source for justifying human rights violations. 
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 The events unfolded as a consequence of the granting of special powers to 
the security forces (and in particular the armed forces, as these are trained to react 
more violently to aggressions) needed to be accompanied by very strict limits, and 
the resource to use lethal force should have been avoided until there was no other 
option left; the reason behind this argument is to avoid the violation of human rights 
as much as possible. It is understandable that in a violent domestic conflict there will 
be some degree of collateral damage, but the State’s obligation is to maintain the 
rule of law and respect for fundamental rights in order to make the breaching of 
them an exception, and avoid normalising the lack of respect for human rights. 
The UK government has learned lessons from the Northern Irish experience, 
as they have currently developed the Joint Doctrine Publication, especially made for 
dealing with the need of the UK army to detain or capture citizens, both in an 
international or non-international conflict. Domestic intervention is specifically stated 
in Part 2 paragraph 6 of the Operations in the UK: A Guide for Civil Responders, 
which refers us to the Emergency Powers Act 1964, in which the army can be 
granted special attributions under a certain context.913 This document states that the 
legal grounds to develop a military operation are: a United Nations Security Council 
Resolution; a humanitarian intervention; the consent of the recognised government 
of a host nation; and state self-defence.914 In the case an internal armed conflict, the 
Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict establishes article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions 1949, and the Additional Protocol II 1977 as the main 
provisions where the basic rules are.915 The same document states in its section 
15.10 and 15.10.1 that there is a duty to protect persons who are not active in the 
hostilities, and includes both civilians and combatants who have surrendered or are 
out of action.916 Finally, the soldiers are forbidden to displace civilians unless there 
are military reasons for this, and also evacuate them without any type of 
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selectiveness.917 This would be a more descripted text about the deployment in the 
armed forces, which at a domestic level is contemplated in the Civil Contingencies 
Act,918 which states that an Act of Parliament or a Royal Prerogative can enable the 
Defence Council to deploy the armed forces, or it can establish a provision to 
enable such deployment. 
To show and additional contemporary example, the British government has 
developed the United Kingdom Operations (UK Ops), which include the figure 
known as the Defence contribution to resilience. As the official document states, the 
term resilience in military terms can be described as “the degree to which people 
and capabilities will be able to withstand, or recover quickly from difficult situations; 
wherever possible, capabilities, systems and munitions that have utility across a 
range of activities, high levels of reliability and robustness should be procured”.919 In 
the legal scope, the Civil Contingencies Act establishes in its section 19(c) that “war, 
or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the United Kingdom”, will be 
considered an emergency.920 The UK Ops also states in the document that criminal 
activity should receive a civil response, but under certain circumstances military 
force might need to be applied.921 The Civil Contingencies Act clearly specifies the 
procedures and requirements that are needed to implement emergency measures; 
this act has a strictly civilian nature which would set the limits from the armed forces 
under Common Law rules. 
 Finally, regarding the rights of the soldiers, it should be pointed that 
standards on human rights training for the armed personnel did not exist when the 
British army was deployed, as the scope that some soldiers had differed drastically 
between them. It should be added that before deploying troops in a conflict which 
had primarily a political origin, the whole context should be explained to everyone 
participating as a member of a security body, as the testimonies of the military 
personnel state that most of them did not understand the cause that divided the 
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Northern Irish society. Apart from the adequate human rights training, institutional 
reforms which ensured that the military had a “citizen in uniform” quality should have 
been established before the deployment. 
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Chapter VI 
6. The German post-WII institutional reforms, the emergency 
powers declared in Northern Ireland, and their potential 
implementation in Mexico: a comparative study 
 
The central goal of this project is to analyse the civil-military reforms in 
Germany and Northern Ireland, addressed in the previous chapters, and use them 
as the base for a comparative study with the current institutional and legal military 
system in Mexico. Both European countries faced regarding issues such as lack of 
accountability and human rights abuses by their armed forces; this draws similarities 
with the current context that has been striking Mexican society for the past 8 years. 
One of the main points that should be clarified in this introduction is the fact that this 
is not a comparative study between Germany and Northern Ireland, but instead both 
countries are compared to Mexico in different aspects. The German institutional 
reforms that allowed the development of highly democratic controls over its armed 
forces will be contrasted with the current system of institutions that monitor the army 
in Mexico. Regarding Northern Ireland, the different emergency provisions, its 
subsequent amendments, and also figures like Internment will be compared against 
the Mexican current legal system that allowed the deployment of the army.  
Germany922 has been selected as one of the countries to develop a 
comparative study. In this case, the institutional reforms concerning the armed 
forces, and its democratic transition that took place after World War II, are the 
objects of study. Their armed forces went through a complete restructuring, as the 
army which served during the Nazi regime was completely dismantled after WWII, 
and was reinstalled until 1954 under the name of Bundeswehr.923 The main ideology 
behind this restructuring was the development of a strong civilian control in order to 
avoid repeating the Nazi experience, where the executive had a complete control 
over the army and there were no mechanisms to prevent this.  
Subsequently, the concept of the “citizen in uniform” was created in order to 
provide the soldier with the same rights and obligations as the civilian security 
                                                          
922 Refer to heading 4.1. “The German post WWII military reforms: a lesson for the Mexican 
case?” 
923 G Nolte, H Krieger (n 532) 341 
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forces and civil society in general. This included mechanisms that gave armed 
personnel more control over their own actions and the orders they received from 
their superiors. The increase in the soldiers’ rights is also a matter of comparison, 
as highly defined structures have been developed for them to issue complaints. The 
Innere Führung that was created in Germany will be the source of comparison with 
the current Mexican standards, along with figures such as the military ombudsman 
and the civilian minister of defence (it should be noted that at the moment of this 
writing, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen occupies such position, being the first woman in 
the history of Germany who is appointed as a Minister of Defence924). The 
constitutional provisions, in which the relationship between the executive, the 
legislative and the armed forces are based, are also part of this study. These 
provisions have been successful to secure the army from being used without the 
consent of both powers, with the legislative having more control over it than the 
executive.  
Comparing the reforms done in Germany with the current Mexican 
institutional ground is important due to the high number of civilian complaints 
regarding the lack of accountability of the armed forces in Mexico. In the first 
chapter of this research, a number of emblematic cases were referenced and 
explained in detail, but more events of high relevance have taken place since then. 
Human Rights Watch have addressed various events, such as the disappearance of 
43 students in the southern city of Iguala (in which HRW documented allegations 
that the students were seen 100 metres from a military base925), and the Tlatlaya 
case, where military personnel executed more than 20 persons inside a warehouse, 
and where the National Human Rights Commission determined that approximately 
12 persons were extrajudicially executed926. There are more recent cases where 
security forces are involved, but for the purpose of this research the focus is kept on 
cases where the army was involved. As it has been stated in previous chapters, a 
recent reform has allowed civilian courts to try military personnel who are involved in 
human rights abuses of civilians, but at the moment of this writing there has not 
                                                          
924 “Ursula von der Leyen” (Federal Ministry of Defence 15 January 2014) 
<http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9
pNyydL3czLzM4pLUoszSXL2U1KJ4GF-
vtKi4NCcxviw_Lx4knpNamZqnX5DtqAgA2ZXRuQ!!/> accessed 13 June 2015 
925 “Mexico: Delays, Cover-Up Mar Atrocities Response” (Human Rights Watch ), 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/07/mexico-delays-cover-mar-atrocities-response> 
accessed 13 June 2015 
926 ibid 
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been a judgment pronounced on such cases. These are examples that illustrate the 
current weaknesses in the institutional structures in Mexico, which this research 
attempts to compare with the German current policies, in order to adapt and create 
the possibility of applying selected figures from this system to the Mexican one. 
In the case of Northern Ireland, the main parallels with Mexico reside in the 
role of the armed forces as the primary security bodies fighting against a non-State 
actor. In the first case it was the Irish Republican Army, and in the Mexican context 
the drug cartels are the groups clashing with the State forces. As it has been 
exposed in the previous chapter, we need to take into account the fact that the 
conflict in Northern Ireland had a clearly defined political nature, as the source of the 
conflict was the polarisation between the Republican and the Loyalist community, 
with all its consequences. On the other hand, the security conflict in Mexico has a 
global scope if seen from a geopolitical point of view (as it as explained before in 
this research, the drug conflict in Mexico would not be understood without this 
country’s vicinity to the United States), and the non-State actor that the security 
bodies are fighting against has a defined illegal goal: the production, distribution and 
selling of drugs.  
Taking this into account, the emergency powers established in Northern 
Ireland had as an unwanted consequence the rise of human rights abuses across 
the main sites of the conflict, but the legal provisions established were more 
structured and defined than their Mexican counterparts. The fact that State officers 
were tried and sentenced during the most conflictive era also indicated less 
tolerance for impunity, another matter for concern in Mexico at the moment. How did 
the Northern Irish society reacted to the deployment of the armed forces in contrast 
with the Mexican society? How does the figure of internment compare to the figure 
of arraigo (“hold”) in Mexico, and which have the consequences been? How were 
the legal provisions that gave birth to the arrest, and stop and search polices 
compared to the ones in Mexico? The recommendations done to Northern Ireland 
about human rights will also be contrasted with the ones that Mexico has received, 
and the actions that each country had. 
It is essential to address the fact that the domestic actors who confronted the 
State in Northern Ireland had identifiable political goals, whereas the non-State 
actors in Mexico (organised drug-cartels) have economic profit as their main goal. 
How can these differences allow a legal comparison? The answer is found in the 
methodology selected for this comparison, as the study is only based on the legal 
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provisions that were employed to activate emergency measures, both in Northern 
Ireland and Mexico, and the severe consequences that these had on sectors of the 
population whose human rights were violated. Even within the legal sphere, only 
relevant parts of the systems were compared, as a microcomparison927 was 
selected as a methodological tool to implement the legal comparison. Also, only 
elements of the systems whose application (or eradication, like the Diplock Courts) 
proved to be successful in Northern Ireland, are used for this comparison, as the 
functionality928 approach that was selected, in order to make a de lege ferenda/de 
lege lata929 adaption to the Mexican legal system. Finally, this comparison used 
refined positivism,930 which takes the cultural context of the objects in comparison 
into account, and used an intracultural931 approach to select elements that both of 
the contexts analysed have in common. For this reason, the political settlements 
that took part in Northern Ireland are not analysed, but this does not affect the legal 
comparison at all. 
6.1 Fundamental Rights and emergencies in Germany and Mexico 
Germany and Mexico both share the same type of State structure: the 
republic; hence, the supreme legal institution in both countries is the constitution 
(called Basic Law in Germany, and Political Constitution in Mexico). It is the most 
important body of rules in a hierarchical order, and the one that establishes the 
essential attributions for the executive, legislative and judicial powers. It is 
appropriate to begin this study establishing what both constitutions establish about 
the use of the armed forces in non-international conflicts and states of emergency. 
There are important differences between the German and the Mexican State in 
terms of the powers that the executive and legislative powers have, and in terms of 
making use of the armed forces for emergency situations. 
The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany932 establish the cases in 
which the armed forces will be used. As the provisions state, the limits and 
                                                          
927 Zweigert, Kötz (n 22) 
928 ibid 34 
929 J Karhu (n 32) 80-81 
930 M Zirk-Sadowski (n 27) 25 
931 P da Cruz (n 37) 235 
932 Article 87a 
[Armed Forces]  
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situations in which the army can intervene for aiding civilian forces are clearly 
defined. In the Mexican Political Constitution, article 89 fractions VI933 is the 
provision in which ex-president Felipe Calderón based himself, as the supreme 
commander of the armed forces, in order to use them justifying his decision by 
establishing that organised crime constituted a threat to society in general. 
How do the previous provisions impact the concepts of accountability in 
Mexico? 
Provisions like article 87a of the German Basic Law do not exist in the 
Mexican Constitution, as the power of using the army resides in the federal 
executive. Therefore, it is considered that the need for the approval of a majority of 
both chambers of Senators and Deputies should be essential in order to deploy the 
armed forces. There is a concept which is consistent in both constitutions, although 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(1) …The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defence….  
(2) Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent expressly 
permitted by this Basic Law.  
(3) During a state of defence or a state of tension the Armed Forces shall have the power to 
protect civilian property and to perform traffic control functions to the extent necessary to 
accomplish their defence mission. Moreover, during a state of defence or a state of tension, 
the Armed Forces may also be authorised to support police measures for the protection of 
civilian property; in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent 
authorities.  
(4) ….if the conditions referred to in paragraph (2) of Article 91  obtain and the police forces 
and the Federal Border Police prove inadequate, may employ the Armed Forces to support 
the police and the Federal Border Police in protecting civilian property and in combating 
organised armed insurgents. Any such employment of the Armed Forces shall be 
discontinued if the Bundestag or the Bundesrat so demands….. 
Art. 115a   
Any determination that the federal territory is under attack by armed force or imminently 
threatened with such an attack (state of defence) shall be made by the Bundestag with the 
consent of the Bundesrat. Such determination shall be made on application of the Federal 
Government and shall require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which shall include at 
least a majority of the Members of the Bundestag. 
Article 115b 
[Power of command of the Federal Chancellor] 
Upon the promulgation of a state of defence the power of command over the Armed Forces 
shall pass to the Federal Chancellor. 
933 Art. 89: The faculties and obligations of the president are the following: 
Fraction VI: Preserving national security, in the terms of the respective law, and dispose of 
the totality of the Armed Forces meaning the Army, the Navy and the Aerial Force for 
internal security and external defence of the Federation. 
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with noticeable differences in their development and legislative process. Article 
115b of the German Basic Law and Article 89 fraction VI of the Mexican Constitution 
both establish that the federal executives can have the command of the armed 
forces. The fundamental difference is that the German Basic Law states that the 
Federal Chancellor can take command of the armed forces only after a State of 
Defence is declared, whereas the Mexican Constitution establishes that the 
command of the armed forces can always be used to preserve national security. 
This last statement is highly open to interpretation and does not establish any clear 
conditions in order to take command of the army.  
 The lack of a constitutional structure that focuses on the armed forces and 
the use that the State can make of them emergency situations, or internal armed 
conflicts, has an impact in the democratic order that Mexico wants to achieve. It has 
been 10 years after the first military deployment as part of the current security 
strategy, and no mechanism of civilian control has been developed. The result is a 
conflict between an important sector of society and the armed forces, based on the 
fact that hundreds of complaints of human rights abuses attributed to military 
personnel have not been solved in a satisfactory way. These abuses are a 
consequence of the inexistence of a democratic relationship between civilians and 
soldiers, and the lack of a legal structure that would protect society from these 
abuses. The constitution needs to be the first framework reformed in order to 
include a structured set of provisions on the armed forces, clearly and coherently 
defined, in which their attributions and limits are established, and where strong 
civilian controls are also set. 
The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany934 has developed a 
clear structure that defines the human rights which can be restricted in states of 
emergency, as it leaves no room for ambiguous interpretations. 
On the other hand, these are the non-derogable rights in the Political 
Constitution of the United Mexican States 
...the following rights cannot be restricted: the right not to be discriminated; 
recognition of juridical personality, life, personal integrity, protection to family, 
name and nationality; rights of the infants; political rights; freedom of thought, 
conscience and professing any religious belief; the principle of legality and 
retroactivity; the prohibition of the death penalty; the prohibition of slavery and 
                                                          
934 Art. 17a (2): Laws regarding defence, including protection of the civilian population, may 
provide for restriction of the basic rights of freedom of movement (Article 11) and inviolability 
of the home (Article 13) 
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servitude; the prohibition of enforced disappearance and torture; nor the 
juridical guarantees which are basic to the protection of such rights...935 
Here we encounter a problem: the Mexican Constitution is highly restrictive 
and opens the door for human rights abuses. How can the Mexican provision be 
reformed in order to increase the protection of fundamental rights? 
Art. 17a (2) of the German Basic Law is more  clear in establishing the rights 
than can be restricted at a certain point because it addresses specifically which 
ones are subjected to restriction. On the other hand, the Mexican Constitution 
provides a list of rights that cannot be restricted, but by establishing a “negative 
affirmation”, the list of fundamental rights which can be restricted becomes highly 
broad. In the German case, only two rights can be taken away in certain 
circumstances, but the Mexican supreme law is establishing that only certain rights 
can be left untouched. 
Therefore, the Mexican provision legitimises the restriction of various 
fundamental rights and other secondary provisions. Article 29 paragraph 2 of the 
Mexican Constitution could benefit from a rephrasing which listed the rights that 
could be actively restricted, instead of listing the only ones that are safeguarded. If a 
state or emergency is declared, a list of the only rights that can be restricted would 
be clearer for both civilian society and the armed personnel, as the aim of the 
provision would not open the doors for different interpretations. The rephrasing of 
article 29 could benefit from the direct quoting of HRC General Comment 29 
paragraph 6, because the recent Mexican reform uses the ICCPR as one of their 
international sources.936 It would be beneficial if the reform was inspired in the 
following phrase from GC 29:  
The fact that some of the provisions of the Covenant have been listed in 
article 4 (paragraph 2), as not being subject to derogation does not mean that 
other articles in the Covenant may be subjected to derogations at will, even 
where a threat to the life of the nation exists. The legal obligation to narrow 
down all derogations to those strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation establishes both for States parties and for the Committee a duty to 
conduct a careful analysis under each article of the Covenant based on an 
objective assessment of the actual situation.937 
                                                          
935 Political Constitution of the United Mexican States 2016 (MEX), art 29 (2) 
936 Human Rights and Governmental United Commissions (n 347) 32 
937 General Comment No 29 (n 306) [6] 
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 The addition of this paragraph could establish a path to legally challenge 
rights restrictions, by addressing that every particular context needs to be judged 
differently, in order to establish which rights can be subjected to restrictions or 
derogations. 
6.1.1 The legislative power and its function concerning emergencies in 
Germany and Mexico 
The German Basic Law establishes in its article 53a the existence of a joint 
committee that will take decisions regarding a state of emergency. Its paragraph 2 
states that:   
The Federal Government shall inform the Joint Committee about its plans for 
a state of defence. The rights of the Bundestag and its committees under 
paragraph (1) of Article 43 shall not be affected by the provisions of this 
paragraph. 
In its first paragraph, article 53a establishes that the members of the Joint 
Committee cannot be members of the federal government, which serves as a 
mechanism for preventing the intervention of the executive in the decisions of the 
Committee. 
This provision does not have an equivalent in Mexico, as the only model that 
could represent a light resemblance is the National Defence Commission in both the 
Senators and Deputies Cameras. In the case of the Senators Committee, article 76 
fraction III of the Constitution938 establishes that this commission should authorize 
the federal executive in order to deploy national troops outside the country, but it 
does not establish any guidelines on domestic military deployments. When ex-
president Felipe Calderon announced the first troop settlement he did not consult 
the legislative power, and only his presidential staff did a press conference with the 
statements of all the members of the executive government related to security 
affairs. It is fundamental to create a strong figure in both the Senators and Deputies 
Chambers that will function completely independent from the executive, and whose 
authorization is strictly required for every operation that involves the presence of the 
armed forces regarding internal conflicts. 
The chain of events in Mexico developed in a different way of the spirit 
established in the German basic law. As it has been stated before, ex-president 
                                                          
938 Art. 76 – These are exclusive faculties of the Senate: III.- Authorising (the federal 
executive), to allow the depart of national troops outside the limits of the country, the 
movement of foreign armed troops in national territory and the settling of troops of another 
power, for more than a month, in Mexican sea. 
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Calderón’s decision to deploy the armed forces (and issuing a decree in order to 
create and justify and use of a special force body, after the armed forces had 
already been deployed) was unilateral, as it did not have the consent of the 
legislative power. One of the main points for issuing a state of defence is the faculty 
of the legislative to set time limits for the special regulations (as article 115c of the 
German Basic Law establishes939). This has never been defined in Mexico, as it has 
not been established for how long the armed forces and its operatives will continue 
operating in Mexico. 
6.1.2 The figure of the Minister of Defence in Germany and its military 
counterpart in Mexico 
The existence of the Minister of Defence is crucial to understand the 
German State commitment with a drastic change of policy, which went from having 
an army completely controlled by the executive power, to handling the head of this 
institution to a member of civil society. Article 65a establishes that the Minister of 
Defence will have the command of the armed forces. As it has been established 
before, article 115a establishes that a promulgation of a state of defence will deliver 
the command of the armed forces to the Federal Chancellor. 
In the case of Mexico, the chain of command starts with the executive 
power, as the President is officially called by the Political Constitution as the “First 
Chief of the Constitutionalist Army”.940 In a hierarchical order the next legal 
framework that establishes the faculties of the Supreme Commander would be the 
Organic Law of the Army and the Mexican Aerial Force, whose article 11 states that: 
“The Supreme Command of the Army and the Mexican Aerial Forces will 
belong to the President of the Republic, who will exercise it himself or through 
the National Defence Secretary. To this effect, during his administration he will 
be denominated Supreme Commandant of the Armed Forces.”941 
There is not a provision that defines the powers of the President and the 
Secretary regarding the use of the armed forces in a clear way. This issue becomes 
                                                          
939 Article 115c [Extension of the legislative powers of the Federation]  
2) To the extent required by circumstances during a state of defence, a federal law for a 
state of defence may: establish a time limit for deprivations of freedom different from that 
specified in the third sentence of paragraph (2) and the fi rst sentence of paragraph (3) of 
Article 104, but not exceeding four days, for cases in which no judge has been able to act 
within the time limit that normally applies. 
940 Political Constitution of the United Mexican States 2016 (MEX), introduction 
941 Organic Law of the Army and the Mexican Aerial Force 2014 (MEX), art 11 
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more complicated due to the fact that the National Defence Secretary is a member 
of the armed forces. Article 15 fraction I of the Organic Law of the Army and the 
Mexican Aerial Force also establishes that the Supreme Commandant (the 
President), will be in charge of appointing the Secretary. The Internal Regulation of 
the National Defence Secretary establishes in its article 10 that the exclusive 
powers of the Secretary and all the most important features are established in 
cooperation with the President of the Republic942 (article 10 fraction XII even 
addresses as an obligation of the Secretary to submit all the designations and 
removals of the Secretary’s public servants to the President’s consideration). 
Does the current Defence Secretary in Mexico allow civilian control? It can 
be stated that a civilian head of the National Defence Secretary, which could be 
accountable upon the Federal Congress and citizen organisations would improve 
the army’s independence from the executive 
The attributions of the Federal Chancellor in Germany are clearly defined 
and strong control of society is ensured by the appointment of a civilian Minister of 
Defence. On the other hand, the Mexican Constitution and the Organic Law of the 
Army and Mexican Aerial Force need to establish clear limits between the executive 
and the secretary. Also, a civilian figure would increase the possibility of a stronger 
control from civil society over their armed forces in the future. There is no other 
mechanism at the moment, as the President is the only person who can elect the 
Secretary of Defence, and there is no appropriate framework for civil society to have 
a real intervention in this process. Like Khakee established, the legislative should 
also analyse the establishment of emergency powers in a periodical manner.943 
Even though the legislative should have an essential vote in the establishment of a 
state of emergency, Tushnet’s theory would also complement this process 
adequately, as “mobilised citizens”944 should review the emergency powers. It would 
                                                          
942 Internal Regulation of  the National Defence Secretary 2009 (MEX): 
Article 10.- The following attributions are exclusive to the Secretary General: 
I. ….Establishing, coordinating and supervising the politics of the Secretary, 
according to the objectives, goals and national politics that the President of the 
Republic determines…. 
II. Submitting the issues of the secretary and its state entities to the agreement of 
the President of the Republic. 
943 A Khakee (n 291) 30 
944 MV Tushnet (n 311) 184 
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also be appropriate for the constitutional article 29 reform to include the power of 
civilian organisations to review emergency provisions and the use of the army. 
Mexico has recently established the figure of state of emergency at a 
constitutional level; this reform can be highly beneficial in terms of control and 
accountability, but it should also be accompanied by the creation of more provisions 
that would regulate this type of emergency. A proper section on the constitution that 
provides the guidelines for the executive and the national defence secretary would 
develop into a beneficial relationship between these figures and the federal 
congress, as both would be subjected to accountability under the same civilian laws. 
Here lies the importance of reforming the provisions that empower the executive to 
appoint and remove the most important public servants in the secretary. The 
President’s power over the bureaucratic structure of the armed forces should also 
be limited in the constitutional provisions. 
6.1.3 The “Innere Führung” in Germany and the Mexican regulations on 
the behaviour and the ethics of the army 
In order to make a comparison that takes functionality and cultural 
background as essential elements, it should be mentioned that the current Mexican 
legislation is highly dispersed. There are approximately 12 legal frameworks and 62 
internal regulations that cover different aspects of the armed forces. In order make a 
comparison between the concept of Innere Führung and the Mexican frameworks 
which establish similar concepts, certain codes have been chosen. These are: The 
Mexican Army and Aerial Force Organic Law, the Mexican Army and Aerial Force 
Discipline Law; the Code of Conduct of the Public Servants of the National Defence 
Secretary; and The Army and Aerial Force Military Education Law. The reason for 
choosing these codes is the fact that the armed forces’ powers and obligations are 
established in them. As the constitution does not dedicate a chapter to the army, 
their obligations and attributions are scattered around the secondary (in the 
hierarchical scale) frameworks chosen. 
The Innere Führung is basic in order to understand contemporary civil-
military relations in Germany. Chapter 2 paragraph 201 establishes that its main 
goal is to “ease the tensions arising from the rights and liberties of the citizen on the 
one hand and military duty on the other”.945 The Innere Führung can be explained 
through the citizen in uniform concept, which describes the needs of the German 
                                                          
945 Innere Führung (n 544) [201] 
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soldiers. Such requirements consist in three main points: 1) to develop his 
personality freely; 2) to act as a responsible citizen; and 3) to be ready at all times to 
carry out the mission.946 
204. The principles of Innere Führung constitute a standard to be met by the 
soldier in all his actions. They are also a guideline governing the activities of 
the members of the federal defence administration in the armed forces as well 
as their relations with service members. 
This paragraph is also essential, because it specifies that the obligations 
stated in paragraph 203 are not restricted to the lower-ranked personnel, but apply 
to the whole German defence apparatus. 
205. The armed forces are subject to the primacy of politics. Primacy of 
politics means that the armed forces answer to politicians who are responsible 
to parliament and that they are subject to special parliamentary control, a 
hierarchical order pervading all aspects of service and the principle of 
command and obedience. 
This paragraph underlines the obligation of the armed forces to be controlled 
and accountable to the civilian State, as hierarchically they are below the 
parliament. Therefore, making it impossible for the executive power to have control 
of the army’s actions, through both the Federal Chancellor and the Minister or 
Defence, as such position –as part of the defence administration-, is also 
accountable to parliament. We can see this being congruent with the social context 
in Germany after World War II, as the totalitarian control that the executive 
exercised over the army was prevented from happening again. 
In order to make a comparison with the current Mexican legislation, the 
following provisions have been selected. As it has been addressed, the high number 
of Mexican laws and internal regulations makes researching for concepts a hard 
task to complete. 
The Mexican Army and Aerial Force Discipline Law establish that: 
“The fulfilment of the soldiers’ duty should be a sacrifice and with any personal 
interests aside; the Political Constitution, the nation’s sovereignty, loyalty to 
institutions and honour to the Army and Aerial Force should also be 
fulfilled.”947 
This article refers to the Political Constitution and the Mexican institutions in 
general. If the constitution establishes that the supreme commandant of the army is 
                                                          
946 ibid [203] 
947 Mexican Army and Aerial Force Discipline Law 2004 (MEX), art 1 bis 
259 
 
the President, it can be established that the military personnel must obey his orders 
at any point. This provision does not make any explicit mention to society, in 
contrast with the Guidelines for the Practical Application of the Innere Führung 
which establish that: 
Each and every soldier has the basic duty to loyally serve the Federal 
Republic of Germany and bravely defend the rights and freedom of the 
German people which may even necessitate risking his life. The basic free 
and democratic order guarantees freedom and justice. The soldier must 
respect this basic order and uphold it in all his actions.948 
The German provision explicitly mentions essential concepts that reflect the 
cultural aim of the “citizen in uniform”: the defence of society, democracy, freedom 
and justice. These concepts are essential in order to set a defined line between the 
authoritarian State of the Nazi regime and the contemporary German State. 
By its part, The Mexican Army and Aerial Force Organic Law establish in its 
first article that both such institutions have the following main duties: 
I. Defending the integrity, independence and sovereignty of the nation; II. 
Guaranteeing internal security; III. Aiding the civilian population in public 
needs….949 
The Organic Law does not establish the defence and respect of concepts 
like freedom and justice. It focuses on the practical aspect of the general missions, 
but it does not focus on any axiological principles. The only secondary framework 
(hierarchically below the Mexican constitution), that establishes certain principles is 
the Code of Conduct for the Public Servants of the Mexican Army and Aerial Force. 
This code bases such principles on the Code of Ethics for the Public Servants of the 
Federal Public Administration, which, as its title implies, establishes general 
principles that were originally planned for administrative positions, not for the armed 
personnel. Here lays the importance to reform the Code of Conduct for the Public 
Servants of the Mexican Army and Aerial Force, and establish principles directed 
specifically towards their behaviour during armed operations and interaction with 
civilians. It should also be noted that the Code of Conduct establishes among its 
principles the need for the soldiers to “have a compromise and perform their actions 
for the civilians”950 This principle states the following: 
                                                          
948 Innere Führung (n 544) Appendix 1 Guideline 2 
949 Mexican Army and Aerial Force Organic Law (n 941) art 1 
950 Code of Conduct for the Public Servants of the Mexican Army and Aerial Force 2008 
(MEX), principle 8 
260 
 
Public servants of the Mexican Army and Aerial Force have the obligation of 
offering the citizens a fair, polite and equal treatment with the goal of inspiring 
their confidence, creditability and respect, manifesting that serving is a 
permanent compromise that the State has conferred to the ones who have the 
privilege of being part of the Federal Public Administration.951 
We encounter a problem here, as the current legislation in Mexico does not 
put the soldier in the same level as a civilian. Restructuring the concepts used in the 
Mexican provisions would improve the relation between the status of the army and 
civilians. 
The principle in Mexico shows the way in which the armed personnel view 
themselves compared with civilians, as it does not encourage the mentality of “the 
citizen in uniform” but describes them as members of an elite with an obligation to 
serve and treat with dignity the civilians, although it does not consider them as part 
of the same civil society. That is the opposite of what the spirit of the Innere 
Führung had in mind, as the relationship between the armed personnel and society 
is horizontal and not hierarchical. The Mexican legislation must avoid establishing a 
hierarchical structure and remove words like “privilege”952 of the code of conduct, 
because it entitles segregation from the rest of the citizens in order to be a part of 
the federal administration. A legal provision that has been considered as part of 
such privilege is the legal figure known as “war immunity” that has its legal base in 
article 13 of the Constitution; such article establishes that no person will have 
immunity, unless it is military immunity for their personnel.953 If the military had the 
same rights and obligations as any citizen, then the war immunity would have no 
reason to exist. 
                                                          
951 ibid 
952 Code of Conduct of the Public Servants of the National Defence Secretary 2014 (MEX), 
principles H(a) and J(b) and Code of Conduct for the Public Servants of the Mexican Army 
and Aerial Force 2008 (MEX), principles 8 and 10 
953 Political Constitution of the United Mexican States 2015 (MEX), article 13: “…No person 
or corporation can have immunity….the war immunity for crimes and misconducts against 
military discipline will prevail, but in no case can the military tribunals  extend their 
jurisdiction over persons that do not belong to the army. When a civilian is involved in a 
crime or misconduct of military nature, the correspondent civilian authority will know of the 
case”. 
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6.1.4 The Military Commissioner in Germany and the Ombudsman in 
Mexico 
All German citizens over 35 years old can apply for this role, and since 1990 
it is not compulsory for them to have served in the armed forces.954 As it has been 
explained,955 this figure holds a special place in the German State, because he is 
not considered a member of the Bundestag but neither is he considered a member 
of the Executive, as his position is situated between both powers, making a 
statement of independence from them.956 The Commissioner is elected throughout a 
secret voting session of the members of the Bundestag for a 5 year period. The 
German Basic Law establishes his main function: 
Article 45b (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces) 
A Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces shall be appointed to 
safeguard basic rights and to assist the Bundestag in exercising parliamentary 
oversight over the Armed Forces. Details shall be regulated by a federal law. 
The Commissioner’s duties can be divided in two sections: 1) guarding the 
wellbeing of the basic rights from the armed personnel; and 2) guarding the 
fulfilment of the principles contained in the Innere Führung.957 These duties mean 
that the commissioner is both in charge of guarding human rights inside the army, 
and also outside, on the relationship between the army and civilians (this does not 
mean that civilians can lodge a complaint against the commissioner for human 
rights abuses, as his role is to be a link between the army and civil society). Another 
fundamental function of the Commissioner is to serve as a specialised ombudsman 
in the armed forces, where the personnel, independently of their rank, can contact 
him directly and make a petition whose nature can be administrative, practical or 
personal.958 He can also request any information needed for investigations from the 
different administrative authorities; plus, he scrutinises various details from the 
Federal Ministry of Defence, including personnel and offices. Finally, he can issue 
recommendations and proposals, which are not compulsory, but experience has 
                                                          
954 German Bundestag, “The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces of the 
German Bundestag” (Deutscher Bundestag,  April 2012), https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80193000.pdf, accessed  8 July 2015. 
955 “Backgrounder – Security Sector Governance and Reform, Military Ombudsman” 
(Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2006) 
956 ibid 
957 ibid 
958 German Bundestag (n 954) 
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shown that the independence of such figures has had a positive effect on the 
behaviour of armed personnel and commands.959 
The Mexican Human Rights Commission President 
The main attributions of the Human Rights Commission President (which is 
the name given to the Ombudsman in Mexico), are established on the Mexican 
Constitution in its article 102B, which states: 
The President…who will also be president of the Consulting Council, will be 
elected in the same terms of last paragraph (by two thirds of the Senators 
Chamber, or when these are not present, by the Permanent Commission of 
the Union Congress)….(the President), will present an annual report of 
activities upon the Congress Chambers… 
It can be established that the figure of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Armed Forces in Germany and the Human Rights National Commission (HRNC) 
President in Mexico hold few coincidences, as both figures have very different 
scopes and obligations. The Commission website states the following concerning 
the function of the President: 
As a result of the investigations done by the general inspection offices, the 
President of the HRNC will approve and issue public recommendations and 
will formulate the proposals needed to achieve a better protection of human 
rights in the country960 
The former statement reveals a much more administrative role for the 
President, who performs more as a representative or the inspection officials whose 
role is to investigate the complaints received. The Second Inspection Office is the 
one that is handles complaints attributed to the National Defence Secretary, among 
other secretaries, and it consists of a director, a secretary and two general 
directors.961 There is no more information on the functions of this office regarding 
the military. 
From the analysis of this section, it has been found that the current figure of 
the Ombudsman in Mexico does not have access inside the military headquarters 
and does not have any accountability powers over the army. In order to solve this 
issue, the creation of a military ombudsman is suggested, as this would improve the 
                                                          
959 ibid 
960 “Structure” (Mexican National Commission of Human Rights) 
<http://www.cndh.org.mx/Estructura> accessed 10 July 2015 
961 ibid 
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conditions of the soldiers and strengthen the faculties of society to protect itself 
against human rights abuses 
The current President of the National Commission of Human Rights acts as 
the head of the Commission as an institution, so a direct relationship between the 
common citizen and him does not exist at the moment; this is also the same case 
with the army. The creation of an ombudsman that works within the legislative 
power but is independent from any State power is needed, in order to improve 
communication between the military processed personnel and the National Defence 
Secretary Commission in the Federal Congress. The current constitution grants 
independence to the current Human Rights Commission,962 but its president and 
administration panel is only chosen by two thirds of the legislators. This does not 
include civilian organisations which could be a counterpart to the interests of the 
Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, political interests tend be involved in the process 
of selecting the candidates to front the Human Rights Commission. 
The proposed figure would also serve as a link between the army and the 
Human Rights Commission in Congress, as an independent figure would be an 
ideal link between the National Defence Secretary and the legislative power. This 
would be beneficial in order to create proper mechanisms of accountability and 
publicity that public hearings in the Congress of the Union can provide to society, 
and would also benefit the army itself, as the ombudsman would also have the 
function to attend complaints from the armed personnel. 
6.1.5 The rights of the military personnel in Germany and Mexico 
The German framework in which this concept is based on is the Law on the 
Rights and Duties of Soldiers, whose section on the Obligations establishes that 
they will have the same rights and duties as any citizen.963 Section 4 also 
establishes that every order followed by the soldiers must be subjected to 
international and domestic laws and regulations.964 The act of establishing in a clear 
way that the soldiers have the same rights as any citizen entitles them to all the 
constitutional and international rights, which allows the way to channel such 
complaints through any legal instances. In the case of the Mexican legislation, the 
large number of codes and internal regulations in which the concepts about the 
                                                          
962 Political Constitution of the United Mexican States 2016 (MEX) art  102B 
963 Civic Rights of the Soldier (n 566) sect 6 
964 Ibid, sect 6 (4) 
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soldiers’ rights are distributed makes it highly challenging to make a comparison. In 
spite of the former problem, various provisions have been selected:  
The Mexican Military Justice Code’s article 119 fraction VI establishes the 
absence of liability for a soldier who follows an illegal order if he does not have 
knowledge of such illegality, although the same provision mentions that the 
unlawfulness of such order must not be notorious,965 which is used again in a vague 
form (and brings to memory the discussion of topics like the concept of 
“reasonabless” in the Northern Ireland emergency regime966). Article 294 of the 
Military Justice Code also establishes the penalty for the superior who gives an 
order that might harm a soldier while performing his duties.967 This is again a 
concept that lacks clarity and constitutes a problem for the personnel to establish 
their innocence if they follow an unlawful order. Apart from these provisions, the rest 
of the frameworks and regulations are focused on the soldiers’ duties (Code of 
Conduct of the Public Servants of the National Defence Secretary, and the General 
Regulation of Military Duties). 
From the discussion in this section, it is clear that there is both a lack of 
clarity and a defined structure for both the rights and duties of the soldiers in 
Mexico. Developing a legal framework specialised in the rights and duties of the 
soldiers in Mexico would improve their current conditions 
The current legislation about rights and duties of the armed personnel in 
Mexico is divided into different frameworks and regulations. This does not allow a 
clear access to the different provisions. Also, the laws that impose duties are highly 
unbalanced with the ones that grant rights. It is fundamental to restructure the 
provisions into one single framework, which should also be referred in the Political 
Constitution in order to provide both the army and society with constitutional 
resources to reference the potential single framework. This framework should be 
structured like the German Law on the Rights and Duties of Soldiers, as this 
framework is clearly defined, and establishes both rights and duties into structured 
chapters. Finally, in order to provide the soldiers with a wide range of rights and 
                                                          
965 Military Justice Code 2014 (MEX) art 119-VI 
966 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v The United Kingdom (n 29) [30], [31], [32] 
967 The article states that there will be a penalty of four months of prison for the superior that 
gives an order to an inferior, which among other descriptions, might “….cause (the inferior), 
to engage in obligations that might be harmful to the performance of its duties”. (in chapter 
about Germany) 
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legal resources, these should be granted the same status as common civilians and 
have the same social aim as the “citizen in uniform” figure in Germany. 
One of the most important contemporary features of democratic military 
systems is the power of the soldiers to file a complaint if they consider that their 
rights have been violated, or is they are unsatisfied with any aspect of their military 
life. The German Basic Law is the constitutional foundation for this system in 
Germany,968 as article 19(4) establishes the right of every citizen to recourse to 
courts if their rights have been violated, and since the soldiers are considered 
citizens in uniform, the same principle applies to them. The Law on the Rights and 
Duties of Soldiers establishes in its section 34 that the framework which describes 
the process to issue complaints for the military personnel is the German Military 
Complaints Regulations (WBO). As it has been established,969 section 1 of this 
framework states the rights of armed personnel to file complaints,970 both against 
particulars and the Federal Defence Institutions. Section 2 protects the soldier 
against potential backlash for issuing a complaint,971 as it states that no 
repercussions will be taken against a soldier for lodging a complaint which has not 
been properly founded.972 This gives adequate protection to the armed personnel’s 
wellbeing in the barracks’ internal life, and also protects them against abuse from 
their superiors. The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces takes a 
fundamental role here too, as one of his main functions is to collect and attend the 
petitions of the personnel inside the army. 
On the other hand, the justice system in Mexico has not developed a 
mechanism that will safeguard the rights of the soldiers that lodge a complaint. The 
Military Justice Code establishes in its article 342 that unfounded complaints will be 
subjected to a punishment consisting of prison, even going to the extreme of being 
arrested for not putting their complaints through the right channels.973 The paths of 
                                                          
968 Civic Rights of the Soldier (n 566) sect 6 
969 German Military Complaints Regulations  2009 (GER) sect 1 
970 “…the rights to lodge a complaint if they believe that they have been treated wrongly by 
superiors or by Bundeswehr agencies or have been harmed as a result of breach of duty by 
fellow soldiers.” 
971 This is the prohibition from reprehending or taking any kind of actions that might put a 
military in disadvantaged for having lodged a complaint without the proper fundament. 
972 German Military Complaints Regulations  2009 (GER) sect 2 
973 Military Justice Code  2012 (MEX) 
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lodging complaints are hierarchical and are solved within the same structure inside 
the army, as the General Ordinance of the Army regulation establishes in its article 
161974 that every soldier needs to appoint all their requests and complaints to their 
immediate superior. In case that this complaint is lodged against their superior, they 
should report it to the next member above in the hierarchical scale.  
Currently, there are no current adequate mechanisms for the soldiers to 
lodge complaints and petitions through channels that will guarantee access to 
justice. This comparison suggests that the creation of a military ombudsman and 
parallel reforms in the Political Constitution and military frameworks would improve 
their current conditions 
The current path to process complaints in Mexico does not guarantee 
efficient access to justice and has no mechanisms for independence either. An 
external figure that is both independent from the executive and legislative powers 
would be appropriate in order to reform the status of the soldiers’ rights according to 
democratic standards. This would also require the creation of a framework that 
establishes the rights and duties of the soldiers, which would include as a prominent 
feature a democratic and independent system of filing complaints that would 
guarantee efficient access to justice, and safeguard the armed personnel’s physical 
and moral integrity. 
6.2 The emergency regime in Northern Ireland and the deployment of British 
troops, compared to the legal justification in Mexico to deploy the armed 
forces in domestic tasks against organised crime 
It is appropriate to start this comparison by referring to the background for 
the deployment of the armed forces both in Northern Ireland and in Mexico, as there 
are important similarities in both cases. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Article 342.- Those who state or deliver to their superiors, either by word or in a written way, 
resources, petitions, complaints or claims regarding issues relatives to the service, military 
position, or personal interest of the ones complaining, will be punished: 
1.- If they use fake data or statements to make their fundaments, eleven months of prison; 
II.- if they do it by physical statements, whether it is one representing others, or two or more 
reunited, fourth months  of prison, and 
III.- if they do not do through the channels allowed by law, unless it was necessarily, they will 
be subjected to sixteen days of prison 
974 General Ordinance of the Army 1912 (MEX) 
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In the case of Northern Ireland, then-prime minister Chichester-Clark 
expressed that, as the violence in Londonderry in August of 1969 increased, he had 
no other option but to take emergency measures. The result was the British 
government deploying troops in Northern Irish territory, the issuing of the 
Emergency Provisions Act 1973, and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1974. Schedule 3 Supplemental Provisions for Sections 1 to 8, Part 
I(3) was the foundation for the power given to the army, as the supplemental 
provision states the following: “(3) In Northern Ireland members of Her Majesty's 
Forces may perform such functions conferred on examining officers as are specified 
in the order.”  
In the case of Mexico, the foundation for the deployment of the armed forces 
is a presidential decree issued by ex-president Felipe Calderon which was 
published on the Official Diary of the Federation on 17 September 2007. The decree 
established the creation of a Special Body of the Army and Aerial Force called 
Federal Support Special Force Body.975 Ex-president Calderon established on the 
same decree the legal grounds in which he justified his decision, these being 
articles 89 fraction I and VI of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States; 
articles 1 fraction II, and 14 fraction IX of the Organic Law of the Mexican Army and 
Aerial Force; and articles 13 and 29 of the Organic Law of the Federal Public 
Administration.976 Apart from the previous provisions, an isolated thesis (criteria 
established by the Supreme Court that does not have the status of jurisprudence), 
established that the aid from the armed forces to the civilian authorities is indeed 
constitutional, as: 
…it is not essential to declare the suspension of individual guarantees 
provided for extreme situations in constitutional article 29 for the intervention 
of the army, navy and aerial force, because reality can generate an infinite 
number of situations that would not justify the state of emergency, but with the 
                                                          
975 Official Diary of the Federation (n 281) 
976 1) Political Constitution of the United Mexican States 2015 (MEX), article 89: “The 
faculties and obligations of the President are the following…. I. Issuing and executing the 
laws that are legislated by the Union Congress, guarding its exact observance in the 
administrative sphere….. VI. Preserving national security, in the respective legal body’s 
terms, and having the permanent Armed Force, meaning the Army and Aerial Force, 
available for matters of interior security and exterior defence of the Federation.” 
2) Organic Law of the Mexican Army and Aerial Force 2012 (MEX), article 1: “The Mexican 
Army and Aerial Force are permanent armed institutions which have the following general 
missions….. II. Guaranteeing internal safety.” Article 14: “The faculties of the Supreme 
Command are…… IX. Authorising the creation of new units for the Army and Aerial Force; 
new arms and services; new settlements for military education or special bodies.” 
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threat of an upscale of danger, the use of force which the Mexican State 
possess would be necessary, always subjecting itself to the constitutional and 
legal current provisions.977 
There is a lack of clarity in the Mexican legislation regarding the powers of 
the president in order to deploy the army, concerning the role of the legislative. This 
research has found that reforming the referred provisions would give a clear 
structure that would legitimise the legal status to the army in constitutional terms 
The social context between Northern Ireland and Mexico is referred for two 
main reasons:  
1) The deployment of the armed forces in Northern Ireland was the response 
to the events in Londonderry in August 1969. On the other hand, in Mexico the 
decision to deploy the army did not constitute an immediate response to an attack 
or emergency situation, but this policy represented a central part of the security 
strategy of Calderon’s administration. The first deployment of the armed forces was 
in the state of Michoacán, but the troops gradually spread across various points in 
the country.978  
2) Northern Ireland did not have a constitutional legal hierarchical order; 
therefore, the supplemental provision contained in the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 did not constitute any breach of legality. In the 
case of Mexico, a chapter on the armed forces is not included in a structured way, 
so the use given by the President is not defined but only inferred, as article 89 
establishes the faculty of the executive to use the armed forces to protect internal 
safety, but does not establish the kinds of attributions that the armed personnel 
should have in the potential deployments. We can see the need for a constitutional 
restructuring that would develop a defined structure on the use of the armed forces 
for emergency situations or as part of a security strategy, as a state of emergency 
has never been officially declared in Mexico. The current reform of constitutional 
article 29 which establishes a mechanism for creating a state of emergency is 
welcomed, although it is still on an early stage to measure its success. Another fact 
that proves the importance of establishing a well-defined emergency powers 
structure is the ability to establish different kinds of emergencies; as Gross stated, 
armed conflicts such as terrorism and war are not the only emergencies, but also 
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economic crises and natural disasters.979 For this reason, contemporary emergency 
powers body should contain different categorizations of emergencies and the 
appropriate response for each of them (a suggestion could be categorising them by 
levels, depending on the level of threat they posed for society). 
Finally, the isolated thesis issued by the Supreme Court should be 
derogated as it does not define the limits which separate democratic order from a 
state of emergency in order to use the army. The criteria is also contradictory 
because it establishes the power to use the armed forces without following the strict 
criteria of constitutional article 29, while mentioning that the State must always 
follow the constitutional provisions in order to use the armed forces. 
6.2.1 Powers of arrest, and stop and search in Northern Ireland and 
Mexico 
The EPA constituted the base for the emergency regime in Northern Ireland, 
as the previous framework (The Special Powers Act) was repealed by the EPA in 
order to award the British government the power of direct rule and apply special 
provisions to what they considered a state or emergency. The EPA was an act that 
was developed through the normal legislative process in Parliament, and subjected 
to periodical reviews. There are certain key points which are the subject of 
comparison with the current Mexican legislation, because they contained special 
provisions that established highly strong enforcement toward suspects of terrorism. 
The provisions that are relevant for this comparison are section 12 (which 
established the right of Her Majesty’s Forces to arrest)980 and section 16 (stop and 
search).981 Section 12 has been criticised for being subjective; Korff established that 
                                                          
979 O Gross (n 314) 6 
980 Emergency Provisions Act 1973 (NI), Section 12,--(1) A member of Her Majesty's Forces 
on duty may arrest without warrant, and detain for not more than four hours, a person whom 
he suspects of committing, having committed or being about to commit any offence. 
(2) A person effecting an arrest under this section complies with any rule of law requiring him 
to state the ground of arrest if he states that he is effecting the arrest as a member of Her 
Majesty's Forces. 
(3) For the purpose of arresting a person under this section a member of Her Majesty's 
Forces may enter and search any premises or other place where that person is or, if that 
person is suspected of being a terrorist or of having committed an offence involving the use 
or possession of an explosive, explosive substance or firearm, where that person is 
suspected of being. 
981 Emergency Provisions Act 1973 (NI), Section 16.-(1) Any member of Her Majesty's 
Forces on duty or any constable may stop and question any person for the purpose of 
ascertaining that person's identity and movements and what he knows concerning any 
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the phrasing of the sentence “a person whom he suspects” instead of phrasing it as 
“a person reasonably suspected” goes beyond the objective elements that should 
be part of a lawful detention.982 On the subject of search, certain practices as house-
to-house search operatives became common, and up until 1976, police build files on 
every citizen that lived in areas considered as Republican.983 
By its part, the current Mexican constitution does not explicitly establish the 
power of the armed forces to arrest, and stop and search. However, the Military 
Justice Code has been reformed and now the military judges have the faculty to 
issue search warrants on private addresses and intervening private communications 
with the authorization of military judges.984 A comparison cannot be made using a 
strict method based on a positivist approach, but the “intermediate theory”985 would 
be more appropriate to use, if the cultural elements and the aims that were behind 
the frameworks are taken into account. For this reason the first code that was 
analysed is the Political Constitution, as this is the highest legal framework in a 
hierarchical scale in Mexico.  
As the powers of the soldiers are not established or referred in the 
constitution, the only legal body that establishes certain parameters and limits is the 
Manual for the Use of Force of common application to all the Armed Forces. This 
code has the status of a regulation and is in a lower hierarchical order to the 
Political Constitution and to the federal secondary frameworks. This manual is the 
base for establishing the use of force from the armed forces, and its Chapter I 
paragraph 1 establishes that Use of Force is to be conceived as: “the use of 
techniques, tactics, methods and armament that the armed forces personnel will 
use and perform in order to control, repeal or neutralize acts of non-aggressive, 
aggressive or severe aggressive resistance”.986 This section implies that the use of 
force will only be applied as a response to aggressions. It should be noted that 
                                                                                                                                                                    
recent explosion or any other incident endangering life or concerning any person killed or 
injured in any such explosion or incident. 
982 D Korff, The Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland: A Fair Trial? (Netherlands Institute of 
Human Rights, Utrecht 1984) 29 
983 K Boyle, T Hadden, P Hillyard, “Emergency Powers: Ten Years On” (1979-1980) 174 
Fortnight 4, 6 
984 Military Justice Code 2016 (MEX) arts 248 fractions II and III 
985 M Van Hoecke (n 28) 185 
986 Manual for the Use of Force, of common application to all the Armed Forces  2014 (MEX) 
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paragraph 2 section D establishes the “rational need for defence”, which describes 
this concept as “the performance of the armed personnel, after having done the 
corresponding analysis about the attitude and characteristics of the aggressor, as 
well as their own capacities, in order to determine the proportionality of the use of 
force”.987 This concept is closely similar to the “reasonable conviction” or “a 
reasonable ground for suspicion”, which was the subject of debate in Northern 
Ireland. 
Apart from the recent reforms to the Military Justice Code, the Federal Law 
Against Organised Crime in Mexico also contains similarities with the Emergency 
Provisions Act 1973. The main goal of both frameworks was to create a special 
legislation against what the State considered as an internal threat caused by non-
State actors. Both laws hold highly repressive provisions of enforcement which were 
targeted at specific groups, although the provisions in both regulations are open for 
different interpretations. In the case of the Federal Law Against Organised Crime, 
the provision that exposes the high level of enforcement that gives a broad margin 
of arrest to the security forces is article 2, which considers as organised crime the 
act of organising to perform one or various crimes which are on the list of 
behaviours considered as organised crime.988 This provision is comparable with the 
behaviour of the security forces in Northern Ireland, when they arrested or in some 
cases989, exercised lethal force against citizens who were considered suspects,990 
as the frameworks also allowed the use of force just for having a “reasonable” 
suspicion about the suspects.991 In the case of the Mexican legislation, the concept 
of “organising” is not clearly defined, and the crimes for which a person can be 
given the status of member of an organised crime group are subjected to high 
sanctions in the Federal Criminal Code. 
There have been proven allegations of the misuse of force by elements of 
the army in Mexico since the current security strategy started. The analysis made in 
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988 Federal Law Against Organised Crime 2014 (MEX), article 2.- “When three or more 
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this research concludes that establishing defined limits for the use of force in the 
Manual for the Use of Force of common application to all the Armed Forces, and 
also at a constitutional level, would subject the armed forces to stronger 
accountability mechanisms. The status of an organised crime member should also 
be reformed in order to establish appropriate limits for the prosecution for this crime. 
The principles established in the Manual for the Use of Force have been 
violated in numerous occasions by the Mexican army. One of the most recent cases 
(the Tlatlaya massacre), was investigated by the Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human 
Rights Centre, who established that the army had orders which are similar to the 
Northern Irish shoot-to-kill policy.992 The order given to the Mexican soldiers by their 
superior stated that “the troops must operate in the night in a massive way, and 
during the day they should reduce their activities, in order to demolish criminals at 
late night, because most of the crimes are committed during such period of the 
day”.993 This shows that there is a semi-official strategy that includes using lethal 
force against the population, as it has not been established in that way by the 
federal government, but those rules have been structured within the army. The 
constitution should textually establish the obligations of the army, which need to be 
consistent with the international treaties that Mexico has signed.  
The use of force should also be defined with a clear structure. To clarify this 
concept, it is relevant to cite the definition that the ECHR gave on the McCann and 
Others v The United Kingdom case that “…the reasonableness of the use of force 
has to be decided on the basis of the facts which the user of the force honestly 
believed to exist: this involves the subjective test as to what the user believed and 
an objective test as to whether he had reasonable grounds for that belief”.994 This 
implies that lethal use of force must never be used as a common practice, contrary 
to what the army instructions in the Tlatlaya case ordered. In the case of the 
description used in the Federal Law Against Organised Crime, the description 
should be reformed and contain descriptive elements of concrete actions, which 
should go beyond the act of mere “organising”. 
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6.2.2 Internment in Northern Ireland and its similarities with the “arraigo” 
model in Mexico 
There are important differences between the figure of internment in Northern 
Ireland and the figure of arraigo in Mexico. However, both share a common goal in 
mind at the moment of being developed: the withholding of a suspect until the 
investigators gather enough evidence to prosecute him. 
As it has been established in the previous chapter,995 Internment was 
created for the purpose of detaining a suspect without a trial in order to prevent their 
escape and gather intelligence. The detained citizens would be taken to the 
headquarters of the security forces, where they suffered diverse human rights 
abuses at the hands of these. The most common form of mistreatment was known 
as “the 5 techniques” (sleep deprivation, starvation diets, white noise, hooding, and 
the enforcement of spread angling against a wall for hours996). The whole purpose 
of internment was to decrease the paramilitary violence by enforcing stronger 
methods of repression against suspects of terrorism. At a legal level, the EPA 
1973997 provided the military with powers of arrest and detention without a warrant 
to anyone that they suspected of committing any crime. This resulted in accusations 
of torture and degrading treatment, especially the procedure known as “the five 
techniques”.998  
In the case of Mexico, the legal concept of arraigo is one of the most 
debated reforms aimed as part of the current security strategy. This figure consists 
of the detention of a person in its own private address or a designed place, for the 
length of 40 days (which can be extended up until 80 if a judge concedes the 
warrant).999 According to the Human Rights National Commission, between 2008 
and 2010 around 120 complaints related to arraigo were presented. 38% were 
related to unlawful detention, 41% with cases or torture and/or degrading treatment 
and 26% presented both an unlawful detention and torture.1000 The legal base of this 
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figure is found in Constitutional article 16, which establishes the power of the 
investigators and security forces to withhold a person who is considered a suspect 
of organised crime, in order to give the authorities time to investigate without the 
concern of the suspect’s escape.1001 The next framework in the hierarchical order 
that establishes this faculty is article 133Bis of the Federal Code of Criminal 
Procedures. 
The Chamber of Deputies has established that, added to the fact that 
academics have considered the participation of the armed forces in arraigo cases 
as inadequate, there have been different occasions in which suspects have been 
withhold in military facilities.1002 This violates an essential constitutional provision 
(article 21), which establishes that only the Public Ministry has the faculty to 
investigate crimes and exercising criminal action (making a petition to a judge to 
submit a person to trial). 
The figure of “arraigo” in Mexico has been misused by both the army and the 
civilian security forces, engaging in a vast number of human rights abuses. It can be 
established that abolishing this figure would improve the democratic order of federal 
investigations against suspects of organised crime 
As it has been previously discussed,1003 the figure of internment in Northern 
Ireland was not a successful method to tackle the paramilitaries, as it damaged the 
legitimacy of the security forces and increased the animosity between the British 
government and the Northern Irish population; hence, its derogation in 1975. The 
figure of internment did not reduce the violence, but provoked the increase of 
murders and terrorist acts,1004 making it not only morally unacceptable, but 
ultimately ineffective for the government’s goals.1005 
In the case of Mexico, the figure of arraigo has not proved to be successful 
either, as the violence related to organised crime has not decreased as a result of 
such policy. This has also damaged the reputation of the security institutions, as the 
armed forces have been accused of breaching their faculties by taking part in the 
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detention of various suspects.1006 The authorities in charge of the investigations 
need to have enough elements for exercising criminal action as soon as possible, 
and it should not take more than the standard number of days for retaining a person 
suspected of committing ordinary crimes (48 hours, established by article 10 fraction 
IX of the Federal Code for Criminal Procedures) to have enough elements for 
prosecution. External human rights visitors should also be provided to detained 
persons in order to guarantee that their wellbeing is respected during this stage. 
Finally, the armed forces should abstain from detaining civilians, as it is not their 
function, and its investigative organ (the military Public Ministry) is currently 
dedicated to investigate crimes exclusively of a strictly military nature. 
6.2.3 The State’s duty to investigate deaths in which an official is involved 
in Northern Ireland and Mexico 
In McCann v UK, the ECtHR established that the State failed to protect 
article 2 (right to life) of the ECHR and addressed that “the State must provide an 
effective ex post facto procedure for establishing the facts surrounding a killing by 
agents of the State through an independent judicial process”.1007 The Court also 
referenced article 9 of the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of 
Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions,1008 to sustain their pronouncement. 
In the case of Radilla Pacheco v Mexico, the IACtHR established that the 
Mexican State had to reform their laws to be in accordance with the American 
Convention in the subject of criminal military jurisdiction, and to create a resource to 
challenge the competence of the mentioned military jurisdiction.1009 The Court 
established the direct responsibility of the State over their officers, as they 
established that the soldiers that had detained Radilla Pacheco were in charge of 
his rights’ protection. Therefore, due to the fact that the victim disappeared under 
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their custody, the State infringed their duty to prevent violations to human treatment 
and life.1010 
In conclusion, it can be established that both the UK and the Mexican States 
violated the rights of citizens when civilians suffered severe human rights abuses at 
the hands of their officers. They were responsible of not protecting the citizens and 
not establishing effective remedies to the victims and their relatives to access justice 
and punish the responsible. Only through the proposed reforms, the victims in 
Mexico will have access to effective justice, and like the IACtHR has established, 
the State would have the obligation to remove the de facto and de jure 
circumstances that generate impunity.1011 
6.2.4 Final considerations of the comparative study 
This comparison study between Mexico and Germany for its post-WWII 
institutions, and Mexico and Northern Ireland for the legal provisions and figures 
established in the emergency regime has been successfully developed. The use of 
an intermediate methodology that takes into account social and cultural factors was 
determinant to find correlations between the countries used for the comparison with 
Mexico; the functionality of the figures discussed has also been established using 
the intermediate theory.  
There is an essential point that should be addressed: both the comparisons 
with Germany and Northern Ireland provide enough evidence that establishes the 
need to develop a deep reform and restructure the Mexican Political Constitution. 
The first problem encountered was the lack of a coherent structure among the 
different provisions that serve as the ground for the correct functionality of the 
armed forces, its institutions and its relationship with the State. This makes the task 
of establishing ordered and clear frameworks, concerning topics like accountability 
of the armed forces, highly complicated. Also, the vast quantity of secondary 
frameworks and internal regulations constitute an obstacle to establish a set of 
provisions dedicated to the current security strategy that would be easier to access 
for victims seeking justice. 
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Regarding the concept of dignity, the Mexican Political Constitution does 
contain a similar idea in its article 1,1012 but it only refers to human dignity as a right 
that should be protected from discrimination. To establish this concept as the centre 
of all legal protection, a provision with the same spirit as article 1(1) of the German 
Basic Law1013 should be established in the Mexican constitution. The proposed 
provision should not necessarily be identical to one established in the German Basic 
Law because, as it has been previously addressed, the concept of dignity does not 
come from a purely textual approach but from the premise that “all law has to 
emanate from the individual’s status as a legal subject”.1014 So the first step for the 
Mexican legislation is to consider the citizen as the central object of the juridical 
order, where all the legal frameworks would have as their main goal the protection 
of his human rights. 
Having addressed this point, the degree of independence and freedom of 
conscience that the German military has achieved can be implemented in the 
Mexican military, as there is no conflict of interests with between the soldiers and 
the citizens. Providing legal recognition to the soldiers as full-citizens would 
increase the trust and legitimacy of the institutions. This recognition, alongside a 
new system that allows the soldiers to lodge complaints without their superiors 
acting as intermediaries, would provide the soldiers with a strong system of 
protection to their fundamental rights. Therefore, the most important adaptation is to 
grant the Mexican soldiers the status of “citizens in uniform”. 
It was also pointed that the inclusion of a military ombudsman dedicated to 
the armed forces is essential, although an adequate constitutional ground needs to 
be previously developed in order to protect his independence and outline his 
attributions. Along the creation of an ombudsman, parameters regarding clear limits 
for the armed forces also need to be addressed in the constitution, as currently the 
provisions dedicated to them are focused on their administrative functions and their 
submission to the President. This dependence on the executive should also be 
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reformed in favour of a truly independent structure and a strong control of civilian 
figures, not only the legislative and the government. The status of the armed 
personnel should also be focused on their own rights as citizens and members of an 
institution. It is essential to create a democratic internal life in the army and establish 
a system to guard the issues and petitions of the soldiers, not only in the current 
context when the troops are indefinitely deployed, but also as a permanent structure 
which should be detailed in the Political Constitution. 
Regarding the current legal regime in Mexico, the attributions of the armed 
personnel to aid civilian forces in the security policy against organised crime/internal 
threats, should be structured as part of the proposed constitutional chapter on the 
armed forces. It is not understandable why the Supreme Court established that the 
current security issues demand the aid of the military, while at the same time stating 
that there was no need to officially establish a state of emergency. The emergence 
of constitutional reforms and dedicated frameworks to the security strategy that 
would go beyond mere crime descriptions (as the Federal Law Against Organised 
Crime currently does), is needed in order to subject the actors involved to domestic 
and international standards of accountability. Topics like the use of force are 
fundamental in any democratic system, whether the armed forces are involved in 
civilian issues or not, and legal controls for this should not be limited to an internal 
regulation (Manual for the Use of Force, of common application to all the Armed 
Forces). Their inclusion in the constitutional and military frameworks needs to be 
developed as soon as possible; the case of soldiers using military facilities to detain 
suspects of organised crime is one of the prime examples that show the breach of 
current domestic legal attributes and international standards. It would be highly 
beneficial if the Mexican legislators worked on establishing measures that have 
been proved successful and abolish figures like arraigo, as this measure has been 
unsuccessful so far to tackle organised crime. 
The Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland cannot be directly compared with the 
Military Courts in Mexico, because the first ones were employed to try suspects of 
terrorist activities,1015 whereas suspects of organised crime are tried in civilian 
federal courts. However, there is a point of comparison between the current military 
courts in the cultural elements which both institutions share. The Diplock Courts 
were considered by the Northern Ireland Rights Assembly as affecting the right to a 
fair trial because of factors such as the lower standards for the admission of 
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evidence when compared to ordinary courts, and the fact that confessions were 
made while incommunicado.1016 In the Mexican case, the civilian courts have 
jurisdiction in cases where civilians are the victims of human rights abuses by the 
armed forces, but when human rights are violated within the army, military courts 
are the only legal resource.  
Recently, the IACtHR issued a Resolution of Supervision of Fulfilment of a 
Sentence from the Radilla v Mexico case, in which they established that the 
Mexican State needs to adopt the adequate reforms to allow the victims of military 
immunity to have an effective way to challenge military jurisdiction.1017 Also, the right 
to a fair trial is violated when the military investigators are still involved in the 
gathering of evidence of a crime where a civilian is the victim, so civilian authorities 
should be in charge of all the investigation.1018 Even though the judgements did not 
lack transparency in the Diplock Courts, and on the other hand, Mexican military 
courts have been reluctant to give any details (even to the relatives of the victims), 
the points being compared are functional, because both courts have proved to be 
unsuccessful (the Diplock Courts were abolished). Therefore, the methodology of 
functionality was useful in this comparison, as the analysis showed that the absence 
of publicity in trials favours the violation of the suspects’ human rights. 
Finally, the cultural element of corruption between the army and Northern 
Ireland and the armed forces in Mexico is also relevant to the discussion. In 
Northern Ireland, the Stevens Inquiry determined that there had been collusion 
between elements of the army, the RUC and the loyalist paramilitaries.1019 The 
analysis of the Inquiry is relevant in this comparison, as there have been reports of 
military personnel being colluded with the drug cartels, proving similarities with the 
Northern Irish case. The Saville Inquiry was relevant to this comparison, as it 
established that the abuses from the army increased as time passed and as the 
emergency provisions lasted for longer. In Mexico, the army has also been involved 
in the death and torture of civilians during recent events like the Tlatlaya case or the 
disappearance of 43 students in the southern town of Ayotzinapa.  
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The security strategy in Mexico needs to be subjected to a deep analysis 
and a subsequent group of deep legal reforms, from the core legislation (the 
Political Constitution) to the secondary frameworks and the regulations. As this 
comparison has established, neither the institutions nor the legal bodies have been 
adjusted to the current security strategy and the mechanisms of control are highly 
undeveloped, as civilian society has no way of accessing justice in an efficient way 
that would affect positively the relation between society and the army. The 
methodology used in this comparison has allowed identifying successful and 
unsuccessful institutions and legal frameworks regulating civil-military relations. 
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Conclusion 
Civil-military relations in the democratic era 
Mexico’s current security conflict is vastly broad and can be subjected to 
diverse analysis; although, for the purpose of developing a deep study on a 
determined field, this research has focused on the current civil-military crisis 
regarding human rights abuses. The current context in Mexico has aggravated since 
this project began in late 2011, as the armed forces have been accused of taking 
part in extrajudicial killings and torture in different cases, with the Tlatlaya and 
Ayotzinapa cases being the most relevant. The development of new theoretical 
mechanisms of accountability, public scrutiny and control over the armed forces is 
essential in order to improve the current conditions that have generated a human 
rights crisis in Mexico since the army was deployed in late 2006. 
The Military Justice Code reform of 20141020 brought a lot of expectations 
regarding future investigations that involved human rights abuses by the military. 
Unfortunately, very few things have changed at a field level and the root of the 
problem seems to have political, institutional and legal origins. In a recent interview, 
current National Defence Secretary General Salvador Cienfuegos stated that the 
armed forces were not going to be subjected to democratic mechanisms of 
accountability by international human rights organisms regarding the Ayotzinapa 
case, as he said:  
I have been standing in the position that the soldiers should not declare; first 
of all, because there is no clear pointing to any involvement in the events. We 
will only give answers to the Mexican ministerial authorities. The covenant that 
the Government of the Republic signed with the Inter-American Commission 
(of Human Rights) does not establish anywhere that they can interrogate us. It 
is not possible; the law does not allow it. It is not clear to me and I cannot 
allow my soldiers –who have not committed any crime until now-, to be 
questioned. What do they want to know, the soldiers’ version? Everything has 
been declared. I cannot allow the soldiers to be treated like criminals.1021 
The interview given by Cienfuegos exemplifies contemporary militarism in 
Mexico. We can infer that the current ideology behind the armed forces is to keep 
secrecy, hierarchical impunity and reluctance to submit to accountability 
mechanisms as part of their culture and values. There is another point to be 
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discussed here: the Secretary mentions his agreement to be investigated by 
domestic authorities, but not by international ones. This behaviour is nothing but 
damaging to the Mexican institutions, as it creates suspicion about the 
professionalism and impartiality of the domestic justice system. When military 
officials confront the justice institutions with double standards, they lose legitimacy. 
 The criticisms on Calderon’s security policy have continued through Peña 
Nieto’s administration because the enforcement strategy has not been reformed, 
and the recent events, especially the Ayotzinapa1022 and Tlatlaya1023 massacres, 
continued to increase the civil-military conflict and generate more impunity to the 
army. The level of polarisation between important segments of Mexican society and 
the government also impacts the way in which civilians interact with the military 
institutions, especially when the later ones are performing domestic security tasks 
on a regular basis. As Greenstone established,1024 differences between society and 
the military in developing democracies tend to have social and political roots; this is 
the case of Mexico, as the Ayotzinapa investigation involves the army in the 
disappearance of students who were political activists. Plus, statements like the 
ones General Cienfuegos has made leave no room for doubts about the 
undemocratic interests of the highest officials, which go beyond issues concerning 
policies and programs. It has been impossible to develop a democratic system of 
civilian control, as the National Defence Secretary keeps being commanded by a 
military in functions. This has prevented the Mexican State from achieving what the 
Council of Europe has defined as “unlimited civilian supremacy over the command 
of the armed forces”.1025 
This research is as relevant as it was when it began in 2011. When the 
general context was explained in the first chapter, it was established that the 
Mexican government has developed its antidrug policy based on a Supply 
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Reduction approach,1026 because the armed forces have been concentrated on 
reducing the amount of drugs in the streets and arresting the kingpins to decrease 
the cartel’s power. This has proven to be an unsuccessful policy, based on the 
number of reports about abuses to the National Commission of Human Rights, and 
the critiques made by international UN officials and the political opposition inside 
Mexico. It can be inferred, judging by the government’s unwillingness to change the 
security policy that the supply reduction operatives will continue indefinitely. With 
this background in mind, the question that gave birth to this project and the 
secondary questions are answered: 
What kind of structures and mechanisms can be developed to solve the 
current crisis regarding civil-military relations in Mexico? 
 This research has provided the theoretical background to suggest new 
institutional and legal models that can be both legislated and introduced as political 
reforms. First, we can establish that the civil-military conflict is a consequence of the 
security policy that the Mexican government developed to fight drug cartels which 
have been defined as organised crime groups.1027 This has created a confrontation 
between the official security forces and the drug cartels which has the 
characteristics of a non-international armed conflict.1028 With these concepts in mind 
a comparative legal study has been developed, taking into consideration the 
Mexican social context and the type of security conflict established in chapters I and 
II. 
The analysis of Mexican militarism and the case studies done in chapter III 
have displayed the legal gaps that exist within the justice system, but they have also 
shown a lack of political will and institutional commitment with the victims and their 
relatives. Military investigators are not trained to handle civilian cases, as their 
relationship with the citizens (the ones who have a direct interest in the case) that 
question them about their relatives who have been victims of human rights abuses 
or the cases themselves is rude, unprofessional and intimidating at best,1029 and 
aggressive or criminal at worst.1030 This behaviour reveals an institution that has 
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been isolated from civil society for decades, which the current security strategy has 
forced them to open their headquarters and files to civilians who are accusing them 
of severe violations.  
There are two points in which this research has provided potential solutions 
for this issue: the first point is related to the jurisdiction. Investigations in which 
fundamental rights are violated need to be investigated and tried by civilian 
institutions. The German example showed that when the armed forces are 
subjected to civilian jurisdictions through the entirety of the case, from the moment 
in which the complaint is received through the whole investigation and prosecution, 
the civilians get access to a more prompt and transparent process of justice. On the 
other hand, special courts showed to be a failure in the Northern Irish experience; at 
a bureaucratic level the Diplock Courts were a waste of budget in their creation, 
taking into account the number of persons that were tried during their existence.1031 
Regarding the respect to human rights, they were the origin of various abuses, as 
the right to a fair trial and the principle of proportionality were violated.1032 In the 
case of the military justice system in Mexico, the prosecutors have gone to the 
extreme of trying facts that constituted crimes like enforced disappearance as 
military discipline administrative sanctions.1033 We can establish that the secrecy 
and isolation of the military investigations and trials are the main cause of impunity, 
so a public criminal justice system like the civilian one is an adequate option for any 
cases in which a military is being suspects of a crime. 
The other main point is the creation of two institutional figures: one that is 
accountable before the federal congress, and another one that works as a civilian 
organism to which the first figure would also be accountable. The creation of this 
first figure can adopt the most important elements of the German Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Armed Forces.1034 This figure, which could be called the 
Federal Congress Commissioner for the Armed Forces, would serve as a linkage 
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between military personnel and the State, but also civil society, as he would also 
work in cooperation with the civilian organism, which would be discussed in the next 
paragraph. The commissioner for the armed forces would also cooperate with the 
President of the Human Rights National Commission in order to discuss complaints 
of human rights abuses where civilians are involved, as currently the president does 
not have any legal attributions regarding the armed forces, and neither does he 
have a close relationship with them.  
This second figure is important due to the social context in Mexico: the 
alarming levels of corruption in the Mexican political class make it essential to give 
powers of vote and recommendations, in any military matter and decision regarding 
the security of the nation, to a civilian staff composed by representatives of all social 
groups and NGOs. This would allow civilian representatives who are not part of the 
political establishment to be in direct contact with the commissioner for the armed 
forces, and take joint decisions with the legislative. The experience in Northern 
Ireland also proved that when a civilian assembly is formed to discuss a security 
issue, they are much more punctual in finding solutions for society as a whole, 
especially when it comes to discussing human rights abuses, as they can gather 
evidence from diverse social groups to analyse and propose recommendations like 
the Northern Irish assembly did.1035 This would generate a closer institutional 
relation between civilians and the armed forces, which would also contribute to have 
a better cooperation with the State powers (executive, legislative and judicial) in all 
the matters regarding the use of the military, both at international and domestic 
levels. 
 In terms of theoretical legal reforms, this research considers that the most 
recent reform of constitutional article 29 has great value in terms of international 
accountability, as one of the principles that guides the reform is publicity, which the 
legislative established as the duty of the State to notify the relevant international 
organisations about the cases that generated the restriction or suspension of rights 
and guarantees, the length of the emergency provisions and the legal provisions 
that will be modified.1036 While this provision opens the door to make the State liable 
in case that this provision is breached, the degree of details about the potential 
emergency regime that the State is required to submit internationally would depend 
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on their political will. For this reason, a federal congress commissioner for the 
armed forces and a civilian staff in charge of monitoring and voting military matters 
are fundamental, as being so close to both the military and the members of the 
legislative would give them access to files and details that would be extremely 
difficult for international organisations to access. This answers the research 
question that addressed the need for institutional reforms that would improve civil-
military relations in Mexico.1037 
 The current deployment of the armed forces inside Mexico also needs to be 
regulated as part of an emergency regime, as they are currently operating in a legal 
loophole. This creates various legal and social issues: there are no legal 
frameworks for making the State and the military commanders accountable for acts 
committed by their personnel, and the legislators have not been able to establish 
limits and guidelines for the use of the army in their current status. If the 
militarization of the security strategy against organised crime becomes part of a set 
of emergency provisions, then the State would be accountable internationally for the 
cases of human rights violations done as consequence of the security operatives, 
especially the cases that involved the murder of civilians or their torture, as 
international courts have established the jus cogens character of their prohibition 
and have also attributed liability to States for not investigating, prosecuting and 
punishing individuals accused of these crimes.1038 The proposed figures of the 
commissioner and the civilian staff would play a relevant role here, as they would be 
in charge of investigating and defending the interests of the parts each one would 
represent. Apart from the establishment of the current military deployment as part of 
an emergency regime, there is another essential reform to make: the development 
of a clear and defined set of constitutional provisions that regulates and serves as a 
guideline for the use of the army in emergency regimes. The existence of clearly 
defined limits and attributions in the German Basic Law strengthens the civil State 
and helps to moderate the natural tensions1039 between certain civilians and the 
army. To end the topic of constitutional provisions for the role of the army in an 
emergency regime, the comparison between the powers of the legislative in 
Germany and Mexico in their powers over the armed forces showed that the 
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command that the Mexican president has over the armed forces in order to 
“preserve internal security”1040 has to be derogated in order to distribute this faculty 
between the legislative and the two figures already discussed: the commissioner 
and the civilian staff. Finally, as Baker has established,1041 the agency theory 
developed by Feaver can be applied successfully in countries with developing 
democracies, as the civil State will always be a counterweight for the armed forces, 
as long as its heads are not a façade of the army.  The first step for achieving a 
stronger mechanism of control must be to name a civilian as the head of the 
National Defence Secretary. This part of the research gives an answer to the 
research’s question that addressed the legitimacy of the military deployment in 
Mexico.1042 
 This research has established the level of dissatisfaction that Mexican 
military personnel have at the moment;1043 the experience in Northern Ireland 
showed that the soldiers find a lot of abandonment and frustration in their daily 
duties when they have the feeling that they are being institutionally isolated from the 
civil State.1044 As the German Innere Führung establishes, the soldier has been 
politicised, not to actively engage in the political system, but to understand tradition 
and evaluate current political events as part of facing Germany’s past.1045 If the 
soldiers in Mexico had a close relationship, not only of control but on their daily-
basis duties, following the agency model of civil-military relations,1046 it would be 
highly beneficial for their understanding of the social background and context of 
their current duties, as they would have a vast understanding of current domestic 
political events. Having a politicised army with strong civilian control and an effective 
independence from political interests increases its relationship and harmony with 
civil society. Currently the Mexican military does not have adequate training that 
would allow a democratic military culture, but neither does it possess any efficient 
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channels to lodge complaints when their own human rights are violated. As the 
IACtHR has established, the Military Justice Code of 2014 did open a legal path for 
civilian jurisdiction to try military personnel when a civilian is involved in a case of 
human rights abuses; but a legal model that would enable soldiers to be tried under 
civilian laws in case that their own human rights are violated, either by other military 
or a civilian, has not been established.1047 It can be concluded that article 57 of the 
Military Justice Code must also include the faculty of civilian jurisdiction for lodging 
complaints, investigating and prosecuting not only cases where the own soldiers’ 
human rights abuses have been violated, but of any case in which a provision 
featured in the federal criminal code is breached. Military prosecutors and courts 
should only be left for the breaching of laws of strict military nature. This would 
strengthen and provide a reliable legal system of accountability for the military, not 
only to protect civilians, but also for the protection of the soldiers’ own rights. This is 
an essential legal reform that would improve the strength of legal accountability for 
the armed forces.1048 
 Regarding the performance of the judicial branch protecting human rights, it 
is important to address that in States that have enforced measures that have 
violated human rights, the judges have fallen into behaviours that have permitted 
the implementation of such policies. This is a problem that appears when the 
judiciary has in its hands the legality of issues that might compromise national 
security, and where the political1049 weight of a situation might be revealed to be 
heavier than the rule of law.1050 This in turn, creates a “relaxed”1051 approach while 
protecting rights. This is in fact a cause of concern when faith is placed in the 
judicial system in a time or emergency, but the reforms that this research proposes 
do not increase the vulnerability of the State, au contraire, they would confer more 
legitimacy to the actions of the government. Stronger enforcement against agents of 
                                                          
1047 Radilla Pacheco, Fernandez Ortega and others, and Rosendo Cantu and other v Mexico 
(Supervision of fulfilment of sentence 17 April 2015) 5 
1048 Which should be the main aspects at both legal and institutional levels that would allow a 
proper accountability system for commands and soldiers in Mexico? 
1049 C Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (George Schwab, tr, Rutgers University Press, 
New Jersey 1976) 
1050 D Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2006) 34 
1051 E A Posner, A Vermeule , Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts 
(Oxford Universit Press, New York 2007) 218 
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the State is not proposed, but the intention is to provide a minimum of access to 
justice to the victims and their relatives. This would reinforce the state of law and 
would grant more legitimacy to the armed forces in their tasks against organised 
crime. National security is not jeopardised by the strengthening of military and 
judicial institutions.  
Even more, there is evidence of judges behaving independently even in the 
face of national security concerns post-9/11 (the Belmarsh case1052 of the US 
Supreme Court approach to Guantanamo Bay1053). These are indicators that the 
judicial system is indeed capable of protecting individual rights in cases that involve 
national security matters. The most important issue for guaranteeing an individual 
justice system is the protection of judges and other judicial personnel, which would 
also ensure the principle of effectiveness in courts.1054 This is a matter that the 
Mexican system also needs to address as soon as possible. A State that 
guarantees healthy independence to its judiciary power, also contributes in 
strengthening fundamental rights for all their citizens, as the courts are for the 
contribution in promoting democracy and creating a better relationship between civil 
society and the State.1055 
The current secondary regulations of the military in Mexico also have 
increased the lack of trust between civil society and military personnel. As this 
research established, using words like “privilege” to describe the moral status of 
being part of the Federal Public Administration1056 does not allow the common 
citizen and the soldier to feel as having the same rights and obligations. This factor 
was also a consequence of the prevailing culture of the federal public servants 
(being elite members) that has been encouraged since the creation of the modern 
                                                          
1052 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 
1053 Boumediene v. Bush 553 US 723 (2008) 
1054 K Lenaerts, “Effective Judicial Protection in the EU” (Assises de la justiceconference 
November 2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-
2013/files/interventions/koenlenarts.pdf> accessed 28 December 2016 
1055 F Abul-Ethem, “The Role of the Judiciary in the Protection of Human Rights and 
Development: A Middle Eastern Perspective” (2002) Fordham International Law Journal 26, 
761, 767, 770 
1056 Code of Conduct for the Public Servants of the Mexican Army and Aerial Force 2008 
(MEX), principle 8 
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Mexican State, as the system allowed the existence of “officer-politicians”.1057 It is 
concluded that the National Defence Secretary position should not be given to an 
active military commander anymore, as the army would benefit from a civilian 
control which would integrate them more with the “mobilised citizens”1058 that would 
form part of the new institutional figures suggested. Both the Federal Congress 
Commissioner for the Armed Forces and the civilian staff would be able to develop 
stronger ties with the armed forces as an institution. Plus, the German comparison 
showed that if the legislative has a stronger control over the army, the executive 
power cannot exercise hierarchical decisions as the current provisions in Mexico, 
where the president can exercise a strong power over the National Defence 
Secretary. As long as the line between being active in the military and engaging in 
political duties is not clearly limited, the military personnel will have a sense of 
superiority among society. It is urgent for militarism in Mexico to go through a deep 
process of reforms that would confer the armed forces the same status as a civilian. 
This is where the “citizen in uniform” concept and the Innere Führung code fit into 
the picture; chapter 2 paragraphs 201 establishes as its principal goal to “ease the 
tensions arising from the rights and liberties of the citizen on the one hand and 
military duty on the other”.1059 It can be seen that the German code has as its main 
objective the creation of a relationship based on the understanding and mutual 
cooperation between the civilians and the soldiers, everything under the assumption 
that both have the same rights and obligations.  
Another of the main legal figures that are incompatible with contemporary 
human rights standards is arraigo.  The act of detaining a person for a large number 
of days proved to be a failure in Northern Ireland when internment was introduced. 
Arraigo was reformed in 2008, and in just two years there were already 
approximately 120 complaints of abuse from the authorities regarding the use of 
such figure. This figure must be derogated and the federal investigators should 
continue using the established limits for the number of hours of arrest that are 
stated in the constitution (48 hours to determine if the suspect’s investigation should 
be sent to a judge in order to try him, or if he should be set free). It is safe to 
establish that the Mexican military and federal criminal legislation is still not 
                                                          
1057 AG Lopez Montiel (n 434) 
1058 MV Tushnet (n 311) 
1059 Innere Führung (n 544) [201] 
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satisfactorily harmonised with contemporary international standards, answering one 
of this research’s questions.1060 
 Regarding the use of force, the question of the possibility of the military 
commanders to be subjected to an investigation for the possible commission of 
Crimes against Humanity should be addressed. The existence of elements that 
could lead to an investigation are certainly present, as the former Defence Secretary 
Guillermo Galvan Galvan officially declared that the fatalities of innocents were 
“collateral damage” resulting from the clash between the armed forces and the drug 
cartels.1061 This would imply that the official strategy does not have civilians as its 
main target, but the strategy nonetheless is completely aware of the deaths of 
innocents as a side-consequence. Recently, the current federal administration has 
been the object of controversy for the recent massacres in which armed personnel 
are allegedly involved. In the Tlatlaya events, the official orders to the soldiers did 
specify performing direct attacks on suspects as part of a strategy.1062 It can be 
argument that this policy targets civilians as part of an official strategy; a 
circumstance that would constitute a crime against humanity. Therefore, the 
International Humanitarian Law mechanisms of investigations must attract this case, 
and enquire about other possible troop divisions in which similar kinds of order 
could have been given. The Northern Irish experience was the subject of essential 
judgements which established the severe violations committed as collateral damage 
of the emergency provisions. Finally, the need for International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) to intervene in the Mexican conflict is another fundamental point of this 
research. As Lawland established,1063 there are two requirements for the 
intervention of IHL in a domestic conflict, which the situation in Mexico fulfils. It can 
be established that the lack of a proper system of accountability for the armed 
forces came from allowing their indefinite deployment without making this policy a 
part of a proper state of emergency.  
                                                          
1060 Is the current military Mexican legislation on par with contemporary international human 
rights legal frameworks and international humanitarian law standards? 
1061 V. Ballinas, “Deaths of civilans in combat against crime, “collateral damages”” La 
Jornada (Mexico City 13 April 2010) 
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/04/13/politica/005n1pol> accessed 15 February 2014 
1062 Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights Centre (n 993) 20 
1063 “Internal conflicts or other situation of violence – what is the difference for victims?” 
(ICRC Resource Centre October) 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2012/12-10-niac-non-international-
armed-conflict.htm> accessed 2 July 2013 
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What is the original contribution and impact of this research?  
 The negative consequences of current civil-military relations in Mexico have 
been constantly neglected by the State. A large percentage of the Mexican 
population still agrees the current deployment of the army1064 and is unaware of the 
high number of reports about human rights abuses at their hands. The left-wing 
opposition parties have established these facts in the past,1065 and have also 
identified the main flaws of the army, but no studies or comparisons with societies 
that have had similar conflicts in the past have been developed before this project. 
Current president Peña Nieto has not made any reforms in the strategy that 
Calderon started, so it seems that the current political establishment has no will to 
develop a legal study like the one this research has produced across its chapters, 
which has its central point in the institutional comparison with Germany and the 
legal comparison with Northern Ireland. Both comparisons had satisfactory 
outcomes, which provided an answer to the research question1066 that enquired the 
election of Germany and Northern Ireland as subjects of comparison. 
 The importance of this comparison resides in the fact that no similar study 
has been done before in order to compare the Mexican current issue in a context 
upon similar conflicts -regarding the State and non-State actors in a domestic 
conflict-. The impact of this study can reach beyond the academic level and have an 
impact in potential reforms through the federal congress, as the theoretical ground 
for the development of new institutions and legal changes is set in these pages.  
Regarding the research methodology used for the legal and institutional 
comparisons, Refined Positivism, as defined by Zirk-Sadowski and Van Hoecke, 
allowed to take into account elements such as the social context of the different 
countries studied when comparing legal frameworks and institutions.1067 By its part, 
using Zweigert and Kötz’s microcomparison allowed the comparison of certain parts 
                                                          
1064 “National Survey on Victimization and Perception of Public Safety (ENVIPE) 2015” 
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of a legal system without comparing the systems as a whole, selecting the relevant 
elements to the conflict that gave birth to this research.1068 Locating the functionality, 
as defined by Hofstede, of the concepts analysed allowed identifying the parts that 
would have a coherent application in Mexico; which proves that the development of 
the comparison in this research constitutes a type of study that has not been applied 
before to the civil-militaries conflict in this Latin American country. While it might 
seem that an armed conflict cannot be compared with others with a different cultural 
background and geopolitical location, a methodology which takes the social context 
into account has been adequate to fulfil this study. One of the main aims of this 
research is to establish that Mexico’s conflict can indeed be compared with similar 
events, even if the political and social context is different, because as it has been 
established previously, key methodology has been selected for this goal. The 
suggestions that arose from the comparison are functional and applicable in the 
Mexican legal and institutional systems. All the points established in these 
conclusions provide an answer to the question that gave birth to this research: What 
kind of structures and mechanisms can be developed to solve the current crisis 
regarding civil-military relations in Mexico? 
Finally, we can conclude by stating that a severe crisis is also an opportunity 
to create deep reforms which can have qualitative changes in the legal and political 
life of a society living amid turmoil. The consequences of the civil-military crisis that 
Mexico is suffering at the moment should be used as the platform for a 
constitutional and political renovation concerning the military culture of the Aztec 
nation. The victims deserve proper access to justice and the armed forces must 
dignify their profession through democratic mechanisms; once the first steps are 
done, a harmonic relation will provide the necessary strength and the ethical stand 
to face the common enemies: organised crime and political corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1068 M. Van Hoecke (n 28) 167 
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